On the Theological Origins and Character of Secular International Politics

Towards Post-Secular Dialogue

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Summary

At the turn of the 21st century, the global resurgence of religion is posing a direct challenge to a Westphalian international system which upholds secular politics as the most peaceful, stable, and universal foundation for international relations. The aim of this thesis is thus to interrogate the secular dimension of the contemporary political foundation as well as the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR's historical foresight so that international dialogue may be facilitated. Through the reconsideration of the secularisation process, I demonstrate that the Westphalian secular order emerged through the usurpation, translation, and appropriation of important religious resources found within Christianity. Far from being universal or neutral, the current foundation of international politics has theological origins and a religious character to which it is oblivious. In turn, this implies that secularism's overconfidence in its own neutrality and objectivity may be a threat to the preservation of peace and security. In the name of value pluralism, IR must distance itself from its secularist history. Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the way IR relates to religion with a view to strengthening political independence and international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts. If IR is to facilitate genuine global cooperation, it must reconsider its secular foundation and exchange it for a post-secular project in which secularism and religion are considered on an equal footing. In the interest of peace and security pluralism should rethink its assumptions concerning the inevitability of secularisation and exchange its secularism for the establishment of a 'post-secular' dialogue with religion.

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It has been reserved…for our epoch to vindicate…the human ownership of treasures formerly squandered on heaven; but what age will have the strength to validate this right in practice and make itself their possessor?

Georg Hegel

What is divine escapes men's notice because of their incredulity.

Heraclitus

Neither give heed to fables and endless genealogies, which minister questions, rather than godly edifying which is in faith: *so do.*

Timothy I:4

1. Introduction

> The world today…is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever
>
> *Peter Berger*

Against all predictions, the late 20th century witnessed a worldwide resurgence of the religious factor on the international stage with profound consequences for the conduct of international politics.[1] Starting in the late 19th century with the rise of Protestant fundamentalism in the United States and taking a completely unexpected turn with the ousting of the US-backed government of the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, this revival came as a great surprise to most scholars. At the turn of the 21st century, the importance of the phenomenon as well as its global and radical dimensions found their most terrifying expression in the 9/11 attacks.[2] The fact that a religious movement could defy not only local governments, but also the world's only superpower on its own territory posed a major challenge to the West's secular vision of the international order.

This return of religion is most paradoxical as it flies in the face of a world that prides itself with its modernity and secularism. The paradox is twofold. First, this global revival came as a shock because of the widespread acceptance of the secularisation and modernisation theses. In all sub-disciplines of the Social Sciences, the demise of religion had been foretold and the advent of a modern and rational

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[1] Jeffrey Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," in *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered*, ed. Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson D. Shupe (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p.22. Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Scott Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[2] Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (London: University of California Press, 1998), p.20, 32. Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*; Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson D. Shupe, *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered* (New York: Paragon House, 1989); Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994).

society was believed to be well under way. In such a context, the return of religion from exile could not have been predicted.[3]

And second, the revival of religion directly challenges the common wisdom according to which secular politics is uniquely able to provide a peaceful, stable, and universal foundation for national and international relations. In Europe, the horror of the Wars of Religion convinced many that religion, and more specifically Christianity, had to be excluded from the conduct of politics and that the secularisation of politics was the sole solution to avoid the barbarism and cruelty of religious warfare.[4] Up to this day, this normative assumption has remained foundational to International Relations (IR) and in *The Global Covenant*, Robert Jackson still defends his pluralist version of secular politics as

> the one political-legal framework that can transcend all the manifold differences between the countries of the world, can accommodate their various belief systems and domestic ways of life, and can serve as a normative basis for their coexistence and co-operation.[5]

Jackson's statement is of great significance to the extent that it is an explicit, emblematic, and most representative outline of the secularist tenets that are taken for granted in the field of IR. However, with the return of religion, a growing number of voices are denouncing the limits or invalidity of secular politics. And in opposition to IR's assumption, they denounce secularism as a cultural achievement rooted in Christianity and its imposition on the non-Western world as "an explicitly religious action as narrowly sectarian as anything attempted by its nonsecular opponents."[6]

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[3] Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

[4] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*

[5] Robert H. Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.366. It is an inherently secular project founded on a set of pluralist assumptions that have their roots in the Westphalian attempt to prevent conflicts over religion. "The historical project of the global covenant…is to forestall hostilities and collisions between different political groups over issues of values. The *societas* of states is arranged in such a way as to reduce unnecessary political confrontation based on value conflict…Religious values have been assigned to that category since 1648. Westphalia represents the taming and domestication of religion…Political religion and political ideology…have no place in international society…That would thus exclude from international relations the Western political ideology of democracy…the Muslim religious belief system of *jihad* …communism or fascism or imperialism, as well as any other religious or political belief system that repudiates the *societas* of states." p.182.

[6] Douglas Johnston, "Religion and Culture: Human Dimensions of Globalization," in *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, ed. Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), p.669. Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.116. Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Knowing that "the global resurgence of religion confronts IR theory with a theoretical challenge comparable to that raised by the end of the Cold War or the emergence of globalization," it is important and urgent to deal with these two paradoxes.[7] On the one hand, it is essential to reassess the secular and modernist dogmas that are inscribed "in the genetic code of the discipline" so that IR may emancipate itself from its 'own theoretical captivities.'[8] And on the other, it is necessary to question the validity of secularism's claims to universalism, stability, and superiority so that we may achieve genuine global coexistence or cooperation.[9]

The aim of this thesis is thus to interrogate the contemporary secular foundation of international politics and the avowed secularism of the field.[10] It is about reconsidering, in light of the return of religion, the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR's historical foresight so that international dialogue may be facilitated. To paraphrase Stephen Toulmin, it is about "reconstructing an account of the circumstances in which [secular politics] was conceived, the philosophical, scientific, social, and historical assumptions on which it rested, and the subsequent sequence of episodes that has led to our present quandary" so that more adequate 'horizons of expectations' may be developed.[11] Such a reconstruction has the potential to fundamentally transform, not only IR theory, but also the very foundation of secular politics.[12]

This project of reconstruction is undertaken by answering the following two questions: (1) What has been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the 21st century? Answering the first question will help us to tackle the first paradox and will allow us to assess whether the type of secularism adopted within the field of International Politics is truly universal or is essentially Christian and Eurocentric in nature. We will look at the origins of secularisation as well as the ideas, beliefs, and

[7] Petito and Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations*, p.3.
[8] Ibid., p.1, 3.
[9] Jürgen Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Oxford: Polity, 2003), p.103.
[10] The term 'foundation' refers to the principles and norms that frame and inform interaction at the international level. The different elements of this foundation are discussed in chapter three. The term 'international politics' neither refers to the concrete affairs of international politics nor to the theoretical discussions of the field of IR. Rather, it corresponds to those intellectual assumptions taken for granted by a socio-cultural group at a certain period in time and that influence both these theoretical reflections and practical implementations.
[11] Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p.3.
[12] Petito and Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations*, p.3.

assumptions that have lain at the foundation of the secular project. The answer to the second question will help us to appreciate the characteristics required by any foundation of politics to tackle the current resurgence of religion. Besides, it will help us to sketch an alternative to IR's secularism.

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The field of International Relations has only recently awakened to the importance of the religious resurgence. In the wake of 9/11, "[d]espite Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* and Juergensmeyer's *The New Cold War*, the discipline of international relations was not ready for the inclusion of the religious variable into the contending paradigms."[13] And it is only afterwards that scholars began to address the burning issue in a sustained manner. But almost a decade later, the field still has to develop the theoretical resources necessary to an in-depth understanding of religion.[14] Thus, in order to answer the questions raised above, it is necessary to draw on the academic discipline most concerned with the study of secularisation, namely, the Social Sciences. Despite the 'frontier police' patrolling the borders between scholarly disciplines, the interdisciplinary nature of my project is justified by the inability of the field of IR to deal, on its own, with religion in all its dimensions.[15]

In the last two decades, the field of Sociology has been home to a lively debate concerning the validity of the modernisation and secularisation theses. Effectively, the return of religion in the late 20th century has led many sociologists to reassess long-

[13] Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, p.1.
[14] Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," *World Politics* 60, no. January (2008).
[15] Peter Burke, *What Is Cultural History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p.11. It is extremely difficult to define the term 'religion' without including or excluding too much. The term has been defined in substantive and functional terms. Substantive definitions are concerned with the essence and the content of religion (belief in God, Scriptures, etc.) Functionalists define the term according to the functions it performs in a society (social cement, morality, etc.). I do not intend to enter this debate in this thesis. Instead, I use the term as defined by Scott Appleby: "Religion is the human response to a reality perceived as sacred…religion, as interpreter of the sacred, discloses and celebrates the transcendent source and significance of human existence…religion embraces a creed, a cult, a code of conduct, and a confessional community…Thus religion constitutes an integral culture, capable of forming personal and social identity and influencing subsequent experience and behaviour in profound ways." R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp.8-9. Of course, this definition has its drawbacks and may seem overly euro-centric. Nevertheless, it remains adequate to carry out the task set in this thesis. The meaning of the term 'religion' has evolved over centuries, adding even more confusion to an already complex subject. Scott Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Society," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): pp.820-21.

held assumptions and well-established dogmas inherited from the Enlightenment. As a result of this process, many scholars reached the conclusion "that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken."[16] Once a systematic theory, secularisation revealed to be "a hodgepodge of loosely employed ideas" that neither fitted the data nor the historical record.[17] Accordingly, sociologists redefined secularisation and dispelled the many myths that surrounded the issue of the future of religion.

Thus, the second chapter of this thesis – the introduction being the first chapter – attempts to differentiate those dimensions of secularisation theory that are 'essentially mistaken' from those that provide an adequate account of the process. Because the 'mistaken' body of literature has been implicitly taken for granted and uncritically accepted in International Relations, I will channel a more up-to-date reading of the process from Sociology back to IR. I conclude that secularisation corresponded to a long-term and systemic process of cultural change that resulted in a shift in sources of legitimacy and forms of authority across Europe.

The study of this civilisational process is a very large endeavour, the undertaking of which is fraught with difficulties. As Kenneth Waltz argues in *Theory of International Politics,* "[i]n reality, everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others."[18] Likewise, Ernest Gellner notes that reality is so 'rich and diverse' that any unselective description of the changes that took place in Europe and the Western world over the last few centuries could not "even be begun, let alone completed."[19] In such circumstances, Gellner advises that "one chooses the crucial and elementary factors operative in human history, selected to the best of one's judgement, and then works out their joint implications."[20] Thus, the third chapter is devoted to this process of selection through the development of an appropriate theoretical framework and adequate analytical tools.

In the first part of the chapter, I look at three complementary ways of studying the socio-cultural processes of change that led to the secularisation of Europe. I begin with Max Weber's study of rationalisation and I then move on to Benjamin Nelson's

[16] Peter L. Berger, *The Desecularization of the World* (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), p.2.
[17] Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," p.13.
[18] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p.8.
[19] Ernest Gellner, *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History* (London: Collins Harvill, 1988), p.13.
[20] Ibid.

notion of structures of consciousness and Charles Taylor's concept of moral sources. In the second part of the chapter, I look at the different approaches developed in the field of IR to address the impact of these civilisational processes on international orders. I connect these systemic changes to transformations in forms of legitimacy and authority at the international level. In this chapter, Sociology merges with International Politics and I demonstrate that the work of Christian Reus-Smit, Ian Clark, and Daniel Philpott are central to the study of the secularisation process. Because my project attempts to understand the nature and workings of fundamental cultural structures and systemic processes of change, the perspective taken is that of Historical Sociology.[21] It is only once the theoretical framework is outlined that I begin to address the secularisation of international politics *per se* and that I tackle the issue of the adequacy of the contemporary foundation of international politics.

In chapters four, five, and six, I explore the formation of the secular foundation of international politics from the Middle Ages until the American and French Revolutions. I look at the secularising influence of the structures of consciousness, moral sources, and principles of legitimacy that emerged during Europe's decisive periods of spiritual turmoil and socio-cultural crises. I devote particular attention to the 'seminal ages' of the 12th century Renaissance, of the Protestant Reformation, and of the Enlightenment as well as to the role played by important cultural intermediaries in the development, organisation, and transmission of more secular cultural rationales.[22]

The 'Eurocentric' character of these chapters is not methodological but results from the importance of Europe in the shaping of the contemporary secular foundation of international politics. This focus on Europe is justified for two reasons. First of all, as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson argue, the creation of the contemporary international society resulted from "Europe's impact on the rest of the world over the last five centuries."[23] In *The Expansion of International Society*, the two scholars

[21] Stephen Hobden argues that historical sociology "is distinct from 'traditional' Sociology because of its prime concern with change and historical context. It is distinct from 'traditional' History because of its concern with social structures rather than recounting the stories of individuals and describing events." Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.3. As such, my project is historical but does not correspond to a history of Europe's changes over the last centuries.

[22] Geoffrey Barraclough, *History in a Changing World* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), p.12. This notion of cultural intermediaries is further developed in chapter two.

[23] Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon,1984), p.1.

demonstrate that the international system of states that emerged in early modern time "was exclusively European until the time of the American Revolution and remained predominantly so until the Second World War."[24] In a similar fashion, Daniel Philpott justifies his focus on the West because its "history tells of the changes that brought the globe to its present condition…It is the origins of our order in which I am interested."[25]

Secondly, in *Formations of the Secular*, Talal Asad argues that West European history "has had profound consequences for the ways that the doctrine of secularism has been conceived and implemented in the rest of the modernizing world."[26] According to him, it is thus legitimate to draw one's material almost entirely from Europe's history. Overall, the development of the secular foundation of international politics essentially arose as a result of the West's supremacy in 'the management of the world system.'[27] Therefore, in light of the above, I believe that the Eurocentric character of this thesis is justified by the importance of Europe in the development of the current secular international order.

Amongst the many themes touched upon in these three chapters, an important thread that runs through all of them is that secularisation was characterised by the 'transfer' of religious power, property, and functions from within the Church to secular elites. In fact, far from developing as an independent, universal, and objective sphere distinct from religion, as is commonly believed, the 'secular' was carved out and emerged from the sacred core of Christianity. Thus, through the study of the changes in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy, I trace this development that questions and contradicts secularism's self-proclaimed neutrality, superiority, and objectivity. This process took place in three successive steps.

The first step was the theological legitimisation of the 'secular' through a slow process of doctrinal rationalisation. With the separation of the realm of the

[24] Ibid. The European roots of the current states-system have been acknowledged by countless scholars. In particular, this view has been developed and upheld by proponents of the English School. Martin Wight, *Systems of States* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), pp.118-19.
[25] Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.29.
[26] Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p.25.
[27] Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof, "Rethinking Religion," in *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History*, ed. Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p.13.

natural from the supernatural, the secular gained autonomy while retaining its sacred character and its role in God's plan. Building on Greek philosophy, but also on Europe's Roman heritage, kings and princes began to claim access to the power and resources of their divinely-ordained counterparts. With the Protestant Reformation, their demands were accepted and secular rulers were finally granted divine legitimacy by Christian prelates. These processes of appropriation and usurpation were direct consequences of the theological legitimisation of the secular (Chapter 4).[28]

Second, building on the newly-consecrated realm of the natural, secular polities were modelled on the Church and theological dogmas were slowly translated into secular terms to constitute political theories.[29] For example, the doctrine of the king's two bodies was developed as a secular image of the Chalcedonian creed of Christ's two natures.[30] After having usurped the Church's 'halo of sanctity,' the state excommunicated it and took its place. Religion was redefined and emasculated to give the secular sphere unquestionable supremacy in all spheres of life. In this regard, the case of Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy is most telling and largely representative of the secularisation process that was unfolding at the time. The creation of a Leviathan as a secular replica of the papal Juggernaut provides a perfect illustration of the case in point (Chapter 5).[31] As Eric Voeglin argued, Hobbes took the decisive step of decapitating God "as the ultimate condition and the origin of its own existence" and replacing him with the state.[32]

Third, once religion had lost its sanctity and authority, philosophers began to sacralise the world on immanent and secular grounds. From the 17th century till the Enlightenment, a new secular eschatology was applied to the material world. Through the use of reason and the experimental method, justification could be attained, redemption achieved, and heaven created in this world (Chapter 6). Under the aegis of civilisation, mankind would emancipate itself from the bonds of nature and establish peace and security here on earth. Ultimately, these processes of usurpation, modelling,

[28] Roger Mehl, *The Sociology of Protestantism* (London: SCM Press, 1970), p.61. In this context, the word usurpation is defined as "The action of taking into use or making use of a thing; acceptance or agreement in the use of anything; usage, employment." In the Oxford English Dictionary Online Edition s.v. 'usurpation.'
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
[31] Michael Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages: The Papal Monarchy with Augustinus Triumphus and the Publicists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
[32] Eric Voegelin, *Modernity without Restraint, the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin ; V. 5*, ed. Manfred Henningsen (London: University of Missouri Press, 2000), pp.28-29, 64.

translation, and secular sacralisation turned the emerging secularism into a "theological discourse in its own right."[33] And today, the contemporary secular political foundation remains very much influenced by these eschatological hopes inherited from the Middle Ages.

During the 20th century, the crisis of modernity and the rejection of the Western colonial order marked a major shift in legitimacy and opened up a space for the reconsideration of the secularisation process. Marking a 'climacteric' comparable to that of the Enlightenment, the last century was characterised by growing disillusionment with secularism and by the return of the old gods whose death had been all too quickly proclaimed. The de-secularisation process that seems to be under way, though limited in its scope, ultimately calls forth the reconsideration of the form of secularism accepted in International Relations (Chapter 7).

In such a context, because of the theological roots and characteristics of contemporary politics and because of the renewed influence of religion in world politics, the secular foundation of international relations cannot be sustained in its present form. Since secularism is neither objective nor neutral but a source of conflicts and tensions, its remaining presence at the heart of the pluralist order is no longer warranted in the 21st century. In any case, secularism is not fundamental to the pluralist architecture. Instead, if International Politics is to account for the continued existence of religion within modernity, it must exchange its secularism for a 'post-secular' horizon of expectation (Chapter 8). Indeed, the preservation and defence of the *status quo* is no longer justifiable since it unduly restricts dialogue to the confines of the secular and thus erects a major obstacle to genuine coexistence and international independence. For the sake of pluralism, International Relations must reconsider its secularism and open itself to a post-secular dialogue with religion.

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Many ideas that inform this thesis are well-known and have been established in the Social Sciences and Humanities for decades. The originality of the argument developed lies in the organisation of the different ideas, in the connections drawn between them across academic boundaries, and in their extension to deal with the situation of the early 21st century. Ultimately, the contribution of this thesis to current

[33] Elizabeth Hurd, S., "The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 2 (2004): p.236.

debates is threefold. First, by working within an interdisciplinary perspective, I expand the boundaries of the field of International Politics and offer a picture of the current trends and events that is not constrained by secularist, state-centric, and positivist biases. This interdisciplinary approach also encourages reflexivity in the field since Historical Sociology acts as a mirror in which International Politics can see its own limits and blind spots. Besides, such an approach is better adapted to the socio-cultural changes that are taking place globally.[34]

As Barry Buzan and Richard Little have demonstrated, International Relations has failed as an intellectual project because of its acceptance of the 'Westphalian straightjacket.'[35] Sectoral narrowness, a-historicism, and theoretical fragmentation are the sources of this underachievement and could be rectified by returning to a grand theoretical vision. And as a matter of fact the tradition of Historical Sociology, like World History, is most suitable to the task since it provides a thicker and more holistic historical framework.[36] By drawing on Historical Sociology, this thesis strips International Relations of its Westphalian straightjacket and, reinstates it in "its proper role as a meta-discipline."[37] In particular, by rejecting the 'presentism,' 'chronofetishism,' and 'tempocentrism' associated with IR, Historical Sociology

[34] Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), p.246. "If the present period suggests accelerated economic and technological change and with it discontinuity of experience, search for roots, recovery of identities lost or submerged, and emergence of new consciousness, then it is reasonable to assume that established models of interpretation will be less than fully adequate." See also Michael Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 4, no. 1 (1991): pp.65-67. Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

[35] Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 1 (2001): p.24. It is interesting to note that Buzan's handling of religion does not get him out of the straightjacket. Barry Buzan, "Culture and International Society," *International Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2010): 1-25.

[36] Theda Skocpol defined Historical Sociology as a "tradition of research devoted to understanding the character and effects of large-scale structures and fundamental processes of change." Theda Skocpol, *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.4. It corresponds to a variety of attempts to combine the disciplines of History and Sociology so as "to investigate the mutual interpenetration of past and present, events and processes, acting and structuration." Dennis Smith, *The Rise of Historical Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p.3. In particular, Historical Sociology rescues the "time dimension of social life [and] the historicity of social structures" from the a-historicism of International Relations. p.3. The tradition rejects the idea that History and Sociology are incommensurable. Philip Abrams, *Historical Sociology* (Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1982), p.335.

[37] Buzan and Little, "Why International Relations Has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It," p.38.

reintroduces a sense of historicity and reveals the unique historical origins and constitutive features of the present order.[38]

Second, by developing an alternative account of the nature of secularism, I provide a thorough critique of the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR's approach to the resurgence of religion. By questioning one of the field's most fundamental assumptions, secularism, I open the door to the development of a better understanding of the challenge posed by the religious revival and of its potential implications for the conduct of politics in the 21st century. I broaden the field of possibilities for inter-civilisational encounters to include non-secularist alternatives. Far from being the only way to accommodate religion within modern societies, secularism should give way to a 'post-secular' worldview. Secular politics should transcend its aversion towards religion and acknowledge the latter's wisdom and resources. Ultimately, religion has the potential to contribute powerfully to international relations and its dismissal is no longer justified.

Finally, by highlighting the theological nature of secular politics, this thesis is an expression of the growing awareness of the sacred that characterises the current resurgence of religion.[39] This thesis is part of the contemporary trend that attempts more or less consciously, after centuries of rationalisation, to re-enchant modernity and to restore wonder to the world. Over the last millennium, reality has increasingly been depicted in rational, mechanistic, and materialist ways. But in the 20th century, the theological nature of this very worldview has been recovered, thereby reinstating context, meaning, and substance to a process that was thought to have none. Accordingly, the disenchanted world of modernity is now being questioned and a

[38] John M. Hobson, "What's at Stake in 'Bringing Historical Sociology *Back* into International Relations'? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2002). Chronofetishism is "the assumption that the present can adequately be explained only by examining the present." The present is 'sealed off' from the past and is depicted as natural and immutable. In turn, tempocentrism refers to this extrapolation of the present order backward in time. pp.6-7, 12.

[39] Some scholars have argued that the so-called resurgence of religion only corresponds to an increased awareness of the role of religion in international affairs by Western scholars, policy-makers, and journalists. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Nicholas Rengger, "Apocalypse Now? Continuities or Disjunctions in World Politics after 9/11," *International Affairs* 82, no. 3 (2006): p.544. Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion and International Relations in the 21st Century: Conflict or Co-Operation?," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (2006): p.539. However, I believe that this greater awareness is itself the result of broader socio-cultural transformations and is only one part of the return of religion – though the part that might be most noticeable in European countries.

space is opening up for its re-enchantment and the recovery of the lost 'sensory receptivity to the marvellous.' [40]

Some scholars have implicitly worked towards the re-enchantment of modernity by recovering its 'religious' character. For example, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Michael Gillespie, and Stephen Toulmin have reinterpreted the advent of secular modernity as the development of a more or less theological project.[41] Such a reading of history is markedly different from the one that was commonly accepted until the late 20th century. Also, some authors have explicitly called for the re-enchantment of the world on the ground that its disenchantment was a flawed political project that was bound to fail. Thus, William Cavanaugh, Jane Bennett, David Griffin, and John Milbank have developed powerful arguments in favour of both theological and materialist forms of re-enchantment.[42]

By reconstructing an account of the emergence of secular politics, this thesis retrieves secularism's hidden theology. But more importantly, by highlighting the limits of secularism and by calling forth the development of a post-secular perspective on the world, this thesis challenges the limits imposed by secular presuppositions and summons up the re-enchantment of the world. Effectively, the partiality of secularism fundamentally questions the historical exclusion of religion from the conduct of politics. While, religion had historically been barred from international relations in the name of order and political independence, the theological roots and character of secularism mean that its remaining exclusion in a religiously and culturally diverse world is no longer warranted. It is in such a context that the establishment of a deeper and post-secular form of pluralism transcends the narrow confines of the secular and opens up a greater space for genuine coexistence, international independence, and religious expression.

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[40] Jane Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings and Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.4. Morris Berman, *The Reenchantment of the World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).

[41] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*.

[42] William T. Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination: Discovering the Liturgy as a Political Act in an Age of Global Consumerism* (London: T&T Clark, 2002). Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life*. David Ray Griffin, *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (London: Routledge, 1998).

2. *Defining Secularisation*

In the 20th century, religion's return from exile was met with great surprise because of the widely-shared belief in the weakening of the influence of religion on politics and in its eventual disappearance from the public and private domains. Whether in the field of International Politics or in the Political Sciences, the work of the Founding Fathers of Sociology had influenced academia in profound ways. Expressing the common wisdom of his time, the once president of the American Anthropological Association Anthony Wallace firmly declared in 1966 that in modern societies, "the evolutionary future of religion is extinction."[43]

This great discrepancy between the predictions of classical sociologists and the reality of the late 20th century led many to question traditional accounts of the process of secularisation. The secularisation thesis began to be decried and denounced as an ideological and doctrinal project with little scientific moorings, i.e., a religion.[44] Because of its roots in a utopian metaphysics, David Martin concluded that "secularization is less a scientific concept than a tool of counter-religious ideologies."[45] As a result, scholars began a process of selection and separation of the mistaken facets of the process from those that fit the historical record and that could account for current trends and events.

In this chapter, my aim is to provide a broad overview of the late-20th century debate in the Social Sciences concerning secularisation and to redefine the process in light of the current comeback of religious fervour. In the first part, I define the terms 'secular' and 'secularisation' and I outline the common wisdom concerning religion and its likely future. I argue that the widely believed predictions of the disappearance of religion emerged from the modernist mood of Enlightenment philosophers and are

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[43] Wallace quoted in Anson D. Shupe, "The Stubborn Persistence of Religion in the Global Arena," in *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, ed. Emile F. Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.17.

[44] Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," p.4. William H. Swatos, "Losing Faith in The "Religion" Of Secularization: Worldwide Religious Resurgence and the Definition of Religion.," in *Religious Politics in Global and Comparative Perspective*, ed. William H. Swatos, *Contributions in Sociology ; No.81*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1989).

[45] David Martin, *The Religious and the Secular: Studies in Secularization* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p.9, 35.

based on a set of unfounded assumptions. Then, I explain how this common wisdom influenced students of International Politics by showing that most, if not all, traditions endorse secularist prejudices that exclude religion from international relations.

In the second part of this chapter, I focus on the development of the secularisation thesis in the Social Sciences. The aim is to give a brief overview of the different approaches developed in the field and to explain how they slowly evolved and came to form a relatively well-integrated theoretical view. First, I look at the classical accounts of the secularisation thesis developed by Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Then, I look at the development of neo-secularisation as an attempt to rescue the thesis from its detractors. Finally, I bring back the insights of neo-secularisation into the field of IR and I show the limits of the approach to religion and secularisation traditionally accepted in the field. I argue that mirroring the anti-clerical prejudices that informed the thinking of Enlightenment philosophers, IR is founded on 'Westphalian presumptions' that are equally biased.[46] I finally conclude the chapter by redefining secularisation in line with the historical record.

[46] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*.

A. The Common Wisdom: the End of Religion

1) 'Secular' and 'Secularisation' Defined

The term 'secular' comes from the Latin *saeculum*, which referred, in the Bible, either to a great span of time or to the nature of the human condition after the Fall, i.e., 'this world.'[47] The term remained virtually unused until the late 13th century when it came to lose its negative undertone and acquired a more neutral connotation to refer to that which belongs to 'the world' as distinguished from the Church (first entry in the *Oxford English Dictionary* in 1290). In particular, it was used to differentiate the members of the clergy living in 'this world' (i.e., secular clergy) from those living in monastic seclusion (i.e., the religious clergy). Interestingly enough, the term 'secular' was understood as being a realm integral to religion and the Christian cosmology.[48]

The term 'secularisation' spread soon after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 to denote the – often forced – removal of territory and property from the control of the Church.[49] The process referred to the "passage, transfer, or relocation of persons, things, function, meanings, and so forth, from their traditional location in the religious sphere to the secular spheres."[50] In the heated atmosphere of the Wars of Religion through to the Enlightenment, the term became charged with normative connotations and came to be associated with godlessness and the profane.

In the 18th century, the term secularisation came to refer, within liberal circles, to the rejection of clerical guidance and to the refusal to submit one's judgment to erroneous superstitions. The historical process of secularisation came to be equated with a radical political project pushing for the privatisation if not the eradication of religion, namely, secularism. Finally, during the 20th century, in light of the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the definitions of the process of 'secularisation' and

[47] Larry Shiner, "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6, no. 2 (1967): p.208.
[48] Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, p.192.
[49] It is interesting to note that the terms 'secular' and 'religion' changed radically following the Reformation and the Wars of Religion. Attila K. Molnar, "The Construction of the Notion of Religion in Early Modern Europe," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 14(2002).
[50] Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.13.

because of the conflation of secularisation and secularism, some scholars suggested that the term be dropped altogether.

The large number of scholarly work on the process of secularisation and the great diversity of approaches running from the Enlightenment up to the 21st century make an exhaustive study of the process unworkable if not impossible. As such, this thesis being a contribution to the field of International Relations, my take on the secularisation of Europe will be limited to the most important approaches to the subject and will not be guided by the current research agenda of sociologists of religion.

Broadly speaking, four successive moments or waves in the development of the secularisation thesis can be distinguished. The first wave corresponds to the strong versions of secularisation developed by 18th century thinkers such as Voltaire and David Hume. The anti-religious, anticlerical, and secularist assumptions that characterised their versions of the process have long been dismissed by sociologists of religion. Yet, they remain implicitly accepted by scholars in the field of IR.[51] The second wave corresponds to the work of the classical sociologists (Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, etc). While their take on the subject is far more balanced than that of their forefathers, the much criticised Enlightenment and modernist assumptions remain deeply anchored. The third wave of interest in the secularisation thesis saw scholars such as Peter Berger, Steve Bruce, Bryan Wilson, Karel Dobbelaere, David Martin, and many others develop a broad array of approaches loosely connected to one another.

The renewed interest in the subject during the last decades of the 20th century was marked by the mounting number of 'anomalies' and evidence disproving the predicted decline of religion. Many scholars voiced their concern as to the viability and reliability of the thesis and some came to argue that the term 'secularisation' should be dropped altogether or "erased from the sociological dictionary."[52] But in opposition to the challenge mounted by the detractors of the thesis, a group of sociologists attempted to rescue some of its invaluable insights. By retaining the bare essentials of the classical accounts, scholars of a fourth wave developed the neo-secularisation thesis.

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[51] Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, pp.10-12.
[52] Martin, *The Religious and the Secular*, p.22. Shiner, "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research," p.219 Rodney Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999).

While the work of proponents of the neo-secularisation thesis is hardly different from that developed by sociologists of the third wave, their explicit attempt to distance themselves from the mistaken Enlightenment and modernist assumptions of classical sociologists makes them stand out. Even though the distinction between third-wave secularisation and neo-secularisation may not be all that significant or relevant in the field of Sociology, because the field of IR relies on assumptions from the first wave to understand religion, it is essential to mark a clear-cut boundary.[53]

2) The Enlightenment and Religion

The most influential thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries were fervent proponents of the idea that Christianity would gradually disappear from Western societies under the advent of modernity and industrialisation. Writing in the early 1700s, Frederick the Great and Voltaire criticised the English writer Thomas Woolston for his pessimistic prediction of the disappearance of Christianity by 1900 and instead predicted it a century earlier.[54] As 'agents of the Enlightenment,' most, if not all, famous philosophers and sociologists predicted the death of the Church and Christianity. [55] The belief in the withering away of religion became an implicit assumption.

The great intellectual movement of the Enlightenment was centrally concerned with the celebration of reason and the omnicompetence of criticism.[56] In *An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"* published in 1794, Immanuel Kant defined the movement as "*man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity*."[57] He argued that in this Age of Enlightenment, man was called to throw off the shackles of alien

[53] In this thesis, I do not deal with the work of contemporary atheists like Richard Dawkins or Christopher Hitchens. Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (London: Bantam Press, 2006). Christopher Hitchens, *God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything* (New York: Twelve, 2007). The ideological, prejudiced, unscientific, and destructive nature of their approach makes their work of little interest to this study. The revival of this type of atheism could well correspond to an expression of the broader changes that are taking place in Western countries. Alister E. McGrath, *Dawkins' God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
[54] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.249.
[55] Martin Riesebrodt, *Pious Passion: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran* (London: University of California Press, 1998), p.3.
[56] S. J. Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of Modernity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp.47-48. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, vol. 2, The Science of Freedom (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.141.
[57] Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: "What Is Enlightenment?" (1794)," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.54.

guidance as these were detrimental to his "progress toward improvement" and away from barbarism. In particular, Kant noted that enlightenment called for the private use of reason to question the legitimacy of religious and traditional forms of authority.[58]

The end of the 18th century and the great socio-political transformations that accompanied the advancement of modernity constituted the cradle for the emergence of Sociology. Building on the Enlightenment concepts of progress and reason, classical sociologists argued that Western societies were emerging from the religious dogmas and superstitions of the 'Dark Ages' and moving into the modern world in which commerce, sciences, and technology would liberate humans from the oppression of religion.

The French thinker Claude Saint-Simon argued that the 'feudal-theological system' was gradually being replaced by a modernised social order based on industrialisation and positivist sciences. For Auguste Comte, the founder of Sociology, the Law of Three Stages meant that every branch of knowledge would successively pass through theological, metaphysical, and positive stages of development. As a consequence, Comte argued that all societies would follow a similar pattern of transition away from the fictions of religion to finally culminate in a modern society "governed by industrial administrators and scientific moral guides."[59] Mankind would come to outgrow the infantile illusion of religion.[60] From their onset the Social Sciences were "committed to the positivist view that religion in the modern world is merely a survival from man's primitive past, and doomed to disappear in an era of science and general enlightenment."[61] Industrialisation, education, urbanisation, bureaucratisation, economic development, science, and technology were believed to lead to the universal spread of a modern society inherently secular.

Anthony Wallace argued that as a result of the irresistible diffusion of true and objective knowledge that accompanied the scientific revolution of the 17th century, beliefs in supernatural forces were ultimately "doomed to die out, all over the world…the process is inevitable."[62] Marxists saw a similar process taking place. According to Karl Marx, religion was meant to become extinct as the workers became more conscious and aware of their exploitation and alienation. As Engels put it,

[58] Ibid., p.59.
[59] Kenneth Thompson, *Auguste Comte: The Foundation of Sociology* (London: Nelson, 1976), p.13.
[60] Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion* (London: Hogarth Press, 1928).
[61] Gerhard Emmanuel Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p.3.
[62] Wallace quoted in Shupe, "The Stubborn Persistence of Religion in the Global Arena," p.17.

"necessity will force the working men to abandon the remnants of a belief which, as they will more and more clearly perceive, serves only to make them weak and resigned to their fate, obedient and faithful to the vampire property holding class."[63] Within this mindset, the establishment of a secular order was morally appealing.

However, as the Enlightenment and the discipline of Sociology swept away clerical obscurantism and dogmatism, they "imposed [their] own restrictive prejudice on the scope and content of scholarship as on literature and the arts."[64] In fact, because "from the positivist standpoint, religion is, basically, institutionalized ignorance and superstition," the study of secularisation became thoroughly impregnated with these prejudices.[65] In turn, these biases produced "more cruel illusions and blacker veils than the religious naïveté and fanaticism it was designed to replace."[66] The Social Sciences originated and participated in the very rejection of religion as an explanation of the world by accepting the widespread modernist and Enlightenment assumptions of the time.[67]

Within this intellectual climate inherited from the 17th and 18th centuries and out of excitement in prophesising Europe's ushering in a new era of peace, progress, and prosperity, thinkers allowed their beliefs and hopes rather than evidence to guide their research. As Grace Davie puts it, the 'fit' between theory and reality "became axiomatic, theoretically necessary rather than empirically founded…as the world modernized, it would automatically secularize."[68] Any deviation from the thesis was classified as a localised anomaly or branded as 'not yet modern.'

3) The Limits of Common Wisdom

It is against this all-pervasive attitude and set of beliefs that Jeffrey Hadden argued, in his 1986 presidential address to the Southern Sociological Society, that the

[63] Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p.270.
[64] Edward Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," in *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, ed. Douglas Johnston, Cynthia Sampson, and Center for Strategic and International Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.8.
[65] Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, p.3.
[66] Daniel Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?," *The British Journal of Sociology* 28, no. 4 (1977): p.421.
[67] Bryan Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," in *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, ed. Philip E. Hammond (London: University of California Press, 1985), pp.9-10.
[68] Grace Davie, "Europe: The Exception That Proves the Rule?," in *The Desecularization of the World*, ed. Peter Berger (Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), p.76.

secularisation thesis corresponds to a '*doctrine,*' an '*ideology,'* a 'sacralised' belief system accepted 'on faith' and taken-for-granted.[69] As a product of a specific social and cultural milieu in which modernisation was bound to lead to the vanishing of religion, the thesis developed more as an ideological preference inherent to this modernising program than as a systematic theory. In opposition to the widely accepted belief in the slow decline of religion, Hadden demonstrated the weak logical structure of the thesis, the lack of empirical evidence, and highlighted the growing political importance of religion around the world. As a result, he concluded that religion is likely to remain alive and globally visible in the 21st century and that the secularisation thesis should be "radically revised or relegated to the category of a marginally useful heuristic pedagogical device."[70]

Following Hadden's critical re-appraisal of secularisation, the statistics that were once used to back up the secularisation thesis were revealed to be inadequate or irrelevant. [71] Sociologists realised that the different processes of religious transformations and 'unchurching' of populations meant that "religion in the modern world [had become] diffused throughout the culture and [was] no longer contained by formal institutions."[72] Glasner argued that because statistics were based on reified definitions of religion as being an activity that takes place on Sundays, within the confines of a church, what was in fact a transformation in religion was equated with outright decline if not disappearance.[73] As a result of this reconsideration of statistical approaches, leading sociologists concluded that "there has been *no demonstrable long-term decline in European religious participation.*"[74] As Swatos and Christiano argue, "[t]he secularization *theory* as does exist is unsupported by data after more than twenty years of research."[75]

Also, besides their critique of the dithering and indecisive nature of quantitative approaches, sociologists began to criticise some of their long-held

[69] Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory."
[70] Ibid., p.23.
[71] Bryan Wilson, *Religion in the Secular Society: A Sociological Comment* (London: Watts, 1966), p.1. Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, pp.31-32. Bellah in Peter E. Glasner, *The Sociology of Secularisation: A Critique of a Concept* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p.29.
[72] Wade C. Roof, "The Study of Social Change in Religion," in *The Sacred in a Secular Age,* ed. Philip E. Hammond (London: University of California Press, 1985), p.76.
[73] Glasner, *The Sociology of Secularisation*, p.7. Martin, *The Religious and the Secular*, pp.48-53.
[74] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.254.
[75] William H. Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999): p.210.

assumptions. For example, the Comtean belief that individuals become less religious when confronted to scientific knowledge began to unravel in the face of the high levels of subjective religiousness in 'advanced' countries.[76] Effectively, the taken-for-granted incompatibility between science and religion is mostly the product of positivist imagination and "largely a red herring."[77] As Steve Bruce argues, "[t]he history of the human ability to believe very strongly in things that turn out not to be true suggests that whether something is true and whether it becomes widely accepted are two very different questions."[78] Finally, Joe Barnhart traced back this assumption to the postmillennialist belief according to which the spread of the Christian message across continents would 'enlighten the heathen' and draw them to 'the manifest truth of Christ.'[79]

Another assumption that was promptly attacked was that in the past, before the rise of modernity, people were extremely religious and devoted Christians, attended Church on Sundays, and above all, feared God. The pre-modern era was an integrated Age of Faith marked by great solidarity and filled with the sacred. However, this story of the type 'once upon a time the world was religious' contrasts sharply with the conclusions drawn by most historical studies.[80]

Contrary to what most people believe, in the Middle Ages, "none of the common people attended" church.[81] When one considers the facts that masses were in

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[76] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.254. Besides, there are lower levels of irreligiousness amongst scientists than non-scientists: Robert Wuthnow, "Science and the Sacred," in *The Sacred in a Secular Age*, ed. Philip E. Hammond (London: University of California Press, 1985).

[77] Steve Bruce, "Secularization and the Impotence of Individualized Religion," *The Hedgehog Review* 8, no. 1-2 (2006): p.37. ———, *God Is Dead: Secularization in the West* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp.106-17. Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.253. Rodney Stark, Laurence R. Iannaccone, and Roger Finke, "Religion, Science, and Rationality," *The American Economic Review* 86, no. 2 (1996). Staf Hellemans, "Secularization in a Religiogeneous Modernity," in *Secularization and Social Integration: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere*, ed. Rudi Laermans, Bryan R. Wilson, and Jaak Billiet, *Sociologie Vandaag = Sociology Today ; Vol.4* (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1998). For example, the historical relationship between religion and the rise of modern science, the religious revival in post-communist countries in which a virulent form of scientific atheism had been preached, and the positive relationship between education and modernisation and the spread of religious beliefs amongst Muslims, seem to contradict the common wisdom. Robert K. Merton, *Science, Technology & Society in Seventeenth Century England* (London: Harper and Row, 1970).

[78] Steve Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.38.

[79] Joe Barnhart, "The Incurably Religious Animal," in *Religious Resurgence and Politics in the Contemporary World*, ed. Emile F. Sahliyeh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.28.

[80] See Stark for numerous references, Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p.255. John Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400-1700*, Opus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* ; P. H. Sawyer, *Kings and Vikings: Scandinavia and Europe Ad 700-1100* (London: Routledge, 1982).

[81] Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World*, p.27.

Latin, that there were no benches for the laity to sit on, that worshippers were illiterate, that churches were not heated, and that in any case there was a very limited number of places of worship proportionally to the total population, one has good reasons to believe that few people attended Church. Furthermore, most parishes had no clergy, and even when they did, it was not certain that the priest would be present or be able to conduct the mass.[82] Ignorance of the most basic Christian principles was general and the central concerns of the Church were far from being purely spiritual.

Besides ignorance and a clear lack of interests, the respect for the sacredness of the Church was little valued. In effect, churches were used as marketplaces, to store grain and crops, and to shelter livestock. Furthermore, within churches men and women would dance and sing, "[m]embers of the population jostled for pews, nudged their neighbours, hawked and spat, knitted, made coarse remarks, told jokes, fell asleep, and even let off guns."[83] Also, ignorance and 'irreligious' behaviour to our modern standards were accompanied by widespread paganism.

Finally, the degree of compulsion was very high. When the Church was the only form of administrative structure to record birth, baptism, marriages, and death, one was 'forced' to be a Christian. Besides, when social gatherings or markets were organised at the Church, one had good reasons to claim membership. According to Jose Casanova, in the Middle Ages,

> because the official structure of society guaranteed that everybody was leading Christian lives, it was not so necessary to stress personal devotion. *It was the structure itself that was religious, that is, Christian, not necessarily the personal lives that people lived in it.*[84]

In the words of Delumeau and Le Bras, "the 'golden age' of Christianity is a legend" since "a society must be Christianized before it can be de-Christianized."[85]

The tremendous gap between what is commonly taken for granted regarding religiosity in the Middle Ages and reality finds its roots in the 'counter-religious

[82] For example, in 1551, in the diocese of Gloucester, 55% of the priests did not know the Ten Commandments. Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* p.164.
[83] Ibid., p.161.
[84] Emphasis added. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.16. See also Jean Delumeau, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire: A New View of the Counter-Reformation* (London: Burns and Oates, 1977), p.226. Colin Morris, "Medieval Christendom," in *The Christian World: A Social and Cultural History of Christianity*, ed. Geoffrey Barraclough (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), p.145.
[85] Delumeau, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire*, p.160. Gabriel Le Bras, "'Dechristianisation': Mot Fallacieux," *Cahiers d'Histoire* 9(1964).

ideological' project of early sociologists.[86] The creation of an Age of Faith was developed from within modernity to legitimise the onset and development of the Age of Reason.[87] Effectively, classical sociologists considered themselves to be at the heart of a grand project towards true knowledge and liberation. As Glasner demonstrated, the rationale underlying the development of the secularisation thesis stemmed mostly from the values of classical Western sociologists, at the heart of which stood the general ideology of progress and the faith that accompanied it.[88] By making religion the domain of the irrational, of the authoritarian, the traditional, and the violent, sociologists had legitimated the superiority of reason and of the modern project and had hoped to displace and exorcise their own violence and irrationality.

The questioning of the secularisation thesis ended in a profound critique of modernity and its Enlightenment heritage. Sociologists realised that the anti-clerical quest for truth had induced major blind spots[89] and that for decades Sociology had operated "unaware of the contingency of its assumptions and the consequences of its universalising tendencies."[90] For centuries 'the secular' had defined "*itself* as the starting point in relation to which the 'religious' is constructed," a starting point that was above all neutral, rational, and democratic.[91] However, at the turn of the 21st century sociologists realised that by asserting the foundational character of 'the secular,' proponents of secular politics were enacting "a particular, though certainly distinct, theological discourse in its own right."[92]

4) Secularisation in International Relations Theory

In Western academia, the influence of the Enlightenment inscribed strong secularist prejudices not only within the heart of the Social Sciences, but also "in the genetic code of the discipline of International Relations."[93] Already in the late 70s,

[86] Martin, *The Religious and the Secular*, pp.16-17.
[87] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P."
[88] Glasner, *The Sociology of Secularisation*, p.vii. Robert A. Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress* (London: Heinemann Educational, 1980), pp.172-78. Andrew M. Greeley, *The Persistence of Religion* (London: SCM Press, 1973), p.19.
[89] William E. Connolly, *Why I Am Not a Secularist* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p.4.
[90] Hurd, "The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations," p.237.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.: p.236. Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, p.192.
[93] Petito and Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations*, p.1.

many US analysts were unable to study, let alone understand, the nature of the Iranian revolution. The proposition to study the religious dimension of the pre-1979 upheavals was vetoed at the CIA despite the central role imams were playing at the time. As Edward Luttwak reports, this decision was motivated "on the grounds that it would amount to mere 'sociology,' a term used in intelligence circles to mean the time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant."[94]

In this context, even though the 20th century witnessed the global resurgence of religion, scholars within the field of International Politics were far from prepared to face the challenge mounted by the September, 11 attacks. As Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler noted,

> Should policy makers have turned to the relevant academic disciplines, the situation was not much better…the discipline of international relations was not ready for the inclusion of the religious variable into the contending paradigms in the discipline.[95]

This lack of preparation, Scott Thomas demonstrated, was directly related to the Enlightenment roots of the Social Sciences, but more importantly, to the Westphalian foundation of the field of IR.[96]

For students of International Relations, the Treaty of Westphalia is a major historical landmark.[97] By putting an end to the most destructive war since the Roman era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), the Treaty enshrined the fragmentation of Christian Europe and gave birth to the central principles of our modern international order.[98] Christendom, and more generally religion, came out of the so-called 'Wars of Religion' discredited. What were purported to be religious atrocities were so appalling that local princes did their best to marginalise and distance themselves from religion. While this was done out of interest in the acquirement of the Church's power and riches, it was also the result of the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant presumption that peace and religious pluralism could only exist if religion was

[94] Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension," pp.12-13.
[95] Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, p.1.
[96] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*.
[97] The issue of the historical importance of Westphalia has been a source of contention in the field of IR. For now, I am simply stating that, as a matter of fact, IR scholars have taken the importance of the 1648 treaty for granted. More will be said in the following chapters.
[98] K. J. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.122. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54.

disciplined by a state.[99] The medieval cosmology of a united Christian community was undermined and religion was privatised, marginalised, and nationalised.[100]

The religious discredit resulted in the need to rethink the foundation of the international order. The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 by which each prince had acquired the right to determine the religion of his own state, i.e., the principle of '*cuius regio, eius religio'* translated as 'whose realm, his religion.' It was agreed that the citizenries would be subjected first and foremost to the laws of their respective government rather than to those of neighbouring powers or to the transnational authority of the Catholic Church. The unification of politics and religion "within the framework of the state" was established with the explicit aim of putting an end to the devastation caused by religion.[101] In the words of Jeffrey Stout,

> liberal principles were the right ones to adopt when competing religious beliefs and divergent conceptions of the good embroiled Europe in the religious wars…Our early modern ancestors were right to secularize public discourse in the interest of minimizing the ill effects of religious disagreement.[102]

As a result, the newborn international system found its roots in the very dismissal of religion as an ordering principle for Europe.

Nowadays, this prejudice is still very much present in Western academia. For example, in *Ordinary Vices*, Harvard professor Judith Shklar argues,

> liberalism was born out of the cruelties of the religious civil wars, which forever rendered the claims of Christian charity a rebuke to all religious institutions and parties. The alternative then set, and still before us, is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and violence [i.e., religion] and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen [i.e., the liberal and secular state].[103]

This Westphalian aversion towards religion is further strengthened by the fact that IR is integral to the Social Sciences, a field that emerged as "an empirical, man-centered, this-worldly, matter-of-fact explanation of human organization and development."[104]

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[99] Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p.77.
[100] Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p.40. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54.
[101] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.163.
[102] quoted in Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.21.
[103] Judith Shklar quoted in Ibid., p.21.
[104] Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," p.9.

And as Bryan Wilson demonstrated, Sociology "began as a contradiction of theology."[105]

Besides mainstream Liberalism, most approaches to international politics share more or less explicitly the same anti-religious prejudice. Of course, exceptions exist in all traditions but as a general rule, secularism is dominant.[106] The Realist tradition develops an approach centred on the relations between sovereign "states pursuing interests defined in terms of power."[107] Realism's emphasis on state sovereignty is undoubtedly rooted in the Westphalian conception of the international order and is accompanied by the 'Westphalian presumption' that religion is no longer supposed to play a role in international relations.[108] States are independent and autonomous units that know no higher authority. The transnational authority of the Church having withered away during the Reformation and the Enlightenment, states are said to live under anarchy and to be pursuing materialist interests devoid of sacred significance. As a result of the process, religion has been reduced to an aspect of state power, a useful set of superstitions states could use to strengthen national morale, maintain order, and gain legitimacy.[109] While religion was a powerful source of inspiration for many Classical Realists and is not overtly criticised, the Realist framework makes it superfluous and unnecessary to understand international relations.

Besides the Westphalian rejection of religion, many traditions within IR are "wedded to a post-Enlightenment epistemology defined by the commitment to reading the political world as understandable, explicable, and knowable by way of human reason and methods."[110] Because, "such an epistemology at once determines how we

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[105] Ibid., p.10.

[106] Such exceptions include Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, etc. On Wight's faith, see Scott Thomas, "Faith, History and Martin Wight: The Role of Religion in the Historical Sociology of the English School of International Relations," *International Affairs* 77, no. 4 (2001). Ian Hall, *The International Thought of Martin Wight* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.21-42.

[107] Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.32.

[108] Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp.15-16.

[109] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.56. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.62. Luttwak, "The Missing Dimension." Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, p.121. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the tradition of Classical Realism was influenced by the strong religious commitment of its supporters, at least until positivism and behaviouralism were to spread throughout the discipline of political sciences in the United States. The Protestant convictions of Classical Realists have always remained subordinated to their public commitments to the Westphalian order, leaving religion as a private endeavour distinct from the realm of international relations. C. Jones, "Christian Realism and the Foundations of the English School," *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003).

[110] Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, p.4.

come to know the world and constitutes the range of what is knowable," its positivist, materialist, and behaviouralist facets tend to veil the importance of religion.[111]

For example, the mutual and exclusive commitment to secular 'rationalism' of neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism or the economic monism and historical materialist foundations of Marxism have mostly led religion to be treated as nothing more than a dangerous pathological irrationality or as the opiate of the masses.[112] In the case of Wallerstein's world-system theory, the tradition is "heavily informed by Marxist and neo-Marxist economic deterministic assumptions. Thus, it also adopts the 'strong version' of the secularization hypothesis."[113] Likewise, Anson Shupe notes that "globalization theory has ignored religion."[114]

A similar case can be made against constructivism since, as Fox and Sandler argue, "for an approach that sees the Westphelian [sic] international system as the creation of man, the divine is in trouble."[115] Effectively, by arguing that "[r]eality is not God-given or Nature-given, but human imposed,"[116] constructivism explicitly rejects religion through the development of a kind of 'hyper-secularism.'[117] Finally, in the case of postmodernism, Swatos and Christiano argue that the tradition "is nothing more than the disenchantment of that sacrality the Enlightenment gave to reason. It is the secularization of secularism."[118] Ultimately, the role of God is further degraded

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[111] Ibid.

[112] R. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. Dec. (1988). It should be noted that Marx's conception of religion is quite sophisticated, defining religion as a means of expression in a world of alienation. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law," in *Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, ed. Jack Cohen (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975).

[113] Shupe, "The Stubborn Persistence of Religion in the Global Arena," p.21.

[114] Ibid., p.24. The work of Peter Beyer is an important exception.

[115] Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, p.29.

[116] John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.218. It should be noted that Constructivists claim the existence of an *a priori* reality. However, this claim springs more from a technical concern with the ontological weakness of the tradition rather than from a real interest in this non-constructed reality. Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.10.

[117] J. Kurth, "Religion and Globalization," in *The 1998 Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs* (Foreign Policy Research Institute1999). Ultimately, Constructivism possesses the resources for the consideration of religion's influence on actors.

[118] Swatos and Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," p.225. It should be noted that this view is one-sided and that amongst all the different approaches, postmodernism could well be the most amenable to an inclusion of the religion factor. Besides, there is a growing literature that stresses the theological and religious character of postmodernism. For example, John Milbank argues that postmodernism is in some way "on a level with the great religious discourses of the world." John Milbank, "Problematizing the Secular: The Post-Postmodern Agenda," in *Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism and Religion*, ed. Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (London: Routledge, 1992), p.42. Likewise, Nicholas Gane notes that according to Baudrillard, the very purpose of postmodernism is to "ultimately re-enchant the seemingly 'rational' world in which we live;" hence Gane argues that

when reality is only in one's mind and dependent on one's subjectivity. However, this brief glance at the rejection of religion should not blind us to the growing attention paid to religion in the main traditions of IR.

Now that the partiality of the predictions concerning the future of religion has been outlined, and now that the acceptance of virulent secularist assumptions within IR has been flagged up, we can turn to the development of a more adequate definition of secularisation. In the second part of this chapter, I look in more detail at attempts by sociologists to develop a less biased approach to the process. First, I outline the classical accounts developed at the beginning of the 20th century. Then, I look at the attempt to rescue the thesis from its detractors and to deal with its failures through the development of neo-secularisation. Finally, I bring the insights of neo-secularisation back into IR and I show the limits of the approach to religion and secularisation traditionally accepted in the field. I conclude the chapter by redefining the secularisation process in light of the argument developed throughout this chapter.

Lyotard, Foucault, and Baudrillard's works can be seen as Utopian and other-worldly. Nicholas Gane, *Max Weber and Postmodern Theory: Rationalisation Versus Re-Enchantment* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.147, 55.

B. Redefining the Secularisation Process

In the field of Sociology, 'secularisation' became "*the* master model of sociological inquiry" under the influence of Max Weber and his associate Ernst Troeltsch.[119] In fact, the first sociological study of the secularisation process is found in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* in which Weber explored the process of the rationalisation of action that was spreading throughout all spheres of life during the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial Revolution.[120] The study of secularisation was subsequently developed through the use of functionalist approaches by Emile Durkheim and others. Even though the term did not appear extensively until the 50s, by the early 70s, it had acquired some sort of 'mystical immunity' and had become "the reigning dogma in the field."[121]

1) The Weberian and Functionalist Traditions

Because he was primarily concerned with the rationalisation processes that paved the way for the social transformation at the heart of Western modernity, Max Weber (1864-1920) only scarcely employed the term 'secularisation.' Effectively, through the study of the rise of 'the spirit of capitalism,' the German sociologist tried to understand how the broader spread of 'Occidental rationalism' came to dominate all spheres of life from the 16th century onward. Instead, alongside his concern with rationalisation, it was the idea of 'disenchantment' that he favoured, an idea used to refer to centuries of religious rationalisation which resulted in the elimination of magic as a means of salvation.

Weber located the deepest roots of this all-pervading 'rationalising force' in Ancient Judaism, and thus made the Judeo-Christian tradition the carrier of the seeds of its own secularisation.[122] Christianity was thus "*the religion for departing from*

[119] Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," p.3.
[120] Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
[121] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.253. Swatos and Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept."
[122] Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion* (London: Faber, 1969), p.10.

religion,"[123] or as Berger puts it, "Christianity has been its own gravedigger."[124] The Judaic non-cosmological conception of God as a transcendental entity standing outside the cosmos led to the affirmation of the existence of a 'disenchanted' world in which man was the historical actor. Berger demonstrated that such an affirmation paved the way for processes of transcendentalisation, historisation, and the rationalisation of ethics, the very processes at the heart of modernisation and secularisation. In fact, this is connected to the rationalisation of the whole of modern life and to the development of individualism, capitalism, liberalism, industrialisation, bureaucratisation, and the secularisation of European societies through the flourishing of religious pluralism.[125]

This process of rationalisation led individuals to look for the explanations of events within 'this world' through the use of reason and based on scientific standards of proof. In turn, religious or 'other-worldly' explanations became superfluous if not outright dangerous. The rejection of the *mysterium tremendum* and the withering away of traditional beliefs led to the disenchantment of the world. The 'mysterious' came to be conceived as something to be conquered and mastered through the development of scientific knowledge and technology. Weber used the terms 'intellectualisation' and secularisation almost interchangeably.[126] In the 60s, Bryan Wilson summarised the situation as follows:

> As social processes are increasingly subjected to rational planning and organization… [m]en may have become more rational, and their thinking may have become more matter-of-fact… but perhaps even more important is their sustained involvement in rational organizations…which impose rational behaviour upon them. The Churches with their dominant function as the institutionalization of emotional gratification necessarily stand in sharp and increasingly disadvantageous contrast.[127]

Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the process of secularisation "is a result, a consequence, in a way a finishing point, a logical conclusion of the historical-

[123] Marcel Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.4.
[124] Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Anchor books, 1967), pp.111-29.
[125] Steve Bruce, *A House Divided: Protestantism, Schism and Secularization* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.26-29.
[126] Max Weber, "'Science as a Vocation'," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p.139.
[127] Wilson, *Religion in the Secular Society*, pp.37-38.

religious process of disenchantment of the world."[128] For Swatos and Christiano, it is this rationalisation/disenchantment process that constitutes the core of secularisation.[129]

Contrary to Max Weber who never explicitly defined religion but implicitly considered it to be no more than a system of beliefs and ideas, Emile Durkheim provided one of the most comprehensive definitions. The French sociologist put particular emphasis on the function that rituals, symbolic ceremonies, and seasonal celebrations play for society as a whole, and thus defined religion as "*a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them*."[130] What is most interesting in Durkheim's definition is his conception of religion as being a 'social thing' per se. In fact, religious beliefs, rituals, and practices were thought to act as the cement of society's moral unity since their object was society itself. Finding its origins in the collective unconscious, religion came to be loosely equated with the worship of the community.

Durkheim's functionalist conception of secularisation pictured the process as being a direct consequence of the social differentiation that characterised the spread of industrialisation in most Western societies. Effectively, industrialisation was thought to lead to functional rationalisation and differentiation, de-traditionalisation, and individualisation, the cumulative effects of which had a direct impact on the decline in church involvement. In Steve Bruce's words,

> [i]ndustrialization brought with it a series of social changes – the fragmentation of the life-world, the decline of community, the rise of bureaucracy, technological consciousness – that together made religion less arresting and less plausible than it had been in pre-modern societies. This is the conclusion of most social scientists, historians, and church leaders in the Western world.[131]

The Weberian and functionalist accounts of the process of secularisation depicted processes of rationalisation and differentiation that unfolded with the advent of modernity and that were logically to lead to the disappearance of religion. With the extensive rationalisation, atomisation, and differentiation of social life, sociologists

[128] Antonio Flavio Pierucci, "Secularization in Max Weber. On Current Usefulness of Re-Accessing That Old Meaning," *Brazilian Review of Social Sciences* Special Issue, no. 1 (2000): p.137.
[129] Swatos and Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," p.212.
[130] Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology* (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2005), p.475.
[131] Bruce, *God Is Dead*, p.36.

could not have predicted anything but the death of religion. In *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Durkheim concluded that "the old gods are growing old or already dead…"[132]

The variety of approaches to secularisation developed in the 20th century is daunting and an exhaustive outline is simply unfeasible. Because this thesis is a contribution to the field of International Politics, such an undertaking is neither needed nor warranted.[133] Instead, I rely on the typology of the secularisation process developed by Karel Dobbelaere. The Belgian sociologist most comprehensively classified the different accounts of secularisation in three distinct categories according to three levels of analysis. First, there is a macro or societal process of secularisation (i.e., institutional differentiation, rationalisation, disenchantment, subjectivisation, the 'Great Disembedding,' etc.). Second there is a meso or organisational process of secularisation (i.e., relativisation, this-worldliness, privatisation, etc.). And finally, there is a micro or individual process of secularisation (i.e., individualisation, bricolage, unchurching, unbelief, etc.).[134] While most theories deal with all three dimensions of secularisation, sociologists generally agree that the macro process is primary and that there is no necessary causal relationship between the different levels.[135] According to Oliver Tschannen, the three fundamental pillars of secularisation are rationalisation, differentiation, and disenchantment/ this-worldliness.[136]

2) 'Something Must Have Changed!'

In the last decades of the 20th century, a complete reworking of the secularisation theory took place. Following Jeffrey Hadden's attack on the thesis,

[132] "…and others not yet born." Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p.427.
[133] As such, even though Charles Taylor's *A Secular Age* is one of the latest and most important works on secularisation to have appeared, I must refrain from engaging with it at this stage. Moreover, Taylor's complete disregard for the advances made in the field of Sociology over the last forty years means that some of the connections drawn in his work have already been disproved. Therefore, I prefer to implicitly consider his almost 900-page long monograph within a sociological framework.
[134] Karel Dobbelaere, *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002), p.166.
[135] Ibid. ———, "Secularization: A Multi-Dimensional Concept," *Current Sociology* 29, no. 2 (1981). Mark Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," *Social Forces* 72, no. 3 (1994): p.753.
[136] Oliver Tschannen, *Les Théories De La Sécularisation* (Geneva: Droz, 1992); ———, "The Secularization Paradigm: A Systematization," *Journal for the Scienitific Study of Religion* 30, no. 4 (1991).

many sociologists developed similar arguments and questioned its fundamentals. Rodney Stark concluded that "[a]fter nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies and misrepresentations of both present and past, it [was finally] time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper '*requiescat in pace.*'" [137] However, suggestions to drop the concept altogether remained unheeded since unlikely, unsatisfactory, and ultimately unproductive. [138] Rather, sociologists attempted to save it.

Even though proponents of the secularisation thesis were over-ambitious and relied too heavily on Enlightenment and modernist assumptions, the phenomenon they were studying was not a chimera. While the secularisation thesis may have had mythical overtones, one cannot deny that as societies modernised and changed, religious institutions and practices also underwent deep processes of transformation. As Peter Berger noted, however inadequate the secularisation theory may be, we cannot deny that historically something has happened, 'something must have changed!'

Contrary to Stark, Hadden, and others, scholars such as Jose Casanova, David Yamane, and Mark Chaves refused "to throw out the baby with the bathwater" and explicitly redefined the secularisation thesis instead of dropping it altogether.[139] They took on board the strong criticisms but retained the core of the thesis. As Casanova puts it:

> In any case, the old theory of secularization can no longer be maintained. There are only two options left: either, as seems the present inclination of most sociologists of religion, to discard the theory altogether once it is revealed to be an unscientific, mythological account of the modern world, or to revise the theory in such a way that it can answer both its critics and the questions which reality itself has posed.[140]

In a similar vein, Steve Bruce noted that "[i]f we can abandon simplistic evolutionary perspectives and keep our minds focused on the complexity of the historical record, we need not…reject secularization as a social myth." [141] Therefore, numerous proponents of the secularisation thesis decided to redefine and systematise their

[137] Stark, "Secularization R.I.P," p.270.
[138] N.J. Demerath, "Secularization Disproved or Displaced?," in *Secularization and Social Integration: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere*, ed. Rudi Laermans, Bryan Wilson, and Jaak Billiet (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1998). Shiner, "The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research," p.219.
[139] Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," p.750.
[140] Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, p.19.
[141] Bruce, *A House Divided*, p.9.

theoretical conceptions in accordance with the new evidence of a religious revival. In the end, the most important result to come out of this reconsideration was the emergence of neo-secularisation.

3) Neo-Secularisation

The neo-secularisation thesis corresponds to a lighter and simplified reformulation of the work of scholars from the third wave, especially the work of Bryan Wilson. Taking on board most criticisms mounted against the traditional thesis, it puts great emphasis on the societal dimension of the process and thus gives a new impetus to the secularisation thesis. Neo-secularisation is based on an explicit attempt to distance itself from the modernist and secularist predictions of the disappearance of religion and is compatible with the current revival. The main exponents of the neo-secularisation thesis are Chaves and Yamane and their starting point is Bryan Wilson's definition of secularisation as being "the process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance."[142]

Neo-secularisation's central move is to shift the locus of the secularisation process from the decline of religion in all spheres of life to the sole decline of the scope of religious authority. This shift in focus leads Chaves to define secularisation as being "*the declining influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the supernatural*."[143] In opposition to the earlier theories that predicted the disappearance of religion, the neo-secularisation thesis "maintains no more than that religion ceases to be significant in the working of the social system" because it "has lost its presidency over *institutions*."[144]

For Wilson, secularisation means that human consciousness changes as a result of rationalisation processes and that people "learn to regulate their behavior to

[142] Wilson, *Religion in the Secular Society*, p.xiv. Ultimately, what separates neo-secularisation from Wilson's model is the former's self-conscious attempt to go beyond Enlightenment biases and its explicit emphasis on authority. It should be noted that by distancing themselves from the mistaken assumptions of classical sociologists, Yamane and Chaves have lost touch of the importance of processes of rationalisation and disenchantment. I remedy this by drawing equally on Wilson's work.
[143] Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," p.756. This shift was first operated by Bryan Wilson.
[144] Emphasis added. Bryan Wilson, "Religion in Sociological Perspective," (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p.150. Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," p.15.

conform to the rational premises built into the social order."[145] Even though he may continue to 'resort to the supernatural' privately, in public, the "irrational man…contributes to the increasingly rational character of external order in an environment that is increasingly man-made."[146] As such, for the British sociologist, the secularisation model does not

> predicate the disappearance of religiosity, nor even of organized religion; it merely indicates the decline in the significance of religion in the operation of the social system, its diminished significance in social consciousness, and its reduced command over the resources…of mankind.[147]

Effectively, organisational and individual secularisations do not necessarily accompany the societal decline in the influence of religious structures.[148] The separation of Church and state is said to free individuals from the compulsion of being a member of the local congregation. But far from turning individuals into atheists, religiosity becomes individualised and independent from the authority of the Church. In effect, when secularisation takes place, "there is no necessary, determinate shrinkage in the character and extent of beliefs."[149] Likewise, organisational secularisation is either challenged or reinterpreted as a process of religious change from church-centred forms of worship to diffuse forms of religions – 'invisible religion' for Luckmann, civil religion for Bellah, political religion for Gentile, 'new Gods' for Crippen, private religions for Casanova, spirituality…[150] The new concept of secularisation means that one should talk of "a shift in the institutional location of religion…rather than secularization."[151]

Such a redefinition of the secularisation thesis strips it of its evolutionary and universalistic twists and from the taken-for-granted incompatibility between religion and scientific reason. By moving away from a predictive approach to a descriptive one, neo-secularisation distances itself from the 'myth of the Enlightenment' and

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[145] Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," p.19.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid., p.14.
[148] Dobbelaere, *Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels*, pp.189-95.
[149] Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?," p.427.
[150] Robert Neelly Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Timothy Crippen, "Old and New Gods in the Modern World: Toward a Theory of Religious Transformation," *Social Forces* 67, no. 2 (1988); Emilio Gentile, *Politics as Religion* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006); Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*; Thomas Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1967). David Yamane, "Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36, no. 1 (1997).
[151] Berger, *The Desecularization of the World*, pp.9-10.

accounts for the current resurgence of religion by arguing that it was only the '*system'* that had become secularised.[152] In other words, the high levels of religiosity do not disprove the secularisation process since it is not because "there is religion" that there is "effective religious authority."[153] As Dobbelaere argues, "individual piety may still persist, however, if it develops independently of religious authorities, then it is an indication of individual secularization."[154] Finally, no mythical Age of Faith is assumed. While neo-secularisation recognises the importance of the legitimacy of religious authority in the Middle Ages, it refuses to infer the existence of societies filled with the sacred.[155] In the end, because one can be secular and religious at the same time, the traditional religious/secular dichotomy becomes obsolete.

4) Bringing Neo-Secularisation into IR

The field of International Politics, through its specific emphasis on Westphalia as a founding moment, accepted a strong version of the secularisation thesis and took for granted the secularist aversion towards religion. However, because this approach towards religion is essentially prejudiced, the insights provided by neo-secularisation must be brought into the field. While traditional definitions of the process of secularisation had a central sociological dimension, neo-secularisation has a central political dimension. As Wilson notes, the focus on authority means that "Political authority is…the most conspicuous arena in which" secularisation is taking place.[156] Indeed, secularisation is no longer the belief in the withering away of religion but should be taken as:

> a process of *transfer* of property, power, activities, and both manifest and latent functions, from institutions with a *supernaturalist frame of reference* to (often new) institutions operating according to empirical, rational, pragmatic criteria

[152] Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," p.19.
[153] Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," p.769.
[154] Karel Dobbelaere, "Bryan Wilson's Contributions to the Study of Secularization," *Social Compass* 53, no. 2 (2006): p.141.
[155] It should be noted that Bryan Wilson never assumed the existence of an Age of Faith. Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, "Religion: The British Contribution," *The British Journal of Sociology* 40, no. 3 (1989): pp.495-96.
[156] Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," p.12.

> In particular, the secularization model has been taken as referring to the shift in the location of decision making in human groups from elites claiming special access to supernatural ordinances to elites *legitimating their authority* by reference to other bases of power.[157]

Thus, the dynamics of change are fundamentally political and secularisation corresponded to a 'political settlement' between Christianity and the state.[158] Simplified to the extreme, "secularization may be said to refer to the process of the separation of state and church in Europe."[159]

This redefinition has important consequences for the field of IR. In particular, it invites us to go beyond the Westphalian presumptions that religion does not and should not play a role in politics and to recognise the fact that religion is neither alien nor detrimental to the conduct of politics. IR's implicit conception of secularisation as being the death throes of religion can now be dropped in favour of neo-secularisation's definition of the process in terms of the changes in the scope of religious authority and forms of legitimacy over time.

In effect, the global revival of religion not only disproves the 'Enlightenment myth' but also calls for a reconsideration of its normative secularist assumption. As will become clearer in the following chapters, the shift in forms of authority and legitimacy distinctive to secularisation was accompanied by the development of a secularist discourse of a theological nature. In particular, this discourse was founded on ideological dogmas that were created to legitimise the rise of the state as the rightful bearer of the monopoly over the use of force (chapter 5). The redefinition of secularisation along 'neo-secular' lines poses a profound challenge to this Westphalian discourse and requires IR scholars to go beyond two fundamental prejudices.

First of all, besides the belief that religion has become extinct, it is widely believed that religion is inherently dangerous and violent and that secularisation brought peace and security to the world. It is common wisdom that "[r]eligious people are particularly susceptible to offense and are very keen on responding to the

[157] Emphasis added. Ibid., pp.11-12.
[158] Gauchet, *The Disenchantment of the World*, p.xii. Connolly, *Why I Am Not a Secularist*, p.36. Brian Goldstone, "Violence and the Profane: Islamism, Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Secular Discipline," *Anthropological Quarterly* 80(2007): p.231.
[159] Swatos and Christiano, "Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept," p.213.

perceived harm with any means, be they legal or illegal."[160] As Mark Juergensmeyer has remarked, "religion seems to be connected with violence virtually everywhere."[161] While it is undeniable that the Christian Church and other religions have given legitimacy to horrendous acts such as the Inquisition, the Crusades, or more recently terrorism, such a secularist depiction must be balanced against the facts that religion was one of the most powerful forces for peace and social change in face of oppression (Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Mother Theresa, Liberation Theology, etc.). As Scott Appleby argues, the sacred is inherently 'ambivalent.'[162] Besides, in the 20th century, secular politics has legitimised Russia's Gulags and Germany's Dachau.

Secondly, from this perception of religion as being violent, thinkers deduced that were this violence to be avoided, politics should be secularised. Such a move was made during the run-up to Westphalia and remains widely accepted nowadays. Yet, when one carefully considers the historical facts, the Wars of Religion that ravaged Europe were also driven by the secular interests of political leaders and princes.[163] The biased depiction of these wars was guided by a political agenda which called for the legitimisation of the state as the only potential 'saviour' from the barbarity of religion. Reflecting the climate of opinion of the 16th century, Jean Bodin justified the absolute sovereignty of the state as the only "acceptable alternative to religious civil war." [164] However, such a representation of history is highly partial since, as Cavanaugh explains, "the rise of the State was at the very root of the so-called 'religious' wars, directing with bloodied hands a new secular theatre of absolute power."[165] In fact, Charles Tilly argues, the process of state formation corresponded to the largest example of organised crime. The very birth of the state was found in war-making: "War makes states."[166]

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[160] Lorenzo Zucca, "The Crisis of the Secular State - a Reply to Professor Sajo," *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 7, no. 3 (2008): p.498.
[161] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (London: University of California Press, 2003), p.xi.
[162] Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*.
[163] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.136. S.J. Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests: The Origins of Enlightenment Anticlericalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p.22.
[164] Bodin quoted in Stephen Holmes, "Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion," in *Religion, Morality, and the Law*, ed. Roland Pennock and John Chapman (London: New York University Press, 1988), p.7.
[165] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.46.
[166] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter June Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.169-70. Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

The current religious resurgence contradicts the belief that religion has disappeared from the realm of politics and also calls for a rethinking of the discourse that de-legitimised religion as a source of authority and established the secular state in its place. In particular, it invites us to go beyond the Westphalian exclusion of religion from politics. As I will argue in the rest of this thesis, these Westphalian presumptions are part of a political project whose prescriptive dimensions may well be as misguided as its predictions. In any case, while this project played a role during the secularisation of Europe, its validity and implications for the conduct of politics in the 21st century need to be questioned. To accept that religion does not necessarily have an adverse effect on the political process opens up a whole new realm of possibilities to confront the theoretical challenges mounted by the worldwide resurgence of religion.

Conclusion:

The aim of this chapter was to provide a broad overview of the late-20th century debate in the Social Sciences concerning secularisation and the likely future of religion. The central task was to redefine the secularisation process in the light of religion's return from exile. The first part of the chapter focused on the common wisdom surrounding religion and modernisation as well as its limits. The influences of the Treaty of Westphalia and the Enlightenment on the public imaginary were outlined. We saw that the predictions of the disappearance of religion emerged from the modernist and rationalist mood of the 17th and 18th centuries. The rejection of religion as an explanatory framework for the world was accompanied by the birth of Sociology and the scientific study of the impact of 'modernisation' on European societies. In turn, this socio-historical context influenced the approach to international relations and the structuring of the field in the 20th century. The deeply seated epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernity led to IR being overtly secular, positivist, and materialist, rejecting in turn the incorporation of religion as a potentially important factor in world affairs.

In the second part of the chapter, I turned to the Social Sciences. I looked at classical accounts of the secularisation theory and at the late 20th century attempt to save it from its detractors. The modernist and Enlightenment assumptions on which the thesis relied were discarded by shifting the locus of the thesis from religion per se to the sole decline in the scope and legitimacy of religious authority. The secularisation process was finally redefined as a long-term and Europe-wide shift in authority and legitimacy, initiated by the rationalisation of human consciousness, and that resulted in a transfer of power and resources from the Church and to the state. Finally, I brought the insights gathered in the field of Sociology back into the field of International Politics and the reality of neo-secularisation was contrasted to the widespread belief in IR that religion has disappeared.

Now that the secularisation process has been defined, it is necessary to come back to the two research questions that motivate this enquiry, namely, (1) What has been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the 21st century? In light of this chapter, we can see that the impact of the secularisation process on the

international order has been a change in forms of legitimacy, a shift from institutions with a religious frame of reference to institutions sanctioned by other bases of power. This process of transfer took place between the Roman Church and the nascent dynastic state. The second question cannot be answered at this stage but it is clear that if the 'Westphalian presumptions' and 'Enlightenment myth' are central to the foundations of international politics, its sustainability and viability can rightly be questioned.

Before moving on to the study of the shift in legitimacy that marked the secularisation of Europe, it is essential to develop a theoretical framework. Not only does the breadth and depth of the subject necessitate adequate theoretical tools to narrow down the focus of the enquiry, but more importantly, the re-appraisal of secularisation as a shift in authority and legitimacy calls for a specific type of theorising. For Chaves, such a redefinition of the process calls for the replacement of 'secularisation theory' by a general theory that could explain why different authority structures seem to be dominant at different times and in different places.[167] Thus, what is needed is a sociology of cultural change to explain the rationalisation of consciousness and the shift away from supernaturalist forms of legitimacy. Interestingly enough, this brings us back to Weber's work on the rationalisation and institutionalisation of meaning and values. Effectively, the German sociologist wrote extensively on the emergence of Occidental rationalism in Europe as well as its impact on forms of authority and legitimacy. And despite his acceptance of Enlightenment assumptions concerning the future of religion, Weber's framework can be re-evaluated in accordance with neo-secularisation's insights.[168] This will be the task of the following chapter and Weber's sociology will be our starting point.

[167] Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," pp.770-71.
[168] Ibid.: p.753.

3. Theorising Secularisation

The secularisation of Western Europe corresponded to a long-term, systemic, and societal process of change driven by socio-cultural dynamics tending towards the rationalisation and differentiation of all spheres of life. Its outcome was the slow transfer of power, property, functions, etc, from the Roman Church to the dynastic state. More specifically, it resulted in the shift in authority from elites claiming special access to God to elites legitimating their rule by reference to other bases of power. From this definition arrived at in the previous chapter, it is possible to isolate three different components. First, there are socio-cultural dynamics tending towards rationalisation and differentiation. Second, there is a shift in forms of legitimacy and bases of power. And finally, there is the process of transfer from Christian to more secular elites.

In this chapter, the central aim is to develop a theoretical framework that can provide us with the analytical tools and vocabulary necessary for the development of our understanding of secularisation. The starting point is the driving force and socio-cultural dynamics that paved the way for the rationalisation and differentiation of societies. And from then onward, I look at the set of steps through which the process of rationalisation led to the changes in legitimacy and authority. I begin my enquiry from within the Social Sciences and I then move to the field of International Politics. Processes of rationalisation have barely been discussed theoretically within IR but have been the object of many studies within Sociology. However, when it comes to notions of legitimacy and authority, IR scholars surely have a lot to contribute.

In the first part of the chapter, I connect the driving force behind the socio-cultural dynamics to the changes in authority. Because of Max Weber's centrality and unique contribution to the study of rationalisation, I begin with his work. I then turn to Benjamin Nelson's notion of 'structure of consciousness' and to Charles Taylor's concept of moral sources to sketch a framework of analysis. Finally, I connect all the different elements of the framework together by returning to Weber and his typology of authority. I argue that processes of rationalisation accompanied changes in

structures of consciousness and moral sources that were ultimately connected with changes in forms of legitimacy and authority.

In the second part of the chapter, I look at the theoretical frameworks developed by scholars of International Relations and I draw connections between Sociology and IR, between structures of consciousness and forms of legitimacy. Then, after having dealt with a few methodological points, I bring the different elements of the theoretical framework together. Finally, I redefine secularisation in a manner that coheres with the analytical tools and the framework itself.

A. Theoretical Framework, Analytical Tools

1) The Driving Force: On Rationalisation

Max Weber's fundamental interest is the study of the genesis and development of the patterns of social action that characterise Western modernity and that differentiate Occidental rationalism from India's greater commitment to faith traditions or China's cultural developments. Throughout his work, the German sociologist demonstrates that these patterns were established to order the world meaningfully through the media of different forms of rationality. Effectively, faced with the essentially fragmented and disconnected nature of reality, humans are pushed by their need for meaning to organise their perceptions and thoughts according to reason. In turn, this guides their worldview and life style.

In *The Social Psychology of World Religions*, Weber discerns four such types of rationality: practical, theoretical, formal, and substantive.[169] The development of patterns and regularities in social action under their impulse is what Weber refers to as rationalisation processes.[170] These processes are not global in scope but "take place at various sociocultural levels and in different life-spheres, both in those relating to the 'external organization of the world,' such as the realms of law, politics, economics…and in the 'internal' spheres of religion and ethics."[171]

Despite the ability of all types of rationality to establish meaningful regularities, the abstractness of theoretical rationality, the ritual nature of formal rationality, and the presentism and problem-solving character of practical rationality make them ill-suited for the introduction of patterns of behaviour. Weber

[169] Practical rationality is defined as the "methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means." Theoretical rationality is the "increasing theoretical mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts." Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p.293. Substantive rationality orders action into patterns in relation to a value postulate rooted in complex worldviews. Formal rationality relates to a structure of domination and it orders patterns of action by referring back to universal rules, laws, and abstract regulations. Stephen Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," *American Journal of Sociology* 85, no. 5 (1980): p.1155, 58.

[170] Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions."

[171] Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," p.1150.

demonstrates that only the values or canons of values at the heart of substantive rationality have the power to institutionalise 'normative regularities of action' within what he calls 'methodical rational ways of life.'[172] By instilling a sense of ultimacy, such 'canons' of values (i.e., feudalism, socialism, Lutheranism, etc.) are able to provide a 'valid' direction to life and therefore to influence behaviour in characteristic ways.[173]

What makes substantive rationality so different and so effective in instituting new patterns and regularities is its ability to orient action by putting psychological premiums upon values.[174] Any action is deemed 'rational' as long as it is consistent with this direction. By the same token, the irrational is that which is incompatible with the direction provided by the canon of values.[175] This idea of premium led Weber to define the 'ethical' as the *belief* in premiums which imposes a normative element upon actions which are therefore deemed morally good.[176]

However, substantive rationality is most effective once values have been subjected to a prior process of theoretical rationalisation and turned into a comprehensive canon or 'ethic of conviction.' This process is called 'value rationalisation' and leads to the creation of a comprehensive religious or secular worldview, and to the methodical rationalisation of all spheres of life in accordance with this unified worldview – i.e., systematisation of knowledge, rigour, etc.[177]

Weber's sociology is interesting because it provides a persuasive account of the driving process and propelling principle behind the secularisation of Europe. The rationalisation of all spheres of life led to the genesis of a new direction, to the spread of a new secular ethic of conviction, to new rational ways of life, and ultimately to the

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[172] Max Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p.307. Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," p.1164. It is important to note that it is not because someone behaves according to a canon of values that he necessarily upholds the values associated. For example, in the case of the development of Protestant sects, membership was not only composed of individuals who believed in the Protestant values. In effect, many individuals were led to join the congregations for the benefits membership would bring to their business. Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," pp.305-10. The situation was similar in the case of capitalism.

[173] Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," p.293.

[174] _____, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," p.307.

[175] Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," p.1156.

[176] Max Weber, Guenther Roth, and Claus Wittich, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* (London: University of California Press, 1968), p.36.

[177] This process of rationalisation of the world according to God's will led to the disenchantment of the world by orienting one's calling to 'this world.' Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," pp.290-91.

rise of modernity. This change in worldview provided an impetus for the secularisation of worldviews and thus could be at the origins of the shift in forms of legitimacy and authority associated with secularisation. However, while Weber's approach to rationalisation provides us with invaluable insights, his frame of reference in time and his typology of rationality have been criticised for being too narrow and inadequate for the study of rationalisation in its 'extraordinary many-sidedness.'[178] Therefore, I now turn to the work of the American sociologist Benjamin Nelson and to the case he made for going beyond Weber's typologies and for studying regularities and patterns of action in terms of 'structures of consciousness.'

2) Rationalisation and Structures of Consciousness

Contrary to Weber who mainly studied the European processes of rationalisation in the context of the 16th century, Benjamin Nelson (1911-1977), argued for the extension of Weber's frame of reference in time. In particular, the temporal boundaries were to be extended back to the 12th century Renaissance and forward to the 20th century.[179] For Nelson, the Reformation came as a response to the Middle Ages, as "direct assaults against the dominant cultural logics and spiritual technologies of the medieval world" and therefore needed to be studied in this context.[180] The location of the starting point in the 12th century is supported by scholars such as Randall Collins, Pitirim Sorokin, Marie-Dominique Chenu, or Quentin Skinner who consider the Protestant Reformation as a second takeoff or a single step in a process of change that can be traced back to Medieval Europe.[181]

In addition, arguing that Weber's typologies of social action and rationality were rather narrow and inadequate for the study of rationalisation, Nelson made a case for going beyond them. The sociologist held that "all behavior gets to be norm-

[178] Benjamin Nelson, "Scholastic *Rationales* of 'Conscience', Early Modern Crises of Credibility, and the Scientific-Technocultural Revolutions of the 17th and 20th Centuries," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 7, no. 2 (1968): p.162.
[179] Ibid.: pp.160-61.
[180] Ibid.: p.161.
[181] Randall Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.76; Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Reformation.*, vol. 2 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1978). Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Western Religion and Morality Today," *International Yearbook of the Sociology of Religion* 2(1966): p.9. Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (London: Belknap, 2007), p.243. Marie Dominique Chenu, *L'eveil De La Conscience Dans La Civilisation Medievale* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1969).

dependent in one way or another, in the sense that all behavior, whether or not it originates in a value, has nonetheless to be referred to a value or defended by a value – i.e., made congruent with a rationale."[182] Therefore, Nelson called for the study of rationalisation by focusing on these rationales, rationales of Conscience, structures of reason, structures of consciousness, or rationales of thought and action.

Nelson defined these *'cultural maps'* and *symbolic technologies* on which social actions are contingent as the "bodies of protocols which correlate all notions and evidential canons, associated with the proof or disproof, of arguments for or against any given declaration or claim whether the declaration be about what is or ought to be." [183] Because these rationales of conscience establish the cultural requirements and expectations "in respect to truth, virtue, legality, fittingness" they unavoidably stand behind all meaningful social regularities and thus behind all forms of institutionalised authority.[184]

Working within a civilisational framework, Nelson developed a typology of these 'structures of consciousness.' He outlined three different types: (1) the sacro-magical type of consciousness, (2) the faith-based type of consciousness, and (3) the reason-based type of consciousness. While the first type is not fully relevant to this study, the second and third structures are fundamental. Effectively, the transition from the second to the third structure corresponds to the shift of consciousness that led to the secularisation and the rise of modernity in Europe from the 12th-13th centuries onwards. As a matter of fact, this shift in consciousness led to "a complete overhauling of the structures of legitimation and theoretical *rationales*" of the Christian medieval world and threatened "the very foundation upon which all vested authority rested."[185] For the American sociologist, the study of the shifts in structures

[182] Benjamin Nelson, "*Conscience* and the Making of Early Modern Cultures: Beyond Max Weber," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.72.
[183] Nelson, "Scholastic *Rationales* of 'Conscience', Early Modern Crises of Credibility, and the Scientific-Technocultural Revolutions of the 17th and 20th Centuries," p.162.
[184] Ibid.: p.163.
[185] Benjamin Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp.99-100. ———, "Certitude and the Books of Scripture, Nature, and Conscience," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.156.

of consciousness is central to our understanding of legitimacy and vice versa.[186] And as we will see in later chapters, the shift from faith to reason-based cultural rationales was concomitant with the shift in authority and legitimacy away from Christian prelates to secular rulers in the 12th century.

Despite the fact that Nelson's concept of structure of consciousness is very abstract and has a limited analytical power, it provides us with an important analytical category for the study of rationalisation. Secularisation no longer takes place in a vacuum but results from the rationalisation of faith-structures of consciousness and from the genesis of reason-based cultural rationales from the 12th century onwards. Also, it bears out the idea that we need to look within Christianity to find the sources of secularisation.

3) From Structures of Consciousness to Moral Sources

This brief contextualisation of secularisation has extended and broadened our perspective to consider long-term civilisational shifts in structures of consciousness. While this was essential to expand and deepen our understanding of secularisation, we now need to develop a parsimonious theoretical framework. Because of the sheer scale of the process, it is simply unthinkable to write what would amount to a 'total history' of the changes in structures of consciousness that took place in Europe over the last millennium. Instead, if one is to study secularisation, it is necessary to narrow down the breadth of Nelson's analytical categories by focusing on what is core and central to the process, namely, the notions of authority and legitimacy.

The way to narrow down our framework is alluded to in the work of Charles Taylor. In *Sources of the Self*, the Canadian philosopher develops a history of the development of modern identity by looking at the 'immanentisation' of the sources of morality in Europe. While his study is not of direct relevance to our understanding of secularisation, it provides us with deep insights into the origins, development,

[186] Benjamin Nelson, "Sciences and Civilizations, 'East' and 'West': Joseph Needham and Max Weber," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.165.

dynamics, and nature of the cultural processes that led to the creation of our modern and secular worldview.[187]

The Canadian philosopher defines moral sources as the constitutive reality that empowers women and men to do and be good.[188] In turn, he defines secularisation as the shift in the moral sources of European culture from theistic and supernatural ones to "ones that don't necessarily suppose a God."[189] And he argues that this "cultural mutation by which alternative [moral] sources to the theistic became available" was fostered by the threefold immanentisation process that included (1) a renewed naturalism, (2) a new sense of inwardness, and (3) the affirmation of 'ordinary life.'[190] Knowing that these moral sources inform all notions of the good and the right, they necessarily inform ideas of legitimacy and thus stand behind all forms of established authorities.[191] In turn, it is most likely that the shift in authority and legitimating principles that characterised the secularisation of Europe resulted from the immanentisation of Europe's moral sources. Indeed, as naturalist and materialist notions of the good superseded God as the source of inspiration in the Middle Ages, pope and priests lost their authority in favour of secular rulers.

The correlation with Nelson's shift in structures of consciousness is gradually becoming apparent. Both approaches look at the socio-cultural processes whereby God disappeared as the central source of truth, legality, virtue, and fittingness and was replaced by an alternative source. But while Nelson deals with whole bodies of protocols and explores a variety of small-scale transformations in cultural symbolic (i.e., the rise of meditative practices, confession, personal responsibility for self-regulation, etc.), Taylor focuses solely on the moral source at their core. Hence, they are both mapping the same process but at different levels of analysis. And because moral sources stand right behind all notions of legitimacy, it is possible to shift our attention away from broad structures of consciousness and to focus solely on the moral sources they embody.

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[187] Taylor recently published a masterpiece on secularisation based on his previous work on the self and in which his study of moral sources is integrated to a study of humanism. Taylor, *A Secular Age*.
[188] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.93-94.
[189] Ibid., p.313.
[190] Ibid., p.316.
[191] Ibid., p.74. Indeed, as Adam Seligman argues, "ideas of authority and of self are inseparable, as certain understandings of self imply certain understandings of authority. The opposite is of course also the case." Adam Seligman, *Modernity's Wager: Authority, the Self, and Transcendence* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.6.

However, it remains essential to refine further our theoretical framework and to connect the changes in moral sources to changes in forms of authority. The connection between Taylor's moral sources and forms of legitimacy is further clarified in the following sections and in the second part of this chapter. Also, changes in morality have so far been abstracted from the broader socio-economic context, the interconnection between moral sources and the material circumstances in which people lived is considered in the last part of the chapter.

4) From Moral Sources to Changes in Authority

In the Social Sciences, as well as in International Relations, the study of legitimacy and authority was pioneered and influenced by Max Weber. Weber is generally considered to be, if not "the modern master of the study of authority," at least one of its most influential theorists.[192] Not only does Weber provide us with a comprehensive set of analytical tools for the study of secularisation, but more importantly, his typology of authority provides us with the connections between structures of consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy.

In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, Weber defines power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."[193] However, the German sociologist is not so much interested in coercive power and force *per se* as in patterned and ordered forms of submission in which there is "a certain minimum of voluntary submission" on the part of the agent.[194] In other words, he is interested in the condition in which "compliance is unproblematic and only occasional deviance needs to be policed."[195] As was argued in the first part of this chapter, these broad patterns and regularities in social action can be traced back to the ability of substantive rationality to put 'psychological premiums' on certain forms of behaviour and to institutionalise such 'normative regularities of action' within 'methodical rational ways of life.'

[192] Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (1999): p.400.
[193] Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1947), p.139.
[194] Ibid., p.297.
[195] Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," p.400.

For Max Weber, this voluntary compliance is ensured by the very nature of legitimate authority. In *Economy and Society*, he argues that at "the basis of every authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a *belief*, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige."[196] In other words, submission and obedience to authority are commended and warranted by people's belief in the authoritative nature of the normative system and the absolute principles upheld by their society. Likewise, the normative system "generates a *constitutional* structure of state in which all supreme political authority is held subject to [a] basic principle."[197] As such, enduring and stable patterns of voluntary obedience to authority result from the orientation of behaviour towards a specific canon of values and once these have become institutionalised, they come to form what Weber calls a 'legitimate order.'[198]

David Trubek defines these legitimate orders as "[1] socially structured systems which contain [2] bodies of normative propositions that [3] to some degree are subjectively accepted by members of a social group as binding for their own sake without regard for purely utilitarian calculations."[199] In turn, these orders have the specificity of orienting behaviours and actions into 'methodical rational ways of life' since they embody a "structured source of guidelines for right conduct."[200] Besides, they do so without relying on force or self-interest for their normative nature makes non-compliance abhorrent to people's sense of duty.[201] Finally, legitimate orders are upheld for two main reasons: (1) because of "a rational belief in the absolute validity of the order as an expression of ultimate values," or because of (2) "the belief in the dependence of some condition of religious salvation on conformity with the order."[202]

Weber's typology of authority provides us with the missing connections between moral sources and changing forms of legitimacy. Effectively, the *belief* on

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[196] Weber, Roth, and Wittich, *Economy and Society*, p.263.
[197] Martin Spencer, "Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority," *The British Journal of Sociology* 21, no. 2 (1970): p.130.
[198] Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," pp.1160-61. Examples of legitimate orders: economic or social structures, bureaucracies, ethical doctrines, or classes.
[199] David M. Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism," in *Max Weber 1, Critical Assessments*, ed. Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1991), p.131.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Weber and Parsons, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p.113.
[202] Ibid., p.116. Even though Weber outlined four ways in which legitimate orders can be upheld, we can safely ignore those upheld by purely affectual loyalty or out of purely selfish motives. Effectively these do not tend to last and their stability over the long durée is extremely limited. This is the reason why I only focus on two out of the four ways of upholding legitimate orders in this thesis.

which authority rests and the canon of values towards which action is oriented correspond to a very large extent to Taylor's notion of moral sources. Moreover, the institutionalisation of more secular principles into legitimate orders corresponds to the shift in structures of legitimacy at the heart of the secularisation process.[203] At this point, one may venture to define secularisation as the decline of the authority of religious institutions under the impact of the broader cultural shift in the moral sources of European societies and of the rationalisation of its structures of consciousness. Or to put it differently, secularisation is the consequences of the shift in the moral sources of legitimacy in the sphere of religious and political authority.

Finally, it should be noted that these concepts of structures of consciousness, moral sources, and legitimate orders correspond to 'ideal types' that do not exist in their pure form but rather in different admixtures. In fact, ideal types are not true representations of the world and should be considered as abstractions designed to guide the researcher by specifying the elements and factors that are to be examined. They are nothing more than useful focusing devices "to bring broad patterns of change into clearer delineation, admittedly at the cost of blurring details."[204]

I have so far relied on the work of sociologists and philosophers to build my theoretical framework and it is now time to connect my findings to the field of International Politics. Not only does IR have an important role to play in the study of the less abstract manifestations of secularisation, but more importantly, systematic studies of the different elements outlined above exist in the field. However, traditional IR remains mostly oblivious to the intricacies of rationalisation processes and civilisational changes in cultural symbolic. Besides, its predominantly state-centric outlook makes it too narrow to study a civilisational process such as secularisation.[205] It was thus essential to begin with the field that offers the least constraining tools and approach, namely, Sociology. In this context, we can now turn to the work of scholars of International Relations and to their attempts to theorise changes in legitimacy. The

[203] Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority," p.756.
[204] Richard A. Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," in *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective*, ed. Richard A. Falk, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, *Studies on a Just World Order ; No. 2* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.653.
[205] Peter Beyer argues that to accept without further qualification a state-centric approach in the case of secularisation is to assume that the boundaries of state and society coincide. However, Beyer demonstrates that to make such an assumption is to make "the mistake of adopting certain nonscientific, but culturally powerful, self-descriptions as the basis for a key sociological concept." While he accepts the relevance of a state-centred outlook, he demonstrates that it only sheds partial light on secularisation. Peter Beyer, "Secularization from the Perspective of Globalization: A Response to Dobbelaere," *Sociology of Religion* 60, no. 3 (1999): p.290.

works of Daniel Philpott, Christian Reus-Smit, and Ian Clark will be drawn upon. We will see that secularisation could be studied as a "crisis of legitimacy."[206]

[206] Christian Reus-Smit, "International Crisis of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2/3 (2007): p.147; Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods* (London: University of California Press, 1979).

B. IR's Contribution, Methodological Issues

Since the 1990s, the field of IR has witnessed a heightening of interest in subjects related to legitimacy, normative beliefs systems, and the role of ideational factors in international politics. In particular, under the impulse of constructivism in the United States, many themes that had been previously developed by the English School were revived and revised. At the heart of constructivism is a fundamental insight concerning the importance of ideas, rules, and norms in international affairs. The significance of ideational factors to any understanding of social reality was explained by Max Weber by the fact that rules and norms

> have a meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of something actually existing, partly as something with normative authority…Actors thus in part orient their action to them, and in this role such ideas have a powerful, often a decisive, causal influence on the course of action of real individuals. This is above all true where the ideas involve normative prescription or prohibition.[207]

For many prominent European sociologists at the beginning of the 20th century, ideas and beliefs were considered to be 'social facts' that, "like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action [was] pushed by the dynamic of interest."[208]

In this second part of the chapter, I draw connections between Sociology and IR, and between the different elements of our framework. I deal with various approaches to these normative belief systems developed in the field of International Politics. In particular, based on the work of Christian Reus-Smit, I strengthen the connections between moral sources and forms of legitimacy. Finally, I deal with a few methodological issues and conclude the chapter by connecting all the different facets of the theoretical framework together.

1) Constitutional Structures and Fundamental Institutions

Building on this renewed interest in ideational systems and subjects related to legitimacy, IR scholars began to study the role that such norms and rules play in the

[207] Weber, Roth, and Wittich, *Economy and Society*, p.14.
[208] Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," p.280.

formation of the international system or international society. [209] They came to describe the existence of structures of authority and legitimacy at the international level. For example, Daniel Philpott pointed out the existence of 'constitutions of international society' and Christian Reus-Smit mapped out 'fundamental institutions.' One could also mention Mlada Bukovansky's idea of 'political cultures' or Ian Clark's study of legitimacy in international society. Broadly speaking, these structures of legitimacy correspond to sets of implicit and explicit norms and rules shared by the major actors of a system and which define the holders of authority and outline expected modes of coexistence.[210] These socially shared expectations, understandings, and standards of behaviour have both a constraining and an enabling effect on their adherents.[211]

In *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, Daniel Philpott defines the international structure of legitimacy as "*a set of norms, mutually agreed by polities who are members of the society, that define the holders of authority and their prerogatives.*"[212] In a Weberian fashion, Philpott argues that constitutional norms do not imply compliance since they are not necessarily enforced: "Indeed, constitutions can be violated, and can experience aberrations and exceptions, without losing their status as constitutions."[213] When constitutions are contested, they are not necessarily replaced by new or more adequate ones (i.e., a 'revolution in sovereignty') but the probability that actions will be oriented towards them simply decreases. The norms no longer elicit widespread endorsement or support.

However, the concept of constitution of international society is limited by the fact that it tends to lump together ultimate principles of legitimacy and their institutionalisation into more basic norms and rules of collective conduct. Since secularisation primarily corresponds to changes in legitimate orders brought about by broader shifts in structures of consciousness and moral sources, it is essential to

[209] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.30. I will neither deal with the various definitions of international society nor with their intricacies and details in this thesis. Effectively, because of their focus on states and sovereignty, the works of most English School scholars are inadequate for the study of the broad cultural shifts of secularisation.
[210] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.12. Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.2. Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.14.
[211] Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.6. Ian Hurd, "Breaking and Making Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy," *International Politics* 44, no. 2 (2007): p.209.
[212] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.12.
[213] Ibid., p.22, 25.

proceed to the analytical differentiation of the two connected yet distinct dimensions of legitimacy. Because Reus-Smit has made the distinction clear and managed to differentiate 'fundamental institutions,' from 'constitutional structures' (legitimate orders), and from the 'moral purpose of the state' (moral sources), I now turn to his work.

In *The Moral Purpose of the State,* Christian Reus-Smit deals with what he calls 'fundamental institutions,' those "*elementary rules of practice that states formulate to solve the coordination and collaboration problems associated with coexistence under anarchy*" – international law, multilateralism, and so on.[214] Through his attempt to develop a theory of the origins of these fundamental institutions, Reus-Smit comes to consider the role played by the "deep constitutive metavalues that comprise the normative foundations of international society."[215] These 'constitutional structures,' as he calls them, correspond to "*coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms, that perform two functions in ordering international societies,*" they define rightful membership and rightful conduct for the units of the system.[216] Like legitimate orders, these deeper constitutional structures are very important since, as John Ruggie puts it, they "have causal priority, and the structural levels closer to the surface of visible phenomena take effect only within a context that is already 'prestructured' by the deeper levels."[217]

Constitutional structures have three main components: (1) a hegemonic belief system about the moral purpose of the state, (2) an organising principle of sovereignty, and (3) a systemic norm of procedural justice. The 'moral purpose of the state' represents the core of the normative structures and defines the ultimate notion of the 'good' served by the political arrangements. It is 'hegemonic' in the sense that it constitutes the established and prevailing form of justification sanctioned by a society.[218] Besides this moral purpose of the state, constitutional structures incorporate an 'organising principle of sovereignty' and a 'norm of procedural

[214] Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, p.14.
[215] Ibid., p.6. Philpott's constitutions of international society correspond to a very large extent to Reus-Smit's concept of fundamental institutions and should not be mistaken with Reus-Smit's concept of constitutional structures.
[216] Ibid., p.30.
[217] John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (1983): p.283.
[218] Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, p.31.

justice.' These two elements are founded on the moral purpose of the state and are largely dependent on it. While the first component plays the most important role, the three of them form a coherent set of values and norms that legitimises institutional practices and international interaction and cooperation.

The major strength of Reus-Smit's analytical framework is that, by looking at the norms and inter-subjective beliefs that shape fundamental institutions, it deals directly with the absolute principles at the heart of legitimate authority. In turn, this allows for a better understanding of the interconnections between changing absolute principles of legitimacy and the generation of the matching fundamental institutions in which all political authority is held subject to the new principles. While Reus-Smit does not directly deal with secularisation, we can see that his theoretical framework encompasses the shift in power and legitimacy at the heart of the process. Effectively, by developing a model that helps us to understand evolving patterns of moral inclusion and exclusion, Reus-Smit leads us to consider how the shift in location of decision-making and the decline in religious authority resulted from changes in constitutional structures and the moral purpose of the state at the international level. However, Reus-Smit's framework is ultimately geared towards the study of normative change through a state-centric lens and as expressed in changes in the principle of sovereignty. To this extent, he misses the complexity of the transfer of authority and legitimacy away from the transnational Church and to the absolutist states of the 17th century.

The theoretical framework developed by Reus-Smit is important because it offers a systematic and comprehensive way to connect the different elements of our own framework. By arguing that the "changes in the metavalues that comprise those structures [are] a primary determinant of systems change," Reus-Smit links the long-term systemic changes to the shifts in canon of values and to the evolving forms of legitimacy and authority.[219] His notion of meta-values can largely be connected to Charles Taylor's moral sources. Indeed, they are both defined as major normative principles and beliefs that influence social and political structures as well as forms of legitimacy. Likewise, Reus-Smit's notion of constitutional structures is akin to Weber's notion of legitimate orders since they both correspond to institutionalised norms and practices that order societies and define notions of legitimacy. Finally,

[219] Ibid., p.164.

Reus-Smit further connects changes in forms of legitimacy to changes in the norms and rules of the international order and hence to changes in forms of authority. As a result, if secularisation is to be better understood, we must primarily focus on the changes in the meta-values of the constitutional structures.

2) Epochal Changes and Seminal Periods

In *The Moral Purpose of the State*, Reus-Smit applies his theoretical framework to the cases of Ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, Absolutist Europe, and the Modern international system. He illustrates his argument through a comparative analysis of the changes in constitutional structures and fundamental institutions of four different societies of states. Other authors interested in the transformation of international normative structures have looked at periods of revolutions in sovereignty, or major epochal changes.[220] This non-linear approach to the study of legitimacy is also thought to be the most adequate by Ian Clark. In *Legitimacy and International Society*, Clark solely focuses on peace settlements for the simple reason that it is after periods of strife and tension that major changes are best observed.[221] As he notes in *International Legitimacy and World Society*,

> new principles of legitimacy tend to emerge most clearly in peace settlements at the end of major wars. Even if those wars were not always themselves the only or even the proximate causes of these shifts, they at least provided the opportunity for new ideas to take hold, and the political space for them to find their way onto the agenda….And so it would seem that the aftermath of wars become noteworthy focal points for tracing the origins of other kinds of norms as well.[222]

However, to assume that new norms, principles, and beliefs necessarily 'find their way onto the agenda' during peace settlements is debatable. Effectively, new legitimate orders result from prior changes in human consciousness and cultural symbolic and are therefore far broader and all-pervasive than what can be embodied in a peace treaty or in its organisation and unfolding. Why should one concentrate on

[220] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*. Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems* (New York Columbia University Press, 1999).
[221] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.8.
[222] Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.37.

treaties when one can get a better grasp of these ideas by looking at them prior to their adoption and translation into political niceties?

For example, the treaty of Westphalia is well-known for its establishment of the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*. However, were one to focus solely on the treaty itself, one would remain completely blind to the broader processes of naturalisation, rationalisation, individualisation, and immanentisation that were revolutionising European principles of legitimacy at the time. As a matter of fact, these fundamental socio-cultural dynamics have a profound impact on the formation of principles of legitimacy but remain untranslated during peace settlements. Scholars in the field of IR have a tendency to abstract specific facets of international relations from larger transformations in human societies and often fail to connect the former to the latter. In this context, it seems that Clark's approach is most adequate for the study of the practice of legitimacy but remains limited when applied to the study of moral sources and secularisation. In turn, the role of Historical Sociology as a tradition complementary to IR is further supported.

While I recognise the great significance and importance of revolutions and social upheavals in the generation and spread of new legitimate orders, I believe that to focus on peace settlements is needlessly restrictive and too narrow. Instead, I prefer to trace the emergence of specific facets of international relations' secular foundation during Europe's decisive periods of spiritual turmoil and socio-cultural crises. Following the British historian Geoffrey Barraclough, I devote particular attention to the 'seminal ages' of the 12th century Renaissance, of the Protestant Reformation, and of the Enlightenment and in the last chapter, I look at the extent to which the 20th century marked a comparable 'climacteric.' [223] These seminal periods have been selected to the extent that "there are certain affinities or similarities in circumstance, or in the questions with which men were coping, that make…their study particularly rewarding" for our understanding of secularisation.[224] In particular, it is during these

[223] Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, p.12. Bruce Mazlish argues that "present-day globalization is the counterpart for our time of that earlier French Revolution. Both have removed reigning institutions and the holders of authority within them, and opened the way for new configurations of power and sovereignty. Both have shattered existing barriers and transcended identities and boundaries in a novel manner…If anything, the twentieth-century rupture is more extensive and expansive than its earlier prototype." Bruce Mazlish, *The New Global History* (London: Routledge, 2006), p.112.
[224] Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, p.13.

three seminal periods that the changes in forms of legitimacy that underpinned the secularisation process took place.[225]

3) Mediatorial Elites

The issue we are now facing is that of the nature of the actors driving changes in legitimate orders. In *National Collective Identity*, Rodney Hall demonstrated that epochal changes are the result of micro-level shifts in the collective identity of the actors. But who are the actors concerned? States, nations, the working class, diplomats and negotiators at peace settlements? Throughout his work, Benjamin Nelson, drawing on Weber's concept of 'status carriers,'[226] points to a specific group of individuals located in between the micro and macro levels of analysis and that plays an extremely important social role in the processes of development, organisation, and transmission of cultural rationales and legitimate orders, i.e., the mediatorial elite.[227] Nelson argues that in every society one can discern a

> motley army of authorized and unauthorized groups and individuals who can collectively be described as the influential others – familial paradigms, extra-familial supervisors and cynosures, cultural paragons, mediatorial elites – The Grand Army of Officers and Aides…who have been trained with responsibility for…the defence of the interests of the governing powers. They are authorities in the interpretation of scripts and the establishment of the directive programs. At any given time these officers and aides have varying degrees of *formal authority*, *indirect influence* or *effective power* in respect to the operation of the mediation process.[228]

Because of their role as prime actors in the structuring and development of cultural patterns and regularities, the work of the most prominent members of this mediatorial elite will be the focus of my thesis. In particular, I will look at the new principles or

[225] Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p.9. One could also mention Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, ed. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p.17.
[226] Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," p.287.
[227] Ibid. See also Vovelle's idea of cultural intermediaries. Michel Vovelle, *Ideologies and Mentalities* (Cambridge: Polity in association with Basil Blackwell, 1990). Ch. 6. In the field of IR, the notion of 'norm entrepreneurs' is more commonly used. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norms and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998).
[228] Benjamin Nelson, "Cultural Cues and Directive Systems," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp.24-25.

'idées-forces' developed by leading ecclesiastical figures, philosophers, and political thinkers.[229] As Guenther Roth argues,

> [h]istorically priests have been the most important legitimizers of political authority… [and that today] they are rivalled and frequently eclipsed by secular legitimizers, whether they be free-lancing intellectuals or employed party ideologists. This competition has destroyed the clergy's one time monopoly.[230]

As a result, it seems important to first look at the Christian mediatorial elite, and as secularisation advances, to progressively switch attention to more secular-minded status carriers; i.e., secular theologians and philosophers.[231]

More specifically, I will look into greater details at the work of Martin Luther, René Descartes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Besides their prominence and importance for the changes in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and legitimate orders, these thinkers are widely considered to be "the begetters of…the modern conscience."[232] Their role in the formulation and spread of immanence and rationalisation is central to our study of secularisation.[233] I do not want to give the impression that secularisation "spread outward from the formulations of epoch-making philosophers."[234] Of course, the collapse of Christianity did not result from the writings of Descartes or Locke. I believe that my focus on these influential thinkers is warranted by the fact that they articulated most powerfully ideas and cultural trends that were 'already in train' and thus helped to shape and guide their 'future direction and form.'[235] Charles Taylor has explained that cultural movements are "diffuse and ambiguous, hard to pick out and define."[236] And in such a context, the philosophical formulations of these great thinkers deserve attention to the extent that they "became normative for broad movements of thought."[237] Through the systematisation and popularisation of new cultural rationales, these thinkers played an important role in the development of new forms of legitimacy.[238]

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[229] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*
[230] Roth and Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History*, p.159.
[231] Amos Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
[232] Jacques Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1929), p.4.
[233] Ibid., p.18, 46. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p.17.
[234] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.306.
[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid., p.307.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (London: Duke University Press, 2004).

My choice of thinkers is justified on a case by case basis in each chapter and the criteria for deciding who to include or omit are open to criticism. But overall, I have selected Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau because their theological or philosophical formulations were most representative of the changes in consciousness that were taking place at the time. Luther's contribution to the emergence of modernity has been recognised by Weber, Nelson, Maritain, and countless others.[239] The case of Thomas Hobbes is more complex, but for now it is enough to note that his philosophical contribution reflected the 17th century shift in the European intellectual consciousness.[240] The influence of Descartes and Locke has also been most significant in the onset of our modern and individualised form of consciousness.[241] Finally, I look at Rousseau's oeuvre in great detail since he completed the rationalisation of Christianity initiated by Luther and fostered a major shift in legitimacy during the 18th century.[242] As Henri Bergson remarked, Rousseau was "the most powerful of the influences which the human mind has experienced since Descartes."[243] Many of the philosophers I deal with have long been recognised as important for the formation of our modern form of consciousness. But overall, I believe that these thinkers, individually and as a group, have developed ideas and resources concerning the secularisation of Europe that have been used by their contemporaries and that remain powerfully available for us to draw on to make sense of our current condition.

Some may argue that such an approach is biased and elitist and cannot provide an accurate depiction of the situation for it entirely ignores the more general social

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[239] Benjamin Nelson, "Self-Images and Systems of Spiritual Direction," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.51. John Herman Randall, *The Career of Philosophy: From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment* (London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

[240] Brian R. Nelson, *Western Political Thought: From Socrates to the Age of Ideology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p.128. Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p.58. Leo Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," in *Hobbes Studies*, ed. K. C. Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965).

[241] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.157. Carl Lotus Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), pp.1-31. Peter Gay, *The Enlightenment : An Interpretation*, vol. 1, The Rise of Modern Paganism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p.37. Gerald R. Cragg, *Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century* (1964), pp.5-6. ———, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason: A Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of England 1660 to 1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), p.77, 114.

[242] Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, p.147. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.964. Joan McDonald, *Rousseau and the French Revolution, 1762-1791* (London: University of London Athlone Press, 1965), p.164. Lord Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, ed. John N. Figgis and Reginald V. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1910), pp.15-16.

[243] Henri Bergson, "La Philosophie Française," *La Revue de Paris* 15 Mai (1915): p.8.

context or the intellectual matrix out of which the works of the mediatorial elite emerged. As Skinner puts it, because "political life itself sets the main problems for the political theorists ... [it is] essential to consider the intellectual context in which the major texts were conceived."[244] However, I believe that my approach is not open to such criticisms since the narrative I am developing is broadly concordant with well-known studies of this very intellectual matrix. More specifically, my narrative will be built upon the work of Walter Ullmann, Reinhard Bendix, and Jonathan Israel and will only be original insofar as it draws connections between elements that had previously remained unrelated.

Nevertheless, to focus on status carriers is not without problems. Effectively, what is the connection between mediatorial elites, rationalisation, legitimate orders, and collective identities? To what extent do ideas influence actions and behaviours? To what extent can we argue that the ideas and beliefs of the status carriers trickle down and come to be widely shared and accepted throughout the population? The study of the mediatorial elite calls for the clarification of the relationship between ideational and material factors.

4) Idealism and Materialism

In *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, Daniel Philpott explores the role ideas played during the great socio-political transformations Europe experienced in the 17th century. Through a study of the ideas of Protestant revolutionaries, he demonstrates how religious beliefs and ideas challenged the medieval constitution of international politics and paved the way for the rise of the modern constitution of sovereign states. Philpott demonstrates that this revolution was sustained by the work of a limited number of intellectuals or 'entrepreneurs of ideas' whose concepts and principles came to be diffused by intellectual communities, activists networks, and other types of 'couriers.'[245] As a result, large social swaths came to be converted and the medieval constitution lost validity. Philpott concludes with the claim that "[t]here must first be

[244] Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Renaissance.*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.x.
[245] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.53, 69.

an intellectual revolution for there to be a political revolution."[246] This point has also been made by Jonathan Israel who argued, in the case of the Enlightenment, that the demolition of the monarchical world would have been "impossible, or exceedingly implausible without a prior revolution in ideas – a revolution of the mind."[247]

From my special interest in normative systems and legitimate orders, and from my focus on the ideas and beliefs of members of the mediatorial elite, some will conclude that I subscribe to some sort of idealism. However this is not the case. Far from rejecting materialistic approaches to systemic changes, I argue for the complementariness of the two perspectives. The significance of ideas does not rule out the importance of material factors and raw power. History shows that ideas of legitimacy are often shaped by, and in favour of, the most powerful actors anyway.[248] Nevertheless, material might is not enough for an actor to achieve its objectives or to establish a stable form of rule.[249] As Reus-Smit explains,

> issues as fundamental as the nature and implications of sovereignty and the institutional architectures of international societies are inexplicable without reference to culture, identity and norms. Ideational factors such as these give meaning to material structures and processes and define actors' identities and interests.[250]

Therefore, despite the importance of material factors, I will treat 'only one side of the causal chain' and solely focus on legitimating principles.[251]

Following Weber once again, I frame the relationship between values and material interests by using the concept of 'elective affinities,' i.e., the 'fit' between the values and ideas chosen by actors and their material interests. While ideas are powerless in and of themselves, social actors are equally powerless without a normative system through which to frame and carry out their interests. In fact, ideas are abandoned if they are not 'elected' and have no 'affinity' with the interests of the mediatorial elite.[252] As such, this relationship is one of reciprocal causation in which

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[246] Ibid., p.51.
[247] Jonathan I. Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.714. Ultimately, intellectual and political change developed in tandem and it is difficult to isolate one factor as the source of change.
[248] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*.
[249] Reus-Smit, "International Crisis of Legitimacy," pp. 162, 65.
[250] Christian Reus-Smit, "The Idea of History and History with Ideas," in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.121.
[251] The Author's Introduction, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Unwin University Books, 1930), p.27.
[252] Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," pp.284-85.

"material and ideal interests mutually reinforce one another to create especially powerful motivational forces capable of sustaining quite resilient patterns of conduct."[253] This in turn further strengthens my position concerning the importance of the mediatorial elite in the study of secularisation for they are those who will elect and judge the 'fittingness' of ideas. By acting as legislators of ideas, these cultural intermediaries are introducing or at least pressing for the adoption of new structures of consciousness and principles of legitimacy.

Because issues of elective affinities and legitimacy are barely quantifiable, it is most compelling to develop some sort of interpretive explanation.[254] As Clark and Reus-Smit explain, since

> the political salience of social recognition for an actor's or institution's power depends upon the institutional context and the degree to which social support maps on to the actor's or institution's intended realm of political action... our assessments of whether a subject is experiencing a legitimacy crisis are based on judgements about whether its level of social recognition has reached such low levels that it must either adapt (by re-establishing legitimacy, or exchanging material for social sources of power) or face disempowerment.[255]

My aim will not be to provide a causal historical explanation of how secularisation came about or of the precipitating conditions that led to the cultural shift. Instead, following Taylor, I will give an account of the new normative systems and canons of values that replaced those of the Church. I will provide an interpretation of why people found the new worldview more convincing, meaningful, and inspiring and thus changed the justificatory framework that previously sanctioned political authority. This thesis is not idealist since it rejects the idea that an interpretive study of idées-forces is *sufficient* to answer the secularisation question.[256] It only assumes that ideational structures, far from being epiphenomenal, shape the development of material interests.

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[253] William R Garrett, "Reinterpreting the Reformation: A Weberian Alternative," in *Time, Place, and Circumstance: Neo-Weberian Studies in Comparative Religious History*, ed. William H. Swatos, *Contributions to the Study of Religion* (London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.135.
[254] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.200.
[255] Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit, "Preface," *International Politics* 44(2007): p.155.
[256] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.204.

Conclusion:

From the driving force behind the secularisation process, through to changes in forms of legitimacy, and down to the very transfer of property, functions, and power from Church to state, the essential elements of the theoretical framework have been outlined. It is now time to pull all the strings together and to summarise the findings. Drawing on the work of Max Weber, I explained that the secularisation of Europe was the outcome of rationalisation processes whereby reality was organised according to a meaningful and coherent worldview based on specific canons of values. I thus went on to sketch a theoretical foundation for the study of these processes by drawing on the work of Benjamin Nelson. I explained that rationalisation processes are best studied by focusing on the decay, transformation, and replacement of what Nelson calls the 'structures of consciousness,' namely, those cultural rationales that establish the cultural standards in matters of truth, virtue, legality, etc.

More specifically, I made a case for shifting attention from the broad cultural rationales to the sole normative principles and beliefs that they embody, that is, their moral sources. Indeed, more than the structures of consciousness, it is the moral sources at their core that inform notions of legitimacy and authority and that thus stand behind the secularisation process. As Weber rightly argued, all forms of authority are founded on normative patterns and regularities associated with specific canons of values. And it is the rationalisation of these values or moral sources and their institutionalisation within immanent legitimate orders that ultimately facilitated the transfer of authority from the Church to the state at the heart of the secularisation process. As such, if secularisation is to be studied, it is necessary to focus on the shifts in moral sources and legitimate orders as well as their interconnections.

In the second part of the chapter, I turned to the field of International Relations to find the appropriate analytical tools for the study of legitimacy and authority. Within IR, concepts similar to Weber's notion of legitimate order or Taylor's idea of moral sources have been developed and it is Reus-Smit who provides the most comprehensive equivalents. In particular, his notions of moral purpose (i.e., moral sources) and constitutional structures (i.e., legitimate orders) embody most perfectly Weber's emphasis on the power of values and ideals in the ordering of the world into

a meaningful unity.[257] The connections that Reus-Smit drew between the two concepts helped us to further integrate the various elements of our analytical framework.

Now that the different levels of the framework have been outlined and that their interconnections have been clarified, the concept of secularisation can be redefined as the founding of new legitimate orders under the impulse of broader changes in moral sources and shifts in structures of consciousness. The end product is the process of transfer of authority from the Church to the state outlined by Bryan Wilson.[258] The different dimensions of my theoretical framework can be combined and represented as follows:



Figure 1: The 4 Levels of the Secularisation Process

[257] Yet, to mark my attachment to the depth of Weber's sociology, I retain the term 'legitimate order.'
[258] Wilson, "Secularization: The Inherited Model," pp.11-12.

Before moving on to the study of secularisation *per se*, I would like to come back to the two research questions that motivate this enquiry, namely, (1) What has been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the early 21st century? In light of our theoretical framework, we can see that the study of the secularisation process will be carried out by looking at the epochal changes in the meta-values that legitimise changing constitutions of international politics. This calls for an interpretive study of evolving forms of legitimacy and this will be the aim of the following four chapters. The second research question cannot be answered at this stage. However, it is clear that if the 'Westphalian presumptions' and 'Enlightenment myths' are coming under increasing challenge (Chapter 2), it could well be that a broader shift in legitimacy is taking place, calling for a shift in the contemporary foundation of international politics.

4. Secularisation, Act I: Medieval Origins

Here begins the interpretive study of the secularisation of Europe. Based on the definition of the process and on the theoretical framework developed in previous chapters, I look at the first two epochal changes connected to the secularisation of Western societies, the 12th century Renaissance and the 16th century Protestant Reformation. The importance of these two socio-cultural revolutions has been recognised by countless scholars and their foundational significance for the development of Western modernity has been established.[259]

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the 12th and 13th centuries saw the onset of a gradual shift in Europe's structures of consciousness from faith to reason-based rationales. Through inter-civilisational encounters between Western Christianity and Islam, Byzantine Christianity, the Mongols, China, Africa and the Jews, the cultural symbolic of Western Europe was radically transformed. The most important borrowing was that of the Hebrew and Arab translations of Aristotle and Plato's philosophical oeuvres.[260] The new form of logic that emerged as a result of these cultural encounters marked "the point of departure for the great searching of the Western spirit."[261] For Benjamin Nelson, the 12th century Renaissance constituted the "*prime seedbeds of the institutional and cultural developments of the Western world*" and corresponded to "*a watershed in the international history of the world*."[262]

In *Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters*, Nelson argues that structures of consciousness rooted in faith (type-2) entailed "that individuals committed to faith feel themselves to be part of the truth, *a manifestation of the divine*

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[259] Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, p.59. Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928). R. N. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
[260] Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," p.99.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Benjamin Nelson, "*Eros, Logos, Nomos, Polis*: Shifting Balances of the Structures of Existence," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.214. This point has also been made by Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.84.

in expression of the universal will or sovereign design. Existence in the faith is truth."[263] Because it required the development of verifiable rationales to confirm the truth of the faith, this form of consciousness begged for the rationalisation of religion. This task was assumed by "the appearance of a science called theology."[264] Besides, the need for a comprehensive and methodical analysis of the relevant doctrines called for the emergence of religious virtuosi who could placate God on behalf of the less gifted masses. Ultimately, the rationalisation of faith structures through debate, theological refinement, and differentiation gave birth to the rational arrangements specific to consciousness-type 3.

The emergence of reason-based rationales was marked by the growing acceptance of new moral sources based on the *Libri naturales* and on the notion of 'nature.' This new source of morality accessible in the 'Book of Nature' challenged many established dogmas and social structures founded on the 'Book of Creation.'[265] "From the year 1210 to the year 1325 there occurred a complete overhauling of the structures of legitimation and theoretical rationales of Christian theology and natural philosophy."[266] The ensuing development of a natural theology marked a 'half-way house' between medieval theology and the emerging natural sciences characteristic of rationalised structures.[267] These breakthroughs to a new logic and form of legitimacy prepared the way, step by step, for the modernisation and rationalisation processes distinctive to Europe.[268]

This first epochal transformation was marked by a shift in structures of consciousness, the rise to prominence of new moral sources, and the creation of new principles of legitimacy behind authority. However, contrary to the other seminal periods I will be dealing with in the subsequent chapters, the 12th century Renaissance essentially corresponded to an intellectual revolution. It is only a few centuries later, with the Protestant Reformation, that a complete reorganisation of societies took place. As Nelson argues, the theologies of Luther, Calvin, and others were essential to achieve the "fundamental reorientation of the social and cultural patterns of the Western world" initiated in the 12th century.[269]

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[263] Emphasis added. Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," p.95.
[264] Ibid., p.94.
[265] _____, "Sciences and Civilizations, 'East' and 'West': Joseph Needham and Max Weber."
[266] _____, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," pp.99-100.
[267] Ibid., p.100.
[268] Ibid., p.101. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, p.103.
[269] Nelson, "Self-Images and Systems of Spiritual Direction," p.51.

The Reformation by no means corresponded to the practical 'implementation' of the intellectual changes that took place four centuries earlier. Rather, the 12th-century recovery of Aristotle and the spread of naturalism brought up to the fore issues and questions that were answered in various and unexpected ways (i.e., the nature of God and man, the existence of universals, etc.). In particular, the re-emergence of nominalism challenged the philosophical foundations of Scholasticism and led to the development of important themes which then came to influence Protestantism.[270] However, it is mostly in the role they both played in facilitating the legitimisation and establishment of a secular political order that the 12th-century Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation converge.[271]

Overall, Protestantism acted as a major force for secularisation by rejecting the mediatory role of the Church in the name of God's omnipotence. By proclaiming the independence of the political realm from within Christianity, Luther, Calvin, and others provided a theological justification for a perceptible shift in attitudes towards secular government. Their success was due to the fact that "they did not deny the need for supernatural salvation, but found a mechanism for it outside the Church."[272] Indeed, they created a powerful moral project for 'this world' which they defended with a potent ethic of conviction. The religious sanction of their vision was fundamental to secure their success over the papacy and to transform the European political arena.

Nowadays, it is widely held that the Reformation unintentionally paved the way for the emergence of capitalism, liberalism, modern science, and secular government.[273] Through their development of alternative theologies based on ideas of

[270] As Michael Gillespie notes, Luther's theology originated "out of the deep spiritual problems that arise from his encounter with nominalism." Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.127. Scholastics believed in the existence of universals and saw the world as the expression or embodiment of divine reason. In opposition, the Nominalists rejected the existence of universals and denied that God could be understood by human reason. These ontological differences had very different implications for the nature of God and man.

[271] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.420. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, p.151.

[272] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.106.

[273] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. I would like to mention three of the most important interpretations of the impact of Protestantism on the development of modernity. First, the sources of modern individualism can be traced back to the Lutheran reliance on faith alone. From a dichotomous organisation that opposed a handful of professionals and virtuosi who placated God on behalf of the society to the religiously illiterate laity, Protestants preached an orderly organisation in which one was only guided by one's interpretation of The Holy Book. This favoured 'the priesthood of all believers' and individual 'calling' at the expense of institutionalised piety and a religious division of labour. Martin E. Marty, *Protestantism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp.51-53; 116-17; 42-54. Secondly, the modern notion of progress finds its roots in the Protestant conception of life and God. In fact, the Church held that sins could be forgiven by paying religious professionals to perform

individualism and progress, Protestants profoundly influenced philosophical thinking to such an extent "that without their labors it is inconceivable that European culture could have pursued the course it did."[274] The Christian reform movement that enflamed the European continent for over a century inaugurated a new 'era.'

The main thread running throughout this chapter is that the secularisation process was characterised by the transfer of power, functions, and resources from the Church to secular elites. Through the study of the changes in moral sources and forms of legitimacy, I trace this process of transfer that questions and contradicts secularism's neutrality and objectivity. Far from developing as an independent sphere distinct from religion, I demonstrate that the 'secular' was carved out and emerged from the sacred core of Christianity. In this chapter, I argue that the first step of this process corresponded to the legitimisation and sanctification of the 'secular' from within theology. In turn, this eventually resulted in the gradual appropriation and usurpation of religious resources by secular rulers as well as in the sacralisation of earthly authority.

In the first part of the chapter, I focus on the 12th century Renaissance and on the shift in moral sources from God to the notion of 'nature.' I begin with an outline of the Christian source of morality and then explain how, as a result of intellectual effervescence, the legitimate orders that sustained the Church were challenged. Building on Greek philosophy, but also on Europe's Roman heritage, secular rulers began to systematically claim access to the power and resources of their divinely-ordained counterparts and thus to threaten the papacy. Through theological rationalisation, the notion of 'nature' gained autonomy while remaining infused with a sacred character and divine purpose. In turn, the realm of the natural began to elicit widespread support and its growing acceptance resulted in the increase in legitimacy

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exercises such as prayers or Masses. From this cyclical purification that proved a major source of income for the Church but a mockery of morality, Reformers developed a linear and irreversible view of life in which the world had been set in motion by a watchmaker-God. Such a conception unintentionally encouraged people to understand life in terms of progress. Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World*, pp.15-16. Thirdly, the modern focus on material success can be connected to the Calvinist notion of predestination. As Randell argues, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination implied that those who enjoyed material success were those that would be saved since God would not allow sinners to prosper. Thus, if individuals prospered, they could take their material success as a sign from God that they were part of the chosen ones. Keith Randell, *John Calvin and the Later Reformation* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), p.45, 49.

[274] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.105.

of secular forms of authority. This change was a key precondition to the major shift in legitimate orders that took place in the 16th century.[275]

In the second part of the chapter, I provide a narrative account of the Protestant Reformation. In particular, I explain how Luther proclaimed the independence of the political realm from the religious realm. With the Reformation, the demands of secular rulers for autonomy were accepted. Kings and princes were finally granted divine legitimacy from within Christianity. The theologies of Luther and Calvin proved challenging to the European order of the 16th century and led to radical changes in the political organisation of societies. By legitimising the shift in authority away from the Church, their doctrines led to the shattering of the unity of Christendom and to the transfer of the sacredness of the Church to the state.[276]

[275] Bendix, *Kings or People*, p.9.
[276] Ibid.

A. Moral Sources, from God to Nature

During the Middle Ages the constitutional structure of government was based on the canon of values of Christianity and as Charles Taylor explains, "God was in some way or other bound up with the only moral sources they could seriously envisage."[277] Through the process of secularisation, this arrangement was challenged and criticised. The Church lost its politico-religious authority and slowly, kings and princes became more influential. To better understand this transformation whereby divine authority lost its supremacy and was supplanted, it is necessary to delve into the work of medieval historians and students of the papacy. In particular, it is important to introduce the typology of changing forms of principles of legitimacy developed by Walter Ullmann. Once the typology outlined, I trace the emergence of the new source of morality during the Middle Ages. I look at the rediscovery of Aristotelianism, the challenge posed by his naturalism, and its impact on the medieval legitimate order. I conclude that, however paradoxical it may be, these changes at the heart of the secularisation process were carried out by prelates from within Christianity.

1) Walter Ullmann and the Two Themes of Government

In his landmark *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*, Ullmann studies the changes in the sources and origins of law and of governmental power in Europe. The Cambridge Professor of Medieval History demonstrates that medieval political thinking was characterised by a shift between two "conceptions of government and law diametrically opposed to each other."[278] In the 12th century, the moral sources behind medieval forms of government shifted and led to the replacement of the Church's 'descending theme' of government with an 'ascending theme.'

[277] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* pp.310-11.
[278] Walter Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1964), p.20.

The descending thesis conceives of absolute power as resting with God. This divine power is entrusted onto a trustworthy mediator (i.e., the pope, the emperor, or the king) who can then distribute it downwards via a hierarchy of officials. As such, the power devolved from the top to the bottom of this imaginary hierarchical pyramid is never original but always "derived from 'above.'"[279] In this scheme, the moral source is God and it informs all notions of legitimacy.[280] As Maurice DeWulf argues, whether power is held by rulers, legalists, the papacy, or a representative republic, "in any case, it always derives back to God as its source."[281]

On the contrary, the ascending thesis designates a populist conception of government in which the source of power is located in the community: "[w]hatever power is found in the organs of the government, whatever power they have in creating law, is in the last resort traceable to the people."[282] As such, the power held by the representatives of the people at the top of the pyramid is always derived from below. The moral source is no longer God but 'the people.'

Even though God was the supreme source of legitimacy up until the Middle Ages, some manifestations of the ascending theme of government remained present throughout the medieval period and provided "a living bridge between the primitive European period and the new Europe."[283] In fact, stressing continuity, Ullmann notes that "after roughly a thousand years of dominance of the descending thesis the ascending came into its own again."[284] Although the ascending theme of government became predominant from the 12th century onward, it only reached full maturity in the 18th century.

The descending thesis gained momentum in the 4th century with the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire in 380. This acceptance of the ultimate authority of God took place shortly after the shift from consciousness type 1 to consciousness type 2. Likewise, the shift to the ascending theme of government in the 12th century was concomitant with the shift from faith to reason-based cultural rationales. In the Middle Ages, the secularisation process corresponded to the shift in structures of

[279] Ibid., p.21.
[280] Maurice De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1922), p.244.
[281] Ibid., p.243.
[282] Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*, p.20.
[283] Ibid., p.24.
[284] Ibid., pp.24-25.

consciousness and to the passage from the descending to the ascending mode of government.

The two theses correspond more to ideal types than to a true depiction of reality. In fact, Ullmann himself acknowledges the existence of anomalies and the discrepancy between theory and reality.[285] While his theory might be too parsimonious for some medievalists, it provides us with a strong and adequate framework to study the civilisational changes in structures of consciousness and moral sources that were taking place at the time.[286] Even though Ullmann's work may contain omissions, mistakes, and questionable interpretations of important texts and even though his emphasis on the importance of Aristotelianism is contested, his narrative seems to fit with the broader socio-cultural trends that marked the advent of modernity in Europe.[287] Also, Ullmann's overall argument is supported by Reinhard Bendix's study of the long-term shift in authority from kings to the people.[288]

Now that the typology has been outlined, we can look at the shift in moral sources. The following sections sketch the historical struggle for authority between the Church and secular powers that took place throughout medieval Europe. First, I look at the main characteristics of the descending order and then I sketch the return of the ascending thesis as a result of the emergence of a more attractive moral source. The recovery of the works of Greek philosophers in the 12th century introduced a new source of morality that challenged the papal claims to spiritual and temporal supremacy and that led to the emergence of an autonomous natural and political realm.

2) The Descending Theme in St Augustine and Gelasius I

Before the 13th century, even though religion and politics were integrated into the papacy and the differentiation of the political from the religious sphere did "not make historical sense," some sort of evolution in this direction can be traced back

[285] Walter Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1967).
[286] For example, Francis Oakley has criticised Ullmann for his omissions, mistakes, idiosyncratic 'interpretations' of certain texts, and rather loose use of key terms such as 'nature' or 'grace.' Francis Oakley, "Celestial Hierarchies Revisited: Walter Ullmann's Vision of Medieval Politics," *Past and Present* 60, no. 1 (1973).
[287] Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.101-02.
[288] Bendix, *Kings or People*.

from the early days of Christianity.[289] The incredible spread of the faith since its inception called for the indispensable development of a complex institutional structure to organise all Christians. In practice, this meant that even though it was "pursuing religious ends, the leadership of the Church was compelled to adopt political ways of behavior and political modes of thought."[290] As Sheldon Wolin argues,

> By the end of the second century, [Christianity] had ceased to be a loose association of believers, bound together by ties of doctrine and the vague primacy of the early apostles, and had become instead an institutionalized order...it was gradually realized that a believing society did not differ from any other kind of society in its need for leadership, governance, discipline, and settled procedures for conducting business.[291]

From 380 onward, by an imperial decree, Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire, and by the same token, "the papacy…became focalized as a governmental institution."[292]

Such an evolution in the nature of the Church marked a turning point which led to a profound questioning of the legitimacy and status of the authority of both pope and emperor. By the mid-5th century, "there was no basic difference between the concept of the monarchic function of the pope and that of the emperor."[293] The Church had become a politico-religious complex and such a dualism of authority within Christianity needed to be justified and legitimised.[294] How could the Church be intertwined with the Empire yet avoid becoming a political instrument? How was the brute military power of the Roman Empire to be reconciled with the message of Christ? Such a task was undertaken by St Augustine and for centuries, his answer prevailed.

St Augustine (354-430) famously considered politics to be a necessary evil that was on the whole most regrettable but unavoidable. For the Bishop of Hippo, men's post-lapsarian condition called for the creation of some sort of coercive arrangement to tame their passions, greed, and selfishness. The subjection of man to man through some form of government was a divinely sanctioned solution to punish the sinners, test the faithful, and control man's destructive impulses. Before one could

[289] Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p.16, 18.
[290] Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.88.
[291] Ibid., p.96.
[292] Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought*, p.20.
[293] Ibid., p.22.
[294] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.99.

hope to reach the blissful state of eternal life in heaven, one had to be a pilgrim in this world and endure the harshness of the present abode. Thus, the Augustinian ideal painted a picture of political communities as "artificial and purely conventional institutions designed (albeit at the behest of divine inspiration)… to control the consequences of fallen human nature."[295]

For St Augustine, politics was essentially limited in its ability to fulfil men's quest for eternal salvation. Since the most fundamental needs of men were those that no earthly society could ever satisfy, the form of government was of little significance. As St Augustine put it: "As for this mortal life is concerned, which is spent and finished in a few days, what difference does it make under what rule a man lives who is soon to die, provided only that those who rule him do not compel him to do what is impious and wicked?"[296] Earthly life was ultimately fleeting and transient and as long as a political government – whether pagan or Christian - could secure peace, order, and allowed the faithful to pursue their religious quest for salvation unhindered by political concerns, it had fulfilled its function within the divine plan.

In his *De Civitate Dei*, St Augustine outlined the existence of two 'cities,' the earthly city or *civitas terrena*, and the city of God or *civitas dei*. Both cities are characterised by the direction in which the love that sustains them is directed, "the earthly by love of self extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love of God extending to contempt of self."[297] Far from equating the city of God with the Church and the earthly city with Rome, St Augustine argued for the essential intermingling of the two.[298] As a result of his teachings

> [an] intricate pattern of religion and politics, intersecting but not absorbing, was fashioned to teach that the political and the spiritual were distinctive, however complementary they might be at certain points; that while each ought to benefit the other, neither could achieve the other's salvation; and since it followed that the one ought not to be judged by the mission of the other, each had to be understood to an important degree in its own terms.[299]

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[295] Cary J. Nederman, *Medieval Aristotelianism and Its Limits: Classical Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy, 12th-15th Centuries* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1997), XI: 4-5.
[296] Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Book V:17. p.217.
[297] Ibid., Book XIV: 28. p.632.
[298] It should be noted that while Augustine himself did not equate the City of God with the Church, the equation was taken for granted in the 5th century. One has to wait until the late Middle Ages for his doctrine of the two cities to be properly understood. Joseph Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450* (New York: Routledge, 1996), p.42.
[299] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.111.

Yet, ultimate allegiance was to the divine order.[300] For the Bishop of Hippo, the wretchedness of earthly existence still required one to look beyond the present life and to the divine qualities of the city of God.

Two generations after the death of St Augustine, the authorities of both Church and emperor were justified through papal pronouncements. Gelasius I (pope between 492 and 496) developed the doctrine of the Two Swords as a means to reaffirm the authority of the Church and the unity of Christian society. Gelasius argued that *sacerdotium* (the Church) and *regnum* (the emperor), though with separate powers, corresponded to the spiritual and the temporal arms of a united Christian society, a duality within Christ's body. As to the relationship between these two 'governments,' Gelasius I was quick to add that the emperor had the duty to assist the realisation of the divine plan in this world through the use of his sword "for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil."[301] As a member of Christianity, the emperor was a son (*filius*) of the Church, remained under the pope's jurisdiction, and was denied any autonomy. By the end of the 5th century, it was agreed that *papa a nemine iudicatur*, i.e., 'the pope is judged by no one.' Besides sacramental power (*potestas ordinis*), the pope came to enjoy some sort of jurisdictional power if not jurisdictional sovereignty (*potestas jurisdictionis)*.[302]

While these pronouncements by no means marked the separation of religious affairs from temporal ones, they laid down the foundation for a 'division of labour' within Christianity. Indeed, in religious matters, the clergy remained in control, while in temporal matters the clergy obeyed imperial laws because of the divine source of the emperor's power. But both authorities were subject to the authority of God.[303]

The descending themes of the Augustinian and Gelasian theological doctrines remained widely accepted until the 11th and 12th centuries. Political theories that called for the complete submission of earthly rulers to spiritual powers set "the predominant tone of political debate in the Latin West down to the thirteenth century

[300] This conclusion ultimately removed ethics from this world and confined morality to the other-world. This denigration of the importance of politics curiously established some form of autonomy for the state. Howard Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992), p.27.
[301] *Romans* 13:4
[302] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.32.
[303] Romans 13:1 "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God," Matthew 22:21 "render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's," and Christ's say to Pilate in John 19:11 "You would have no power over me if it had not been given you from above" legitimated the authority of secular rulers in profane matters.

and, in many respects, beyond."[304] In fact, one has to wait for the inter-civilisational encounters of the 12th century, the rediscovery of Aristotle, and the Thomist synthesis, to witness major challenges to the doctrines of the Two Swords and of the Two Cities. Combined with an increasing resistance of rulers to accept their role as 'sons of the Church,' these theological challenges proved devastating to the Church's authority and marked an epochal shift in structures of consciousness, sources of morality, and forms of legitimacy. The self-defeating nature of the papacy's claim to supreme authority and the 'discovery' of a new source of morality led to the establishment of a new political entity, the state.

3) Nature as a Moral Source

At the political level, the 12th and 13th centuries witnessed the emergence of proto-territorial states in England, the Norman kingdom of Sicily, and France.[305] However, the striving of territorial entities within the universal jurisdiction of the Church posed major political, theological, and legal issues.[306] While the medieval view whereby temporal and spiritual powers coexisted within the Church had proved a viable alternative for centuries, the papacy and lay rulers began to question this arrangement in a fundamental manner. Both parties came to recognise the essential need for an ultimate authority.

As was explained in the previous section, through a gradual process that took place over centuries, the Church had acquired

> many of the attributes of a state – for example, enduring institutions – and was developing others – for example, a theory of papal sovereignty. The fact that churchmen were deeply involved in secular politics, that no ruler could function without their advice and assistance meant that political theories and the administrative techniques of the Church had a direct impact on the lay government.[307]

[304] Dyson in the introduction to Thomas Aquinas, *St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings*, ed. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.xxiv-xxv.
[305] Joseph Reese Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970), p.10.
[306] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.83.
[307] Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, pp.15-16.

With the Church becoming far more assertive and influential as an "autonomous European-wide institution," Pope Gregory VII (1025-1085) thought to increase the Church's independence from non-Christian elements through its centralisation under the pope's command.[308] Out of the Investiture Contest that ensued, the Church came strengthened as a "fully centralized and rationalized" ecclesiastical institution.[309] In fact, through its victory over the Holy Roman Empire the Church was settled "in its long-term direction as a body of power and coercion" and "gained leadership, if not total control of European society."[310]

Accordingly, the 12th century introduced major innovations in the theory of papal monarchy.[311] Numerous canonists and publicists began to challenge the dualist approach to authority and to develop hierocratic theories of power to assert the supremacy of the papacy. The pope took over the title of Vicar of Christ and began to claim 'fullness of power' - *plenitude potestatis*. Along with his bishop's mitre, he came to acquire a crown - *regnum*.[312] Claims to political supremacy found their utmost expression with Innocent III.[313] Under his leadership, the medieval papacy reached its 'apogee.'[314]

Arguing that the salvation of all was entrusted onto the pope, Innocent III (1161-1216) proclaimed his ability to govern in such a way as to halt and combat any hindrance that might be in the way to the salvation of the Christian society. Therefore, he not only claimed the right to universal jurisdiction, but arguing that sin was the main obstacle to salvation, maintained that whenever sin was implicated, the pope had a duty to act. Under 'reason of sin' (*ratione peccati*), the papacy was given power to intervene in any situation.[315] As Adda Bozeman explains

> Under Innocent III the church had become an international state. It had the power to set large armies in motion…to control the mighty and the meek, to raise funds by direct taxation, and to bring offenders to justice. It controlled education, propaganda, social

[308] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.87. Walter Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages* (London: Methuen, 1972), pp148-49.
[309] Donald A Nielsen, "Inquisition, Rationalization and Sociocultural Change in Medieval Europe," in *Time, Place, and Circumstance: Neo-Weberian Studies in Comparative Religious History*, ed. William H. Swatos, *Contributions to the Study of Religion* (London: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.109.
[310] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.96. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, p.21.
[311] Colin Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989), p.205.
[312] Ibid., p.130.
[313] Ibid., p.205.
[314] Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*, p.225.
[315] Ibid., p.224.

> welfare, and the courts, and it wielded the awesome power of eternal life and death.[316]

As a result of Gregory VII and Innocent III's challenges, the Church distanced and separated itself from secular political authorities. This separation strengthened the papacy but begged for the definition of the role secular rulers were now to play. Because their religious authority was no longer justified, kings and princes had to find another foundation on which to establish their power. As Joseph Strayer put it, "the Gregorian concept of the Church almost demanded the invention of the concept of the State."[317] Such a demand found an answer in three major intellectual transformations.

The first transformation was the "emerging rationalism of medieval jurisprudence" through the "full-scale rationalization and systematization from 1050 to 1300 under the influence of the universalizing rationales of Roman law."[318] As a result of this process, "an increasingly sophisticated mode of discourse for the elaboration of ideas relevant to political matters," was created.[319] This first transformation led the Church to develop a "centralized, bureaucratic and juridically oriented" outlook.[320] While "from 1073 to 1119 every pope was a monk," during the 12th and 13th centuries they were all lawyers.[321]

The second transformation consisted in the rediscovery of Roman literature – especially of the work of Cicero. This transformation will be considered within the frame of the third and most important of the three transformations, namely, the recovery of the great works of Aristotle. As many medievalists have noted, the rapid introduction and circulation of many works of Aristotle "entailed a rather radical re-orientation in the realm of thought."[322] So radical a re-orientation that, Ullmann

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[316] Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p.256.
[317] Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, p.22. See also Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, p.79.
[318] Nielsen, "Inquisition, Rationalization and Sociocultural Change in Medieval Europe," p.112.
[319] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.84.
[320] Nielsen, "Inquisition, Rationalization and Sociocultural Change in Medieval Europe," p.110.
[321] Morris, "Medieval Christendom," p.136.
[322] Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*, p.231. Cary Nederman argues that 12th century scholars were acquainted with Aristotle's philosophy by means of alternate sources prior to the rediscovery and translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotelian ideas were already integrated into the intellectual life of medieval Europe and the recovery of the *Ethics* only 'confirmed and reinforced' ideas that were familiar and even traditional. Cicero played a very important role in this regard and was central to this 'underground tradition' that circulated elements of Greek philosophy. Nederman, *Medieval Aristotelianism and Its Limits*, I:59, 67, 75.

claims, "[i]t would be hard to point to any historical phenomenon of doctrinal order which was to effect such far-reaching changes."[323]

Cary Nederman has noted that even though "Aristotle was perhaps the single most decisive classical figure in medieval moral and political philosophy," the idea of a swift and ubiquitous 'Aristotelian revolution' in the Middle Ages is essentially a 'scholarly chimera.'[324] While it is true that Ullmann exaggerated the importance of Aristotle's *Politics* as a catalyst in the shift from descending to ascending order, I believe that the impact of Aristotelianism must be studied to the extent that it reflected and articulated the profound transition in forms of consciousness that was taking place at the time.[325]

The recovery of *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* through Christianity's encounters with Islam allowed for the rediscovery of Aristotle's political thought during the late 13th century. The introduction of ancient Greek philosophy in the context of the Middle Ages proved inspiring and provocative as it provided rulers with the tools they had until then lacked to dispute the ecclesiastical order and the theological foundation of its legitimacy.[326] Aristotle's conception of man as a political animal by nature proved a direct challenge to Christian revelation. Because it implied that the realisation of men's nature could only be achieved within the perfect *polis*, it offered a way for people to realise their potential independently of the Church and without the mediation of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Not only was the political dimension of mankind thought to be superior and to encompass all others, but more importantly, the origins of the political community and the authority of the rulers were no longer found in God but in nature.

Aristotle's philosophy culminated in the view of the state as the supreme community of citizens and as the by-product of the proper functioning of the law of nature. The establishment of the 'natural' realm cannot be underestimated. In effect, earlier challengers to the pope's theocracy, "because they spoke the same language, used the same Bible and the same similes, and worked with the same patristic

[323] Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*, p.231.
[324] Nederman, *Medieval Aristotelianism and Its Limits*, p.ix, II:193-94. Cary Nederman argues that the importance of Aristotle is exaggerated and that Cicero's influence was of greater significance. This dispute does not affect the line of argument developed in this thesis since ultimately both Cicero and Aristotle shifted medieval scholarship in a naturalistic direction.
[325] Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters."
[326] Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*.

equipment as their opponents did," remained unsuccessful.[327] But in the 13th century, as Ullmann argues, "what generations of writers and governments had been seeking was now found in the simple application of the concept of nature. The State was in a word, a natural thing, and herewith the conceptual gulf between it and the Church was opened up."[328] Ultimately, Aristotle allowed for the creation of a reality outside the wholly Christocentric intellectual framework of the papacy. Revelation was now confronted by the Aristotelian source of morality. Armed with the concept of nature, the ascending theme of government and law was recovered at the expense of the papacy, paving the way for the general differentiation of the religious and political spheres at the heart of the secularisation process.[329]

4) The Political Implications of 'Nature'

Faced with the Aristotelian threat, Pope Gregory IX (1143-1241) had no choice but to forbid the study of his works until they had been 'examined and purified.' Amongst others, Thomas Aquinas undertook this vast task of bringing Aristotle within the sphere of the Church and making it 'compatible' with the revealed Word of God. The work of Aquinas provided the foundation to the appearance of a 'systematic theological science' and to the emergence of an 'official doctrine' defended by a multitude of 'experts' in law and theology.[330] The resulting synthesis allowed for Aristotle's ideas to be introduced and included within the medieval intellectual milieu, and thus to serve as a catalyst for the shift from faith to reason-based structures of consciousness.[331] The birth of what Nelson called a 'new theology' marked the advent of rationalised cultural symbolic.[332]

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[327] ———, *Medieval Political Thought*, p.193.
[328] Ibid., p.179.
[329] It is important to note that in some cases Aristotelianism was marshalled to strengthen the papacy as in the case of Giles of Rome.
[330] Nielsen, "Inquisition, Rationalization and Sociocultural Change in Medieval Europe," p.114. "This 'rationalization' of the contents of faith helped create a Church 'rich in dogmas.'"
[331] Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," p.99. Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.529. In this respect, the importance of Aquinas is also noted by Figgis who argues that his work "may be taken as the beginning of the later medieval rationalising political thought." John Neville Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius 1414-1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916), p.6.
[332] Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," p.96. Swanson, *The Twelfth-Century Renaissance*, pp.115-38.

In the 13th century, Aquinas (1225-1274) introduced political theory to medieval Europe and worked toward the development of a science of government based on natural human reason. The work of the Dominican monk was deeply influenced by his thorough study of Aristotle. In particular, the ideas of a teleological and self-sustaining nature and the definition of man as a social and political animal became important pillars of the Thomist philosophy. In an Aristotelian fashion, Aquinas held that man's natural instincts would ultimately bring about the development of an organised community, of which the pinnacle was the state. The state was a natural thing that emerged according to natural laws and through the use of natural reason. Knowing that nature was God's creation and possessed its own intrinsic laws it could now operate without the spiritual mediation of an ecclesiastical body.

This reappraisal of the relationship between the Church and the state opened up a major conceptual gulf: "[t]he State was a natural product; the Church a supra-natural product."[333] In fact, the natural origins of political government meant that the Church was no longer necessary for the proper conduct of political affairs as these were no longer divine in any sense, but natural. Conversely, because the state worked according to the divine laws as expressed in nature and accessed through reason, it could function independently from the Church.[334] Civil law was "thus attributed an importance in spiritual terms that it had not heretofore enjoyed. Most importantly, this link between nature and spirit made politics, from a Christian perspective, an important and worthy endeavor."[335] Earthly politics was no longer incompatible with the spiritual realm as St Augustine had upheld, but could now have a positive function of its own in facilitating "man's attainment of the [supernatural] end for which he was created."[336] Likewise, as the upshot of the workings of natural and rational laws, the political realm and secular rulers were given an autonomous role in God's plan.[337]

The redrawing of the boundaries of the spheres of politics and religion led Aquinas to revive the theory of the Two Coordinate Powers according to which "the temporal power was inherent, not derived, and that the secular state must be

[333] Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought*, p.179.
[334] For Aquinas, the use of reason was "nothing less than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." Aquinas quoted in Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History*, p.250.
[335] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.92.
[336] Frederick Charles Copleston, *Aquinas* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p.242. Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.92.
[337] Williams, *International Relations in Political Theory*, p.41.

recognized… as part of God's plan and as rooted in man's nature."[338] In *Scripta Super Libros Sententiarum*, Aquinas judged that

> Spiritual and secular power are both derived from the Divine power, and so secular power is subject to spiritual power insofar as this is ordered by God: that is, in those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul. In such matters, then, the spiritual power is to be obeyed before the secular. But in those things which pertain to the civil good, the secular power should be obeyed before the spiritual, according to Matthew 22:21: 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' Unless perhaps the spiritual and secular powers are conjoined, as in the pope, who holds the summit of both powers.[339]

For Aquinas, political institutions were thus "justified on a purely human plane, independently of religious values, which do not alter the natural order of which the state is a necessary expression."[340]

The recognition of the importance and autonomy of politics, though seriously qualified, marked the clear-cut separation of the two realms and allowed Aquinas to reconcile Aristotle with Christianity. Through his attempt to bring Aristotle within Medieval theology, St Thomas ultimately, though unintentionally, argued that the intelligibility of nature did not depend on revelation and led medieval political thought in a more naturalistic direction.

Likewise, the philosophy of Aquinas marked a turning point in the acceptance of the descending thesis of government and law. The legitimisation of the existence of the state independently of the supernatural realm meant that the institutional foundation of Christianity and the corresponding monopoly of the papacy were now superfluous. Even though nature was God's creation, the creation of the natural provided an alternative source of legitimacy for the kings. Besides, it only took a generation for the link between God and nature to be severed and for the laws of

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[338] Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History*, p.245.

[339] Aquinas, *St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings*, Scripta Super Libros SententiarumII, Dist. 44, quaest. 3, articulus 4. p.278. In *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas applied a similar principle to the government of the faithful by unbelievers: "here we must note that dominion and authority are institutions and human right, whereas the distinction between the faithful and unbelievers arises from Divine right. Now Divine right, which comes from grace, does not abolish human right, which comes from natural reason. And so the distinction between the faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not abolish the dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful. Nonetheless this right of dominion and authority can be justly abolished by the sentence or ordinance of the Church, as having the authority of God: because unbelievers, by reason of their unbelief, deserve to lose their power over the faithful, who are made children of God. But the Church sometimes does this, and sometimes she does not." ———, *St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings*, IIaIIae 10, p.271.

[340] A. P. D'Entrèves, *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought: Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, Richard Hooker* (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p.24.

nature to draw their validity from their inherent reasonableness, a source of validity independent from the divine.[341] Overall, what Aquinas achieved was to make "available the intellectual equipment by which his successors – notably Marsilius of Padua – were at last to begin to unravel the long established interweaving of secular and spiritual themes in European political discourse."[342]

5) The Ascending Challenge to the Medieval Order

The spread of Aristotelianism and the revival of natural philosophy meant that "man came to be repossessed and reinstated in his full powers, as a *homo* in the ethical sphere or as a *civis* in the political field."[343] This resurrection of natural man was soon followed by the claim to the position and function that his *fidelis* counterpart had held for a millennium or so. As a matter of fact, the Thomist combination of the natural realm to the supernatural realm as part of a 'double ordering of things,' paved the way for a dualism: the *fidelis* had now to share the socio-political space with the natural man, i.e., the citizen or *civis*. Also, it implied that one could be considered either from a political or a moral standpoint, thus facilitating "the atomization of man's activities."[344]

The Aristotelian and Thomist ideas deeply influenced the newborn study of the art of government. And by the end of the 14th century major works had been written on the relation between the political and the supernatural; "Nothing less than an intellectual revolution had progressively occurred."[345] As Jean Elshtain argues, "'political theory' in the Middle Ages and early modern period was not the possession of a few articulate, self-possessed political theorists labouring away in their studies but, instead, was the making manifest of a whole climate of opinion that permeated the culture."[346]

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[341] The full transition took place over centuries. For example, Hugo Grotius considered the divine to be fully intelligible in natural law.
[342] R.W. Dyson in Aquinas, *St Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings*, p.xxxvi.
[343] Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, p.124.
[344] ———, *Medieval Political Thought*, p.170. This separation of politics from morality or of Politics from Ethics may well be the cradle of the tenet held by Realist scholars in the field of IR, namely, that ethics and morality have nothing to do with politics and war. ———, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, p.119.
[345] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.134.
[346] Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Sovereignty: God, State, and Self* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p.67.

Among the many thinkers to foster this climate of opinion, three of them are of particular importance to our subject: Dante Alighieri, John of Paris, and Marsiglio of Padua.[347] These scholars dealt with important issues brought up to the fore by the recovery of Aristotelianism and the spread of naturalism. The themes and ideas they developed based on their more or less successful use of nominalism greatly influenced political thinking for centuries, especially that of the Reformers. In particular, Marsiglio developed a strong version of the ascending theory of government which he systematically supported with nominalist and naturalist arguments.[348] In the remainder of this section, I outline the most important implications of the work of these three scholars for our understanding of the process of secularisation.

In *De Monarchia,* Dante (1265-1321) attempted to tackle three broad issues pertaining to the necessity of monarchy, Roman history, and the divine source of monarchical authority. The third theme was meant as an address and contribution to the debate that was raging at the time on the relationship between the emperor and the papacy. Through a careful development of Thomist themes, Dante maintained that the pope's authority only extended over the supernatural realm, and thus, that the natural realm was left to the emperor and secular rulers. Arguing that 'what comes from nature comes from God,' Dante denied any papal right of supervision over political affairs.[349] Instead, based on his acceptance of the Thomist idea that grace only perfects nature, the Italian poet argued:

> Temporal government does not receive its existence from the spiritual, nor the power which is its authority, nor even its operation as such; but it does receive help from the spiritual government to operate more powerfully by the light of grace with which the blessing of the supreme pontiff infuses it in heaven and on earth.[350]

As a result of this separation, Dante maintained that the mediation of the clergy between God and man was supererogatory. Moreover, based on his beliefs in the divine origins of the emperor's authority and in the natural necessity of having a single sovereign, he established imperial supremacy in temporal affairs.

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[347] Medievalists disagree on this issue and for example, Cary Nederman argues that John of Paris and Marsiglio were not so much influenced by Aristotle as by Cicero. Ultimately, this does not affect the logic of the argument developed in this thesis since both Roman and Greek scholarship worked towards the immanentisation and naturalisation of politics. Nederman, *Medieval Aristotelianism and Its Limits*. Cary J. Nederman, *Community and Consent: The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Padua's Defensor Pacis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
[348] Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p.102.
[349] Alighieri Dante, *De Monarchia*, ed. E. Moore and W. H. V. Reade (Oxford: Clarendon, 1916), p.88.
[350] Ibid., p.71.

In conjunction with this re-working of the relation between the natural and the supernatural, Dante further developed the ascending thesis of government which Aquinas had begun to restore. While Aquinas had developed the themes of the 'will of the people' and political representation, Dante went further and came to argue that 'the function of any right government is to see that men exist for their own sakes,' making in turn the government the servant of the people. These developments in political thought at the turn of the 14th century marked the beginning of the modern concept of popular sovereignty and Dante's work was "a prophecy of the modern State."[351]

In a similar vein, John of Paris (1255-1306) challenged the papal claim to authority over both temporal and spiritual realms. Following Aquinas, he defined man as a political and social animal and located the origins of political authority in natural law. The position adopted by John of Paris differed from Aquinas' in that he starkly marked the difference between the Church as a purely mystical entity and the state as a purely natural one. By the same token, he allocated purely sacramental powers to the former and purely jurisdictional powers to the latter.

In his *On Royal and Papal Power,* John of Paris equated the spiritual Church with the supernatural, and the temporal political government with the natural.[352] This clear-cut opposition of the two spheres was accompanied by the claim for the independence of the two realms from one another's jurisdiction. As such, in theory, any temporal object was relocated under the authority of the state, leaving only the spiritual lands to the Church.

Following Aquinas and Dante, John of Paris argued that the power of the king was derived from the will of God as expressed through the will of the people. In the cases of both Church and political government, rulers and holders of offices drew their power from elections or the consent of the people. In fact there was a dual source of authority in the case of prelates; their power was "not from God through the pope but immediately from God and from the people who elect or consent."[353] However, like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Dante, John of Paris conceived of nature as being the creation of God, and as such there remained a major step to be taken before men could

[351] Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought*, p.25.
[352] John of Paris, *On Royal and Papal Power*, ed. Arthur P. Monahan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
[353] John of Paris quoted in Brian Tierney, *The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300: With Selected Documents* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p.208.

become independent from the Father and His divine law. Such a step was taken by Marsiglio of Padua in *The Defender of the Peace*.

Opposing natural reason to revelation, Marsiglio (1290-1342) argued that the relationship between nature and God was not factual but rather a matter of faith that could not be demonstrated through the use of natural reason. As a consequence of the unknowable nature of this relationship, the Italian medieval scholar affirmed the strict separation of the natural and supernatural realms. From this separation, there followed that the only object of study that could matter to a student of government and political science was the natural political entity devoid of any supernatural features.

Contrasting with the idea of Thomas Aquinas that 'grace does not do away with nature but perfects it,' Marsiglio broke the link between the two. Politically, this meant that secular communities became ends in themselves and could not be perfected by any supernatural element. Whether citizens were Christians or pagans mattered very little since the constitutive element of "the only public body that lived on its own laws and on its own inner substance," the state, "was the citizen pure and simple."[354] By the same token, the authority of the laws did not reside in its divine source but was derived from the universal body of citizens within the political community, i.e., the will of the people.[355] Laws were no longer revealed but made and the 'congregation of the faithful' gave way to the 'congregation of citizens.'

Like Dante, Marsiglio maintained that the only domain reserved to the Church was the care of the souls. There followed that the Church's wealth or 'coercive jurisdiction' were irrelevant if not damaging to the proper conduct of its tasks.[356] He saw the papacy's 'plenitude of power' as a major source of strife and disruption to the tranquillity that humans naturally seek. The Italian scholar criticised the juridical powers of the Church and argued that these had been unjustifiably seized from both Christ and princes, the sole judges in divine and human matters respectively. Far from holding any such juridical powers, coercive function, or 'intrinsic dignity,' Marsiglio argued that the priesthood was of conventional origins and only held a voluntary position of 'stewardship' as well as "a power of ordering church ritual and of regulating persons in respect to the practice of divine worship in the temple or house

[354] Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought*, p.206.
[355] Marsilius of Padua, *The Defender of the Peace*, ed. Annabel S. Brett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Discours I, Chapter 2, sections 3-9. pp.66-72.
[356] Ibid., Discourse II, Chapter 4, section 5. pp.161-63.

of God."[357] Instead, Marsiglio claimed that the Roman emperor was the supreme holder of coercive authority. As the elected prince of the universal body of faithful citizens, the emperor was endowed with all powers over the priesthood. Indeed, Marsiglio thought that the restoration of the emperor to his rightful position was "the only means of restoring the tranquillity that every realm must desire."[358]

This redrawing of the roles and spheres of influence of both religion and politics marked the secularisation of the papal-hierocratic doctrine. As Michael Wilks argues, "the *Defensor Pacis* is in many respects nothing more than an Aristotelianised version of the traditional medieval theory of the Christian Roman empire."[359] Even though his ideal society remains Christian, an important shift in emphasis has taken place. As Wilks notes, Marsiglio's society no longer exists for a religious end, but instead, "the Christian religion is permitted to flourish in the society for the purely secular end of internal security... The human society of Marsilius is a complete inversion of the papally-inspired Christian society, and in nearly every way is an exact parallel to it."[360]

The Marsiglian shift in emphasis away from grace and towards nature placed an important stress on the natural realm as the new arena for human salvation. This process of 'disenchantment' paved the way for what Weber called the shift towards inner-worldliness - i.e., participation within the world and the concentration of human behaviour on worldly activities as a means to salvation.[361] For Donald Nielsen, it is this shift in orientations towards inner-worldliness that was linked with "the rise of universities, the growth of towns, the emergence of new handicrafts and forms of intellectual and manual labor, and the rationalization of cultural life in general."[362]

6) Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, I looked at the historical struggle for authority that took place throughout the Middle Ages between the Church, the Roman Empire,

[357] Ibid., Discourse II, Chapter 15, section 8. p. 316.
[358] Ibid., p.xxxi.
[359] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.113. Some scholars have argued that Marsiglio's philosophy had Ciceronian elements. For example, Nederman, *Community and Consent*
[360] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.113.
[361] Weber, Roth, and Wittich, *Economy and Society*, p.542.
[362] Nielsen, "Inquisition, Rationalization and Sociocultural Change in Medieval Europe," pp.20-21.

and secular rulers. Having introduced Ullmann's framework for the study of the shift in principles of law and government, I first outlined the main characteristics of the papal descending theme of government. Then, I moved on to consider the shift in moral sources from God to the notion of 'nature' under the impulse of the recovery of Aristotelian philosophy and the growing importance of natural reason. I explained how, as a result of intellectual changes, the constitutional structures legitimating the authority of the Church became challenged. The notion of 'nature' became widely accepted and led to the increase in legitimacy of secular forms of authority based on the ascending theme of government.

The assertion of the self-sufficiency of the political realm threatened the entire politico-theological structure of medieval Europe and defied the papal claim to universal sovereignty. Effectively, the origin of the authority of rulers could now be legitimated by means independent from the papacy. Instead, the workings of natural laws and processes – that could be accessed through the use of natural reason - were to culminate in the creation of natural political communities made up of citizens and independent from ecclesiastical institutions. And since nature was a divine creation, papal powers did not extend to the realm of the state - provided that the latter was in adequacy with natural reason. By the same token, the state came to be given an autonomous role in God's Design. The first step in the secularisation process (i.e., the theological legitimisation of the 'secular') was well under way.

The fact that medieval thinkers and theologians granted secular rulers a role to play in the divine plan by providing peace, security, and justice to their 'citizens' begged for the establishment of adequate judicial and administrative institutions outside those of the papacy. As such, the rationalisation of theology and faith-structures of consciousness paved the way for bureaucratic structures of government.

Medieval thinkers such as Dante, John of Paris, and Marsiglio of Padua spearheaded a profound purge of all Christian and supernatural elements from the Augustinian doctrine of the Two Cities and the descending theme of government. While political studies started within a Christian framework, they slowly came to emancipate themselves from their own creator thanks to the creation of the realm of the natural. Politics came to be excised from its religious foundation, thus secularising an originally Christian science. Ultimately, the papal system was undermined "by the

very men who believed that they were doing everything in their power to build it up."[363] As Wolin argues in *Politics and Vision*:

> The irony, however, lies in the fact that the Church paid a price, one that was strictly exacted at the Reformation, of a loss in religious vitality… [T]he politicization of religious thought, which had all along accompanied the emerging of a purely religious identity of the Church into a politico-religious compound, opened the way for the development of an autonomous body of political theory which a compromised theology could not contain.[364]

As part of this civilisational shift towards reason-based structures of consciousness, principles of legitimacy and authority slowly shifted away from God *per se* to the more immanent, natural, and rational principles embodied in His creation. The end result was the slow secularisation of European societies.

However, this profound change was essentially intellectual and one has to wait until the end of the 15th century and the Protestant Reformation to witness major practical changes and the application of the ascending theme. [365] In the words of John Figgis, it is only with Luther that "the idea of the freedom of the lay powers to be found in Dante, in Marsiglio, in Wyclif, steps upon the stage of practical politics."[366] However, even though the writings of John of Paris and Marsiglio undoubtedly foreshadowed the secularisation of political thought in the 16th century, their ideas only marked "the origins of an intellectual tendency" of which the full impact two centuries later presented "a quite different order of problems."[367] This 'time-lag' might well be due to the fact that the 12th century rationalisation of theology solely corresponded to some sort of theoretical rationalisation which, as Weber argued, does not have any impact on practice since incapable of putting psychological premiums on actions. These ideas developed during the Middle Ages failed to be 'elected' by members of the mediatorial elite and their impact on the organisation of societies remained limited. Therefore, it is in such a context that the Protestant Reformation deserves to be studied.

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[363] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.10.
[364] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.88.
[365] Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought*, pp.222-28. For the case of Dante, see John Milbank, "The Gift of Ruling: Secularization and Political Authority," in *After Modernity? Secularity, Globalization, and the Re-Enchantment of the World*, ed. James K. A. Smith (Waco: Baylor University Press 2008), p.24. For the case of Marsiglio, see John Bowle, *The Unity of European History: A Political and Cultural Survey* (London: Cape, 1948), p.194.
[366] Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought*, p.70.
[367] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.630 n.2.

B. Legitimacy After the Protestant Reformation

The advancement of rationalised structures of consciousness and the religio-political upheavals that accompanied their spread and maturation took a radical turn on 31 October 1517 when Martin Luther nailed his list of complaints about the Church on the door of the cathedral of Wittenberg. This seemingly insignificant event was to become the symbol of the genesis of a profound and fundamental transformation of Europe.[368] As a matter of fact, Luther's complaints were the reflection of deeper and widespread social changes that proved radically challenging to the order of the Catholic Church. The Protestant Reformation that subsequently enflamed Europe led to the Wars of Religion and the transformation of the international order.

The second part of this chapter looks at the origins and nature of the Protestant Reformation, as well as its consequences for the socio-political and theological organisation of European societies in the late Middle Ages. Because the doctrinal disputes it fostered served as vehicles for the expression of wider socio-political grievances, the Reformation had a very profound and long-lasting impact. With the Reformation, kings and princes were finally granted autonomy and divine legitimacy from within Christianity. In fact, it is Luther, Calvin, and others who legitimised the shift in authority from the Church to 'the people.' Their theologies proved challenging to the European order of the 16th century and led to radical changes in the political sphere. As a result, the unity of Christendom was shattered and the sacredness of the Church was transferred to the secular realm.

In this second part of the chapter, after brief descriptions of the 'secularisation of the papacy,' the 'politicisation of the Church,' and their origins in heated theological disputes, I outline Luther's doctrine of 'justification by faith alone' as well as its socio-political consequences. While the Reformation started with Luther's attempt to depoliticise theology and to restore the repute of the message of Christ, it ended with Calvinism and the recovery of the political dimension of religion. I conclude that by enshrining the usurpation and appropriation of religious powers and resources by secular political forces, the advent of reformed theological doctrines

[368] G. R. Elton, Tom Scott, and E. I. Kouri, *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (London: Macmillan, 1987), p.15.

paved the way for the adoption of new legitimate orders and thus marked a major turning point in the secularisation of Europe.

1) The Secularization and Politicisation of the Papacy

The Reformation was primarily a religious endeavour concerned with theological issues as well as broader concerns over corruption, injustice, and misbehaviour.[369] Among the many factors that made the Reformation possible, hardly any of them were new, not even the call for a profound reform of Christian institutions.[370] But the impact of the charisma and doctrines of gifted men such as Martin Luther, John Calvin, or Huldrych Zwingli proved decisive. While critiques of the Church and papacy had been developed in previous centuries, what was truly revolutionary was the development of religious doctrines that led to practical changes. Contrary to their predecessors, Luther, Calvin, and others developed substantive rational doctrines that put direct psychological premiums on actions. The values or canons of values at the heart of these doctrines instilled a sense of ultimacy, gave a direction to life, and thus facilitated the institutionalisation of normative regularities and rational ways of life.[371]

In a context of widespread discontent with the state of the Church these 'ethics of conviction' encouraged all challenges to the monopolistic status of Christendom.[372] In particular, the papacy's systematic exploitation of all sources of income – annates, tithes, sales of dispensation, offices, indulgences, and absolutions – stirred up the jealousy of local princes and national monarchs. In this, they were largely supported

[369] A. G. Dickens, *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966), pp.34-41.
[370] Owen Chadwick, *The Reformation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp.11.39.
[371] Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," p.307. Kalberg, "Max Weber's Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History," p.1164. It is important to note that it is not because someone behaves according to a canon of values that he necessarily upholds the values associated. For example, in the case of the development of Protestant sects, membership was not only composed of individuals who believed in the Protestant values. In effect, many individuals were led to join the congregations for the benefits membership would bring to their business. Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," pp.305-10. The situation was similar in the case of capitalism.
[372] Vivian H. H. Green, *Renaissance and Reformation: A Survey of European History between 1450 and 1660* (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), p.109.

by a rising middle class antipathetic to the mediatory authority of the Church and interested in the latter's riches.[373] Moreover,

> the steady dissolution of the feudal economy together with the effects of the widespread economic depression of the later middle ages resulted in the emancipation of the peasantry from their servile condition…They resented more than ever the domination and financial demands…of their ecclesiastical…overlord, the Church.[374]

And on top of this, "[w]hat was new was the extent of men's awareness of the defects in Church order and the possibility of remedy."[375] The invention of printing allowed for the widespread availability of the Old and New Testaments, and by the same token, many found that the papacy had little support in the Holy Book. The accumulation of all these social factors provided an extremely fertile ground for the religious and political revolution that disintegrated "the Christian Church-system and its supernatural foundation."[376] Slowly, there ensued "a gradual, though clearly perceptible decomposition of Europe as a single ecclesiastical unit, and the fragmentation of Europe into independent and autonomous entities which were soon to be called national monarchies or states."[377] Ultimately, "this fragmentation heralded the withering away of the papacy as a governing institution operating on a universal scale."[378]

The unpopularity of the papacy reached its maximum height at the end of the 15th century. Besides the fact that a large number of priests were engaged in adultery and promiscuity, had children, were married, brawlsome, had no knowledge of Latin, or simply did not fulfil their basic function, one of the most serious problems was the 'secularization of the papacy.'[379] In fact, popes were chosen among Italian princes, and as such, in a context of power struggles among the different authorities, the Holy See began to narrow and 'Italianize' itself in order to safeguard its independence.[380] Its interest in aggrandising its territory and developing an effective state in central Italy led the papacy to get involved in a rigorous form of taxation. In turn, popes had

[373] Robert Wuthnow, *Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and European Socialism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.65.
[374] Green, *Renaissance and Reformation*, p.116.
[375] Chadwick, *The Reformation*, p.22.
[376] Ernst Troeltsch and W. Montgomery, *Protestantism and Progress: A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1912), p.90.
[377] Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*, p.270.
[378] Ibid.
[379] Stephen J. Lee, *Aspects of European History 1494-1789* (London: Methuen, 1984), p.12. Delumeau, *Catholicism between Luther and Voltaire*, pp.155-59.
[380] Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*, p.314.

to develop political relations with rulers and powerful families, leading Innocent VIII to marry his legitimised son to a daughter of the Medici family in the Vatican palace itself.[381] As a consequence, "in several respects the picture which the papacy presents in the last decades before the great revolution, was one of a leading Italian renaissance court. The pope was an Italian prince whose interests were local and purely egoistic."[382]

At the local level, diocesan bishops tended to mirror this process by taking over the functions of feudal lords. This overlapping of ecclesiastical and secular functions may well have found its utmost expression in the case of Thomas Wolsey's accumulation of the titles of Lord Chancellor to Henry VIII, Archbishop of York, Bishop of Lincoln, Prince-Bishop of Durham, Cardinal, and Canon of Windsor; and in the case of Antoine du Prat, French diplomat, who was rewarded by the King with the archbishopric of Sens but only entered the cathedral for his funeral.

Alongside the secularization of the papacy, a second reason behind the Reformation can be found in the increasing politicisation of the Church during the Middle Ages. As Sheldon Wolin notes,

> the remarkable spread of Christianity and the evolution of its complex institutional life were accompanied by a politicization of the Church…In pursuing religious ends, the leadership of the Church was compelled to adopt political ways of behavior and political modes of thought…merging [in turn] the purely religious identity of the Church into a politico-religious compound.[383]

This evolution of the Church was accompanied by the realisation that a religious society, like any society, requires some sort of discipline, leadership, and judicial system. By the same token, the Church came to accept secular power as a legitimate instrument to advance its ends.

This overlap of ecclesiastical and political functions led to the development of the territorial conception of the church at the heart of the Protestant Reformation. And by 1500, the Church had already been compelled to delegate some of its control over the local ecclesiastical body and administration and the publication of papal briefs to the national monarchs.[384] By the same token, rulers were indirectly in control of the

[381] Ibid., p.319.
[382] Ibid., p.322.
[383] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* pp.87-88.
[384] H. G. Koenigsberger, George L. Mosse, and G. Q. Bowler, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Longman, 1989), p.161.

property of the Church, and therefore, had access to ecclesiastical revenues.[385] Ironically enough, while

> it was through the operation with the unadulterated monarchic role of the pope that the papacy became Europe's focal point in the Middle Ages…it was the operation with this self-same monarchic function which on the threshold of the modern period reduced the papacy to a power situated in central Italy.[386]

Besides the politicisation of the papacy, the economic situation of the peasantry, and the grievances of a growing bourgeoisie were essential to the Reformation. While these factors were by no means new, they found a powerful mode of expression through the theological doctrines of charismatic and potent elites.

2) Luther on Spiritual and Temporal Authorities

This dissatisfaction with the secularisation of the papacy and the politicisation of the Church found its expression in Martin Luther's theological critique of Christian institutions. While material-practical interests proved essential to the Protestant revolution, only the development of a substantive critique of Christianity based on an alternative canon of values permitted the development of new forms of legitimacy, institutions, and ways of life.[387]

As a temporal state as well as a spiritual authority, the Holy See had built up an extensive political, judicial, and fiscal system so as to finance its grandiose projects. The enormous resources that were needed were partly gathered through the sale of indulgences (i.e., the remission of sins by a money payment to the Church). However, the theological foundation for this practice was deeply questionable and came under increasing criticism, especially with Pope Sixtus IV's extension of their scope to souls in purgatory. As Dickens put it, "Luther's initial revolt was provoked by this spectacle of a salvation assurance company with branches in heaven, earth and purgatory."[388]

In opposition to this mechanistic approach to man's salvation that proved a major source of income for the Church but a mockery of morality, Luther developed the doctrine of 'justification by faith alone,' a doctrine that came to be foundational to

[385] Chadwick, *The Reformation*, p.26.
[386] Ullmann, *A Short History of the Papacy in the Middle Ages*, p.332.
[387] Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," pp.305-10.
[388] Dickens, *Reformation and Society in Sixteenth-Century Europe*, p.35.

most of his socio-political and theological critiques of the papacy.[389] The doctrine of justification was concerned with the actions one should undertake, as an individual, to be saved and absolved from one's sins.[390] Luther, breaking with the Church's materialistic assertion that "the soul flies out of purgatory as soon as the money thrown into the chest rattles," argued that justification could only be reached through the acceptance to put one's full trust in the promises of God and Christ.[391] As a result, good works and the respect of the Christian law became secondary to, and a proof of, one's unswerving faith rather than the other way around.[392] Such dispensation from 'material' duties came to be referred to as the 'liberty of the Christian.'

Because individual faith was all that was needed for men's justification and because "the Word of God was the start and the finish of his faith," Luther called for the believer's total reliance on the Holy Scriptures.[393] The role of the priesthood as the crucial intermediary between man and God was challenged. In turn, the Church was dispossessed from its divine legitimacy and priests lost both their exclusive right to preach and administer the Sacraments and their monopoly over scriptural interpretation. In accordance with this focus on faith alone, Martin Luther and John Calvin preached an orderly organisation in which one was only guided by one's own interpretation of the Book. This emphasis on 'the priesthood of all believers' favoured individual 'calling' at the expense of institutionalised piety, and hence worked towards the development of religious pluralism, individualism, and the atomisation of faith.[394] Also, Jürgen Habermas argues, the Reformation was a key historical event in the establishment of the modern principle of subjectivity.

> With Luther, religious faith became reflective; the world of the divine was changed in the solitude of subjectivity into something posited by ourselves. Against faith in the authority of preaching and tradition, Protestantism asserted the authority of the subject relying upon his own insight.[395]

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[389] In this context, to justify is defined as "to declare free from the penalty of sin on the ground of Christ's righteousness, or to make inherently righteous by the infusion of grace." It is related to the themes of the redemption and absolution through Christ's sacrifice. In the Oxford English Dictionary Online Edition s.v. 'justify.'

[390] Alister E. McGrath, *Reformation Thought: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.91.

[391] Martin Luther, *First Principles of the Reformation: Or, the Ninety-Five Theses and the Three Primary Works of Luther Translated into English*, ed. Henry Wace and Karl A. Buchheim (London: J. Murray, 1883), p.8. thesis 27.

[392] Maurice Barbier, *Religion & Politique Dans La Pensée Moderne* (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1987), p.18.

[393] Green, *Renaissance and Reformation*, p.125.

[394] Marty, *Protestantism*, pp.51-53; 116-17; 42-54.

[395] Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p.17.

Through this subjective turn and transfer of religious legitimacy from the papacy to the individual believer, a complete overhauling of the medieval legitimate order was accomplished within theology. Religion was 'laicised.'[396]

The importance of the doctrine of 'justification by faith alone' cannot be underestimated as its socio-political consequences were far-reaching.[397] Effectively, medieval Catholicism had divided the world in a binary manner – yet unified within the body of Christ. The Augustinian 'doctrine of the Two Cities' defined two separate realms, one spiritual and solely controlled by the Church, and one temporal governed by secular ruler under the supervision of the pope. This division of the spheres of authority permitted the Church to enjoy a dominant status and to control all dimensions of European politics.

However, Luther refashioned this 'doctrine of the Two Cities' into the 'doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.' His preaching on the priesthood of all believers presupposed the essential belonging of all Christians to the spiritual estate, an estate that up until then had been exclusively reserved to the ecclesiastical body. However, because all men were not Christians in the true sense, worldly governments were needed to enforce the divine will – and were thus brought into God's Kingdom. In Luther's words: "Let no one think that the world can be ruled without blood; the sword of the ruler must be red and bloody; for the world will and must be evil, and the sword is God's rod and vengeance upon it."[398]

Luther argued that kings, princes, or magistrates were performing a divine role of structuring and ordering an essentially sinful world.[399] Likewise, he explained the necessary nature of the temporal kingdom by the fact that

> The social corpus of Christendom includes secular government as one of its component functions. This government … should operate freely and unhindered, upon all members of the entire corpus,

[396] Hans Hillerbrand, "The Age of the Reformation," in *The Christian World: A Social and Cultural History of Christianity*, ed. Geoffrey Barraclough (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), p.199. Amos Funkenstein argues in a similar vein that "Theology became 'secularized' in many parts of Europe in the original sense of the word: appropriated by laymen." Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*, p.5.

[397] Maritain and Preus argue that Luther's doctrine of salvation is the key to his theology. Thus, I believe that I am justified in focusing especially on his notion of 'justification by faith alone.' Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, p.17. Robert D. Preus, "Luther and the Doctrine of Justification," *Concordia Theological Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (1984).

[398] Luther quoted in Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.142.

[399] McGrath, *Reformation Thought* p.207.

> should punish and compel where guilt deserves or necessity requires, in spite of pope, bishops, and priests.[400]

Therefore, he even required true Christians to go by secular law. In his *On Secular Authority: how far does the Obedience owed to it extend?*, Luther explained that

> the Sword is indispensable for the whole world, to preserve peace, punish sin, and restrain the wicked. And therefore Christians readily submit themselves to be governed by the Sword, they pay taxes, honour those in authority, serve and help them, and do what they can to uphold their power, so that they may continue their work, and that honour and fear of authority may be maintained.[401]

As a consequence, Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms required men to follow privately a Christian ethics in accordance with the gospel and publicly to go by human standards of justice and righteousness even though these may be based upon coercion.

Such an arrangement reduced the spiritual authority of priests to the domain of the believers' souls and left their body and property to the coercive authority of the princes and kings. As Nelson explains, Luther's insistence on the absoluteness of individual freedom in matters religious "was purchased at the sacrifice of a fabric or casuistry in the moral or the political sphere."[402] The Lutheran doctrine only left to the Church "the purely interior government of the souls of its members; their bodies [were] handed over to the secular authorities."[403] Moreover, because the Church was an institution of this world, Luther argued that it had to submit itself to the authority of secular rulers, except maybe in matters of doctrine.

This division of labour led him to claim in his letter to Nicholas Amsdorf on 30 May 1525 that in the case of the peasants' war that was raging in Germany:

> it is better that all the peasants be killed than that the princes and magistrates perish, because the rustics took the sword without divine authority. The only possible consequence of their satanic wickedness would be the diabolic devastation of the kingdom of God. Even if the princes abuse their power, yet they have it of God, and under their rule the kingdom of God at least has a chance to exist.[404]

In such a context, it is easy to see how Luther's theological approach opened the door to the domination of the Church by states, and why it gathered impetus and support

[400] Luther quoted in Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.142.
[401] Harro Höpfl, Martin Luther, and Jean Calvin, *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.13-14.
[402] Nelson, "*Conscience* and the Making of Early Modern Cultures: Beyond Max Weber," p.75.
[403] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, pp.24-25.
[404] Preserved Smith, *The Life and Letters of Martin Luther* (New York: Frank Cass, 1968), p.164.

from ambitious secular rulers.[405] As Luther strived to depoliticise the Church and to disentangle it from secular works, he re-politicised it through his reliance on secular sovereigns. In the words of Cavanaugh, "[w]hile apparently separating civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the effect of Luther's arguments was in fact to deny any separate jurisdiction to the Church." [406]

The Reformation delegated matters of faith and religion to individual believers and handed over the full jurisdiction of the political sphere to earthly rulers. Instead of inaugurating a clearly populist legitimate order, Protestantism solely justified the power of kings as a divine command and declared the absolute separation of the secular realm from matters of faith. It is only in practice, in its individualism, this-worldliness, and support for secular rulers that Lutheranism worked towards the establishment of an ascending order. Even though he had eschewed the notion of nature and rejected the Thomist synthesis of Aristotle as an "unfortunate superstructure on an unfortunate foundation," Luther ultimately – though unintentionally – enshrined the legitimisation of the 'secular' within theology.[407] Starting from a different set of premises as it were, the German priest built a foundation on which to erect a secular political order independent from the papacy and populist at heart. Finally, as a result of this theological justification of secular government, the way was paved for the secular usurpation and appropriation of religious legitimacy and resources.

3) Shift in Attitudes Towards Secular Authority

The proto-territorial states that emerged from the 12th and 13th centuries onwards slowly came to replace the feudal order. Until then, civilians had owed varying allegiances to several princes and nobles and political dominion was not territorially-bounded but rather overlapped and interpenetrated with those of neighbouring princes. As was argued in previous sections, the development of states

[405] Green, *Renaissance and Reformation*, p.124. Lutheranism was so permissive that it was used by temporal rulers to justify all sorts of behaviours. The German priest thus wrote *On Secular Authority* to end the "destruction of Christian faith, the denial of God's Word and blasphemy against God's majesty" which he had unintentionally permitted by criticising the papacy and legitimising the secular power. Höpfl, Luther, and Calvin, *Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority*, p.6.
[406] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.24.
[407] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.134.

led to a political and legal contest for their legitimacy within the universal jurisdiction of the Church.[408] The resulting establishment of the supremacy of the temporal realm over the papal monarchy was profoundly influenced by Protestantism.

The practical implementation of the ascending thesis of government and the corresponding affirmation of the authority and power of kings and princes were not legitimised and strengthened by the secular rulers themselves purely out of self-interest and through the sole use of military or diplomatic means. It did not spring from purely practical and means-end calculations by greedy monarchs. On the contrary, kings came to dominate European societies principally as a by-product of the creation of a new 'ethic of conviction' within Christianity. The rise of a multitude of states took place at the same time as the development of the theological arguments for the independence of kings from ecclesiastical control. Through its critique of the papacy and support for kings, Protestantism opened up a new space in which the establishment of a more secular notion of sovereignty was facilitated.

In *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Joseph Strayer maintains that the strong organisation and power of the emerging states were not sufficient for their legitimisation. Rather, as he demonstrates, "the relatively badly organized states of the early sixteenth century were able to break out of a pattern of instability and civil war because a shift in attitudes produced greater loyalty to the ruler and to the state."[409] This attitudinal shift permitted "the acquisition by the state of a moral authority to back up its institutional structure and its theoretical legal supremacy." [410] To paraphrase Herbert Butterfield, in the 16th century a wind was blowing in favour of kings.[411]

The roots of this shift in loyalty towards secular rulers and the corresponding empowerment of emerging states is best exemplified by the theological shift in the use of the notion of *corpus mysticum* in the 12th and 13th centuries. So important was the rationalisation of the notion that its "universal bearings and final effects cannot easily be overrated."[412] The notion of *corpus mysticum,* prior to the 12th century, used to refer to the *Corpus Christi*, the consecrated host in the Eucharist. In fact, in Christianity, people were said to be connected to God "through a system of

[408] Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought, 300-1450*, p.83.
[409] Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, p.107.
[410] Ibid., p.9.
[411] Adam Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.15.
[412] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, p.195.

sacraments which unite them through the body of the Church with the mystical body of Christ."[413] However, the advent of the 'new theology' secularised many agreed doctrines and thus "the notion of *corpus mysticum*, hitherto used to describe the host, was gradually transferred…to the Church as the organized body of Christian society united in the Sacrament of the Altar."[414] The notion of 'mystical body' came to designate the Church, not only in its spiritual dimension, but also in its institutional, political, and administrative forms. The once liturgical concept took a political connotation by being applied to the coercive apparatus of the Church.

Simultaneously, this change in doctrine came to challenge the hierarchy between the Church and secular polities. If the political and legal organs of the Church could be 'sanctified' through its membership in the mystical body, so could purely earthly governmental bodies. "In that respect," Kantorowicz argues, "the new ecclesiological designation of *corpus mysticum* fell in with the more general aspirations of that age: to hallow the secular polities as well as their administrative institutions."[415] This change marked the secularisation of the notion as it shifted from theological to juridical discourse.[416] The term became decreasingly transcendental and increasingly immanent. Finally, by referring purely to the Church as a political body, the notion came to be applied and transferred to any "body politic of the secular world."[417] Vincent of Beauvais and Baldus respectively described the commonweal and 'the people' as mystical bodies.

By becoming charged with secular connotations within the Church, the concept of mystical body allowed "the secular state itself – starting, as it were, from the opposite end – [to strive] for its own exaltation and quasi-religious glorification."[418] Through this process of usurpation, the nascent state came to appropriate itself in a profound manner a certain theological vocabulary and "finally proceeded to assert itself by placing its own temporariness on a level with the

[413] Bryan S. Turner, *Max Weber: From History to Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1992), p.143. In the words of Henri de Lubac, "[t]hrough the Eucharist, each person integrates himself in reality into the only true body. The Eucharist unites all the members among themselves, just as it unites them to their common head." Helene Merlin, "Fables of the 'Mystical Body' in Seventeenth Century France," *Yale French Studies* 86(1994): p.126.
[414] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, p.196.
[415] Ibid., p.197.
[416] Merlin, "Fables of the 'Mystical Body' in Seventeenth Century France," p.127.
[417] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, p.206.
[418] Ibid., p.207.

sempiternity of the militant Church."[419] Ernst Kantorowicz argues that through the politicisation and secularisation of the papacy, the Church became "the perfect prototype of an absolute and rational monarchy on a mystical basis," and in a parallel fashion the state increasingly showed

> a tendency to become a quasi-Church or a mystical corporation on a rational basis…the new monarchies were in many respects "churches" by transference…late medieval and modern commonwealths actually were influenced by the ecclesiastical model, especially by the all-encompassing spiritual prototype of corporational concepts, the *corpus mysticum* of the Church.[420]

These processes of usurpation and adaptation led the Speaker of the Commons, before the close of Parliament in 1401, to compare the political body made up of King, Lords, and Commons to the Holy Trinity and the procedures of Parliament with the celebration of masses.[421] In the following century, these very same processes gained a new momentum by being theologically condoned under the influence of Protestantism.

From the 16th century onward, "Protestantism intervened in the development of the State in the direction of autonomy, and powerfully furthered it."[422] This change marked the end of the papacy's supremacy and the death of the descending legitimate order supported by St Augustine and Gelasius I. Effectively, Luther argued in his *Address to the Nobility of the German Nation* that

> forasmuch as the temporal power has been ordained by God for the punishment of the bad, and the protection of the good, therefore we must let it do its duty throughout the whole Christian body, without respect of persons: whether its strikes popes, bishops, priests, monks, or nuns.[423]

Obstacles to salvation were lifted by giving secular authorities full freedom to conduct their affairs. Luther thus laid claim to the superiority of God's secular arm over the Church: "the idea of the Pope and Emperor as parallel and universal powers disappear[ed], and the independent jurisdictions of the *sacerdotium* [were] handed over to the secular authorities."[424]

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[419] Ibid.
[420] Ibid., p.194.
[421] Ibid., p.227.
[422] Troeltsch and Montgomery, *Protestantism and Progress*, p.108.
[423] Luther, *First Principles of the Reformation*, p.23.
[424] Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Reformation.*, p.15.

Luther also held that "Christ's body is not double or twofold, one temporal, the other spiritual. He is one head, and he has one body."[425] Reversing the medieval conception of the two administrative competencies within a unitary Christendom and under the final authority of the pope, the Reformer developed a conception of a single body under the leadership of secular rulers. This appeal in favour of princely political control over all the Lutheran communities within their realms meant that the "direct control over the churches was vested in a consistory whose members were appointed by the prince."[426] Accordingly, secular authorities came to be considered as "fellow Christians, fellow priests, similarly religious, and of similar authority in all respects."[427] In practice, this meant that "[w]hen images of saints were removed from the chancel arches of parish churches, they were often replaced by the royal coat of arms… [further establishing] a sanctification of secular power."[428] The legitimisation of the 'secular' from within Christianity was now complete and the process of transfer of power and resources from the Church to the state was well under way. In particular, a very special type of power and resources was transferred: the very sacredness of the Church.

As Sheldon Wolin demonstrates, what Luther did was to elevate "the status of rulers by clothing it with a sacerdotal dignity [and entrusting them] with some of the religious prerogatives previously belonging to the pope."[429] In effect, the German theologian argued that any secular government is part of the social corpus of Christendom and thus "is spiritual in status, although it discharges a secular duty."[430] As a result, the state came to be regarded as a religious institution and was "directly assigned Church functions."[431]

For Calvin, "[c]ivil government and ecclesiastical government did not symbolize distinctions of kind, but of objectives. Their natures, therefore, were more analogous than antithetical."[432] According to the French theologian, "political and

[425] Luther, *First Principles of the Reformation*, p.23.
[426] William M. McGovern and Edward McChesney Sait, *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941), p.33.
[427] Luther quoted in Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.132.
[428] Philip Richard D. Corrigan and Derek Sayer, *The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), p..61.
[429] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.133, 42.
[430] Luther quoted in Ibid., p.142.
[431] Troeltsch and Montgomery, *Protestantism and Progress*, p.106, 09.
[432] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.153.

religious thought tended to form a continuous realm of discourse."[433] From the dichotomy between *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, Calvinism preached the essential affinities of the two realms. The political realm came to be referred to as *regnum politicum* and the spiritual realm as *regnum spirituale*. As Wolin explains, "by declaring each of them to be a *regnum*, Calvin was pointing to the fact that the coercive element was common to both governances. The differences between them lay in their range of objects or jurisdiction."[434] Calvinism "gave the State a direct and generous share in the work of spiritual and ethical elevation and the pursuit of the ideals of civilisation."[435] Under the joint impact of Luther and Calvin's theologies, political society became "a divinely-ordained agency for man's improvement."[436] But, the newly legitimised secular realm, having acquired some autonomy and power of its own, began to expand and develop independently from the Church. In the end, "the secular powers, whose assistance [Luther] had invoked in the struggle for religious reform, began to assume the form of a sorcerer's apprentice threatening religion with a new type of institutional control."[437]

4) The Protestant Devotion to the Nation

Besides its centrality in the reversal of the Gelasian and Augustinian doctrines, Protestantism played a major role by legitimating and supporting some sort of nascent "devotion to the idea of the *national state* (as opposed to other forms of community life)."[438] This devotion can without doubts be traced back to the fact that Reformers "invested the expanding civil officialdom with the character of God-ordained calling, which plays its part in the execution of the Divine will; and it thus gave to the new centralised administration a strong ethical reinforcement."[439]

The idealisation of the state was antecedent to the Reformation since "[t]here had long been a cult devoted to the king … [and in] 1300 there was a cult of the

[433] Ibid., p.161.
[434] Ibid., p.154.
[435] Troeltsch and Montgomery, *Protestantism and Progress*, p.110.
[436] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.162.
[437] Ibid., p.133.
[438] McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*, p.21.
[439] Troeltsch and Montgomery, *Protestantism and Progress*, pp.108-09.

kingdom of France."[440] However, Protestantism was essential and necessary to the spread of these beliefs from a handful of royal officials to entire populations and communities. As a matter of fact, "the very notion of the national state emerged into public consciousness only after and largely as the result of the Reformation."[441]

The disintegration of Christendom and the loss of legitimacy of papal authority were accompanied by the emergence of the 'nation' "as a claimant of the affective loyalties of peoples to whom simple genetic affiliation and narrow feudal obligations seemed insufficient substitutes for lost celestial benefactions."[442] The belief that secular governments have a rightful place in God's plan helped to foster the idea that the nation was "also a genuinely consecrated community, one which had its roots in nature but its goals in some superior, extra-mundane realm."[443] Hence, with the breakdown of Christendom, "the transcendental loyalties which that community had once inspired were in part transferred to the genius of the nation, which took its place as an object of devotion similar to that occupied by the totemistic deities in primitive tribes."[444] Knowing that in the Middle Ages the Latin word *natio* was used interchangeably with the words *gens* or *populus* (i.e., 'people'), this transfer was thus to a large extent one from the descending to the ascending theme of government.[445]

In practice, the birth and spread of nationalist movements in Europe were directly related to the politico-religious alliances fostered by the Protestant Reformation.[446] In the case of the Dutch Revolution, the religious reform of the Church was inseparable from the national movement of protest against the Habsburg dynasty.[447] Protestantism was so closely linked with the rise of nationalism that Ernest Barker argued that the nation "began its life at the breast of Christianity … [and] was craddeled in Christianity."[448] This redrawing of the boundaries between the secular

[440] Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, p.56. "France was a holy land … [that] the French were a chosen people, deserving and enjoying divine favour [and that] To protect France was to serve God."
[441] McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*, p.21.
[442] Willson Havelock Coates, Jacob Salwyn Schapiro, and Hayden V. White, *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism: An Intellectual History of Western Europe*, vol. 2 (London: McGraw-Hill 1966), p.92.
[443] Ibid.
[444] Ibid.
[445] Peter Burke, *Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.161.
[446] Turner, *Max Weber*, p.106. Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.175.
[447] Turner, *Max Weber*, p.109.
[448] Ernest Barker, *Church, State and Study: Essays* (London: Methuen, 1930), p.147, 43.

and religious realms marked the disenchantment of theology and the 'enchantment' of politics under the impulse of Lutheranism.[449]

In England, mirroring and implementing Luther's political theology, Henry VIII participated in the severance of the English Church from the papal hierarchy. The Church of England arose as an independent and territorial ecclesiastical organisation.[450] While the theological doctrine of the newborn Church evolved quite radically over time, its call for the supremacy of the national state over the Church in all matters remained unabated.[451]

Anglicanism went beyond Lutheranism in the redrawing of the boundaries between the religious and secular realms and emphasised the essentially national and political dimensions of worship as opposed to Luther's belief in the possibility of a universal, though invisible, Church. Contrary to Luther who claimed that secular powers should have control over the visible church, Anglicanism assumed that "church and state were merely two different aspects of the same thing, that church and state were both phases of the national commonwealth."[452] The fusion of the political with the spiritual became total with Henry VIII's designation of the church as a *corpus politicum* integral to the state.[453] As such, the newly created state-church in England was at the heart of the "fusion of Protestantism and nationalism."[454]

This rejection of the existence of an invisible church in practice and the resulting focus on the visible church as a mere dimension of the national commonwealth had a direct symbolic impact on members of the Church. In a time when the Church corresponded not only to the clergy but to the entire "congregation of men and women of the clergy and of the laity, united in Christ's profession,"[455] the denial of the invisible church and the transfer of the visible church within the domain of government and politics meant that Church members – i.e., every single member of

[449] Joshua Mitchell noted that "Protestant thought does not disenchant the Roman Church-dominated world but, rather, enchants the world in a different manner than does the Roman Church." Joshua Mitchell, "Protestant Thought and Republican Spirit: How Luther Enchanted the World," *The American Political Science Review* 86, no. 3 (1992): p.689.
[450] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.133.
[451] McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*, p.36.
[452] Ibid., p.37.
[453] As such, as Clanchy argues, "Without being aware of it, Henry had achieved what Max Weber refers to as the 'routinisation of charisma.'" In Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great Arch*, p.35.
[454] Turner, *Max Weber*, p.107.
[455] Stephen Gardiner quoted in J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (London: Methuen, 1928), p.163.

every community – became *ad hoc* members of the political state.[456] As a result, "membership of the one involved membership of the other: the good citizen was necessarily also the good churchman."[457] At the symbolic level, visible church and state became one: "L'Eglise, c'est l'Etat: l'Etat, c'est l'Eglise."[458]

5) The Divine Right of King

The secularisation of theology and the spiritualisation of politics created a space within the political sciences in which theological transformations were mimicked through the development of political doctrines. The theological claim for the supremacy of the state developed by Lutherans and Anglicans came to be translated into a full-fledged political doctrine of the divine right of kings, the widespread acceptance of which marked "the transition from mediaeval to modern modes of thought" and "permitted the emergence of the national state of today."[459]

The doctrine of the divine right of kings originated in the power struggle between the papacy and the empire and was developed as a theological doctrine of politics antipathetic to the papal doctrine of ecclesiastical power.[460] Pope Innocent III developed a thorough theory of absolute power; and it is in opposition to this doctrine of papal 'sovereignty' by Divine Right that thinkers, inspired by the works of Dante and Marsiglio of Padua, formulated the doctrine of the divine right of kings.[461] Indeed, in a context in which the Church was – at least in theory – all powerful, any claim for the independence of national states "had to be [based on] something better than the right of the stronger; it had to be a divine dispensation."[462]

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[456] Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great Arch*, p.59.
[457] Barker, *Church, State and Study*, p.139.
[458] "The Church is the State: the State is the Church." Ibid., p.86. "If the commonwealth be Christian, if the people which are of it do publicly embrace the true religion, this very thing doth make it the Church." Hooker quoted in Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, p.195.
[459] Coates, Schapiro, and White, *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism*, p.98. John Neville Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), p.15. McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*, p.50.
[460] Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*.
[461] The term sovereignty here refers to the idea that the pope enjoyed 'unfettered freedom to legislate.' The pope stood 'outside and above the Church' and thus exercised full legislative power. Ullmann, *Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages*, p.72.
[462] Coates, Schapiro, and White, *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism*, p.97.

The Protestant rejection of the divine authority of the pope "had left a void in men's minds which it was necessary to fill."[463] In such a context, "the parallel of divine rule for the maintenance of cosmic order with monarchical rule for political order was powerfully convincing and engendered passionate and mystical devotion to kings."[464] Because of the widespread belief in the divine role of earthly rulers, the legitimate recipients of this divinely ordained authority and power were the kings and princes of every European nation.

Contrary to medieval political theories that were hardly upheld by secular powers, the idea of the divine right of king was quickly adopted by rulers themselves. Even though the doctrine had existed for some time, the association of psychological premiums under the Lutheran influence made it all the more attractive. For example, King James VI (later James I of England) endorsed the doctrine and came to equate the office of king with that of God. In a speech before the Parliament, he went so far as to argue that "Kings are justly called Gods for they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth…For Kings are not only GODS Lieutnants vpon earth, and sit vpon GODS throne, but euen by GOD himselfe they are called Gods."[465] Kings became 'Gods Vicegerents,' a function that had until then remained the sole property of the Pope.[466] The idea of the Divine Right of King was not solely confined to England but was also adopted by French and Italian monarchs.[467]

Moreover, some sort of political cult was slowly established "by borrowing a good deal of the ritual of the feast of Corpus Christi, annexed to the profit of monarchy the most powerful sacred symbol in Christianity."[468] For example, Charles VIII of France was described as the

> Lamb of God, saviour, head of the mystical body of France, guardian of the book with seven seals, fountain of life-giving grace to a dry people, deified bringer of peace; one worthy to receive, without the formality of being slain, blessing and honour, glory and power.[469]

[463] McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*, p.50.
[464] Coates, Schapiro, and White, *The Emergence of Liberal Humanism*, p.99.
[465] King of England James I, *The Political Works of James I. Reprinted from the Edition of 1616*, ed. Charles Howard MacIlwain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), p.61, 307.
[466] Ibid., p.327.
[467] For example, "by the accession of Francis I in 1515 it had become comparatively banal to speak of the king of France as a corporeal god." Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400-1700*, p.155.
[468] Ibid., p.154.
[469] Ibid., pp.154-55.

Symbolically, the notion of divine right of kings strengthened the transfer of power from the Christian Church to the sovereign, from the sacred body of the Church to the sacred body of the king. While the Church was once the sole holder of divine authority, with the Reformation, the secular and political realm became the legitimate repository of God's power.

6) The Halo of Sanctity

The theologies of Martin Luther and John Calvin proved extremely challenging to the European order of the 16th century. Contrary to the theoretical nature of Thomist and Marsiglian philosophies, Lutheranism, and Protestantism more generally, led to rapid practical transformations and to the establishment of new regularities in behaviour.[470] The Reformation sprang from localised shifts in values and ultimately led to fundamental changes in social structures, political organisations, trade, technology, and military might.[471] Luther and Calvin proclaimed the independence of the political realm from the religious realm and thus provided a theological justification for a perceptible shift towards an ascending form of legitimate order. "The positive and committed attitude towards the secular order so characteristic of the Reformation and charged with such importance for the shaping of modern western culture rests upon a series of theological assumptions."[472]

Luther's theology participated in a shift in attitudes and attachment away from the Church and towards nascent secular political entities. This shift in legitimating principles heralded a transfer of power and loyalty from the papacy to the nation and its representatives. In turn, secular rulers were made the repository of the sanctity once reserved to the sole Church. As John Figgis argues,

> what Luther did in the world of politics was to transfer to the temporal sovereign the *halo of sanctity* that had hitherto been mainly the privilege of the ecclesiastical; and to change the admiration of men from the saintly to the civic virtues, and their ideals from the monastic life to the domestic.[473]

[470] Wolin, *Politics and Vision* p.173.
[471] Daniel Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern Ir," *World Politics* 52, no. 2 (2000): p.207.
[472] McGrath, *Reformation Thought* p.218.
[473] Emphasis added. Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought*, p.93.

Protestantism thus achieved the transfer of the 'halo of sanctity' and provided powerful arguments for the legitimisation of the ascending theme of government at the expense of papal sovereignty. Despite his 'absolutism,' Luther's individualisation of faith and soteriology, challenge to the papacy, and theological support for secular rulers and nationalism provided decisive resources for the establishment of Ullmann's ascending thesis. The secularisation of Europe was marked by the transfer and usurpation of the Church's halo of sanctity from an institution that took God as the supreme authority to an institution that legitimated its authority by reference to other bases of power.

However, the sanctity of the Church – i.e., its sacredness, holiness, saintliness or spirituality – was by no means destroyed. The survival and preservation of this quality outside the papal framework and within an earthly institution is of great importance for our assessment of the nature of modern secularism. As I will demonstrate, this very process of transfer calls into question the widely accepted idea that secular politics is universal, non-religious, objective, and neutral.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to begin the interpretive study of the secularisation of Europe. Based on the definition of the secularisation process and on the theoretical framework developed in previous chapters, I looked at the broad changes in sources of morality and legitimate orders that took place during the two seminal periods of the 12th century Renaissance and 16th century Protestant Reformation. In the first part, I looked at the rediscovery of Aristotle and explored the shift in moral sources from God to the notion of 'nature.' I explained how the constitutional structures legitimating the authority of the Church became challenged and were replaced by structures legitimating the authority of secular rulers, i.e., the shift from ascending to descending theme of government. In the second part, I looked at the impact of the Reformation on the secularisation of Europe. I explained how Luther proclaimed the independence of the political realm from within theology. Even though Luther did not use the notion of 'nature,' I argued that he worked towards the secularisation of theology, the critique of the papacy, and the sacralisation of secular political entities.[474] It is with Luther that "Christianity came to provide a crucial basis of legitimacy for emerging nation-states."[475]

Theological disputes over the source of authority were the means through which the process of disenchantment made its way into Christianity. With the secularisation of the concept of *corpus mysticum* and the resulting transfer of its mystical characteristic from Christ to the visible Church and to the political realm, the state came to enjoy some sort of spiritual glorification. The legitimacy of the civil and secular bodies was carved out and emerged from within the 'sacred' core of Christianity. The change in attitudes fostered by Lutheranism instilled a sense of devotion and loyalty to the state, the king, and the nation. The result was the domination of all ecclesiastical institutions by the state; itself a new Church by transference. As James Mayall explains, the nationalists "moved into the building which had previously been occupied by dynastic rulers and religious authorities…

[474] Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*, p.5. Secularisation of theology defined as the appropriation of theology by laymen.
[475] Turner, *Max Weber*, p.105.

[but] left the building itself more or less intact"[476] Our diagram on the four levels of secularisation can now be further completed.



Figure 2: The 4 Levels of Secularisation after the Reformation

To come back to the wider theme of this thesis, it is important to locate the transfer of the Church's halo of sanctity within the more general frame of the

[476] James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.26.

secularisation of Europe. According to the argument developed in this chapter, it seems that the secularisation process took place through different means. First, it began with the rationalisation of theology and the legitimisation of secular authorities through theological debates. And second, as part of the sacralisation of politics, secular rulers usurped "that which it felt to be the source of the church's power, namely, the church's claim to possess and to dispense a supernatural force."[477] As I argued in the above sections, the first form of secularisation took place through the media of Thomist theology and the separation of nature from grace. And the latter took place through religio-political arrangements such as those encouraged by Lutheranism and Calvinism.

This redrawing of the boundaries between the secular and religious realms marked the disenchantment of theology and the sacralisation of politics. The transfer of the halo of sanctity from Church to state, from Church to nation, from Christ to king, and from pope to king paved the way for the fusion of "[t]he spiritual tradition of the new and secular nation…with the spiritual tradition of the old and Christian society."[478] From a conception of a Church as an absolute and universal sovereign authority, the secularisation of theology led to the fusion of Church and state.[479] In turn, the state came to be considered as a 'consecrated community' clothed in 'sacerdotal dignity,' and became the new source of moral authority and unity for the community.[480] These developments were the proofs, for John Figgis, that "the religion of the State superseded the religion of the Church."[481] The Love of the Father was transmuted into the love of the fatherland.

Now that the first step of the secularisation process has been outlined, we can turn to the second step, i.e., the processes of modelling and translation. In fact, the *modelling* of the state on the Church and the *translation* of religious dogmas into secular terms have already been touched upon in the previous sections (i.e., the secularisation of the papal doctrine of absolute sovereignty, the replacement of the mystical body of Christ by that of the King, and the development of the doctrine of divine right of kings). However, these processes were still taking place within a theo-

[477] Mehl, *The Sociology of Protestantism*, p.61.
[478] Barker, *Church, State and Study*, pp.138-39.
[479] Ibid. Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*, p.5. Bryan Turner called this new sovereign entity the 'nation state-church.' Turner, *Max Weber*, p.112.
[480] Harold J. Laski, *The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1921), p.13.
[481] Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought*, pp.62-63.

centric framework and were thus more part of the process of appropriation than of translation on secular grounds. Because of the importance of that second step for our enquiry, I will devote the following chapter to the most well-known process of secularisation by translation within the political sciences, namely, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*.

5. Secularisation, Act II: Hobbes' Sacred Politics

The politico-theological revolution triggered in the 16th century supported and fuelled the secularisation process in two ways. First, it endorsed themes and ideas indispensable to the emergence of the ascending theme of government and law. And second, it justified the transfer of legitimacy and authority from the Church to the nascent state. As a result, the 'halo of sanctity' of the Church was transferred to the secular realm of politics. This process of transfer mainly took place within a theo-centric framework and was advocated by Protestant prelates. But soon, the argument in favour of the control of the religious realm by secular rulers came to be transposed into the political sphere and couched in purely secular terms. In the 17th century, secularisation was no longer fuelled by the rationalisation of theology and the legitimisation of secular authorities through theological debates. Rather, political processes of modelling and translation marked a second step in the secularisation of Europe.[482]

On the one hand, lay scholars and political philosophers laid the foundation for a comprehensive political liturgy modelled on Christianity to replace that of the Church. Following their newly-acquired and religiously-sanctioned legitimacy, secular polities were *modelled* on the Church and theological dogmas were slowly *translated* into secular terms to constitute political theories. More and more, religious concepts began to pass over into the secular realm. Indeed, in a context in which the Church came to be equated with or dominated by the state, in which theological and political doctrines supported the spread of nationalism, in which theology was secularised, and in which political apparatuses were spiritualised, "a perfectly secular sort of sacred was asking to be created…and its name was sovereignty."[483] And on the other, political thinkers proceeded to redefine the term 'religion' in accordance with

[482] Mehl, *The Sociology of Protestantism*, p.61.
[483] Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400-1700*, p.155.

the new liturgy developed within the political sciences. After having stripped religion of its sacred character, they redefined and emasculated it to secure the supremacy of the political realm. Because this process is central to our understanding of the implications of secularisation for the foundation of politics, it is the focus of this chapter.

It is often assumed that the sciences and philosophy of the 17th century operated a gradual shift away from a theological account of the world to more naturalistic interpretations of events. And Thomas Hobbes, the self-proclaimed "founder of political philosophy or political science," is commonly thought to be the thinker most representative of this process.[484] For Brian Nelson, Hobbes' works embodies the 'intellectual revolution' that made "the religious point of view irrelevant" in a Europe "convulsed by religious revolutions."[485] In *Natural Right and History*, Leo Strauss describes Hobbes' *Leviathan* as the first doctrine to point unmistakably to an 'enlightened' and atheistic society as the solution to Europe's religious strife.[486] Thus, Hobbes played a central role in the sharp break between the downfall of Christianity and the emergence of secular liberalism.[487]

Until the end of the 17th century, all theories of government were based on some sort of divine authority.[488] And with the exception of Hobbes,

> all the political theorists up to the end of the seventeenth century either have religion for the basis of their system, or regard the defence or supremacy of some one form of faith as their main object. Hardly any political idea of the time but had its origin in theological controversy.[489]

In this context, Hobbes acted as 'the Galileo of political theory' in that he developed a 'strictly materialist science' in order to exclude "any religious explanations of physical reality."[490]

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[484] Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," p.1. See also Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Academic Edition, s.v. 'Thomas Hobbes.'
[485] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.128.
[486] His whole scheme was geared towards the elimination of fear in invisible powers and required "such a radical change of orientation as can be brought about only by the disenchantment of the world, by the diffusion of scientific knowledge, or by popular enlightenment." Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), p.198.
[487] Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy."
[488] Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, p.11.
[489] Ibid., p.219.
[490] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.128. "Instead of speculating on God and his nature, he considered man and his nature. Hobbes restated questions about religion as questions about human behavior, reduced that behavior to psychological states, and then portrayed those states as artifacts of desire, fear, ignorance, and the material environment. 'Seeing there are no signs nor fruit of *religion* but

Despite the fact that Robert Filmer was much more influential than Hobbes in the 17th century, the latter has become the symbol of key socio-cultural transformations that were taking place at the time.[491] This is the reason why I focus on Hobbes' masterpiece to illustrate the revolution in political philosophy that saw the advent of a secular foundation to politics. However, contrary to the common wisdom and in support to existing interpretations, I explain that the socio-cultural revolution embodied in the work of the English scholar did not so much result in the rationalisation and disenchantment of religion as in "the transformation of politics into a secularized theology."[492] While I agree that Hobbes played a central role in the intellectual shift of the 17th century, I contend that this move in a more secular and naturalistic direction was achieved by modelling and translating theological dogmas into secular terms. Far from disenchanting the world, Hobbes re-enchanted it on a secular basis.[493] I argue that Hobbes' *Leviathan* draws its significance from the role it played in this second step of the secularisation process.[494]

Therefore, this chapter is organised as follows. In the first part, I look at the 17th century creation of a secular political liturgy to match that of Christianity. Following an outline of the historical context - the Wars of Religion and Westphalia - I explore the birth of a political and fully secular doctrine of salvation through the study of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. I argue that the English thinker, far from being an atheist, translated Protestant theological principles into political dogmas and furthered the sacralisation of politics as well as its autonomy from Christianity.

In the second part of the chapter, I look at the implications of this modelling of politics on religion. I outline the ways in which religion came to be redefined under the pen of the political 'liturgists' in order to justify the legitimacy of the newborn secular realm. Religion was turned into a set of private beliefs and the communal element of Christianity was transferred to the state. The result was the creation of a realm independent from the Church but sustained by an equivalent form of sacredness.

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in man only,' he declared, 'there is no cause to doubt but that the seed of *religion* is also only in man.'" Mark Lilla, "The Persistence of Political Theology," *Current History* 107, no. 705 (2008): p.44.

[491] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*.

[492] Gabriel L. Negretto, "Hobbes' Leviathan. The Irresistible Power of a Mortal God," *Analisi e Diritto. Ricerche di Giurisprudenza* (2001): p.179.

[493] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.226. Gillespie describes this process as follows: "this disenchantment is not a form of secularization but a theological transformation within Christianity that imagines God as a *deus absconditus*." This process is a result of the re-emergence of nominalism and is essentially theological. Hence, "[i]nsofar as Protestantism always defined itself in terms of the *deus absconditus*, secularism can be understood as merely one of its extreme forms." p.227.

[494] Hobbes got the title of his book from the Old Testament Job 41.

A. Leviathan, from Theology to Politics

1) The European Wars of Religion

In the 16th century, the benefits of conversion to Lutheranism were important for princes since it allowed them to claim power and control over the property that had once been in the hands of the Roman Pontiff. This defiance of the papal order was also espoused by Catholic rulers who forced the pope to make concessions during the 1600s. In turn, the withering away of the once universal authority of the Church led to a century of violence, massacres, and wars. The conflicts were, on the one hand, religious and involved a struggle between Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans and, on the other hand, political and involved a struggle between rival kings and princes. The most destructive war since the Roman era, the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), was to mark a turning point in European history.

The end of the 'Wars of Religion' was sealed with the Peace of Westphalia that was concluded, after decades of an exhausting struggle, at Osnabrück for the Protestants and Münster for the Catholics. The treaty was the result of years of negotiations between all parties involved and marked the redefinition of the role of religion in European politics. The roots of the Westphalian Treaty were indisputably to be found in Protestantism's intrinsic content that pointed to self-determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention.[495] The Protestant revolution was essential in the emergence and "the rise of the modern international society."[496] As Daniel Philpott puts it, "no Reformation, no Westphalia."[497]

As a result of the Thirty Years War, the concept of Christendom was discredited.[498] The so-called religious atrocities were so appalling that local princes did their best to marginalise the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire.[499] While this was done out of self-interest in the acquirement of the Church's power and riches, it was also the result of the development of a widespread liberal and Protestant

[495] R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
[496] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54.
[497] Philpott, "The Religious Roots of Modern Ir," p.206.
[498] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54.
[499] Daniel Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," *Political Studies* 47, no. 3 (1999): p.574, 81.

presumption that peace and stability could only exist if religion was disciplined by a state.[500] It extended the Reformist demand that the medieval cosmology of a united Christian community be undermined and that religion be "privatized, marginalized, and nationalized."[501] By marking a movement away from a cohesive and universal Christendom, the treaty opened the door "to a new political theory or even theology of international relations."[502]

The Treaty of Westphalia required all parties to recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 by which each prince had acquired the right to determine the religion of his own state - the principle of *cuius region, eius religio*.[503] It was agreed that the citizenries would be subjected first and foremost to the laws of their respective government rather than to those of neighbouring powers or to the transnational authority of the Catholic Church. By enshrining the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention in international law and by establishing fixed territorial boundaries for many states, Westphalia marked the beginning of the modern state-system and was thus considered by some to be the "majestic portal which [led] from the old world into the new world."[504] While numerous scholars have described this view of the treaty as 'wrong' or a 'myth,' they have so far failed to "dethrone the common wisdom."[505] Even though 1648 might not have been the 'consummate fissure' described by Leo Gross, "it was still… as clean as historical faults come."[506] As such, despite all the arguments to the contrary, Westphalia is still considered by many to be the "origin of a European system of sovereign states."[507]

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[500] Tilly and Ardant, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, p.77. In Allen's words, "People, it is true, became Protestant for every conceivable reason. The desire to annex Church property and jurisdiction made very stout Protestants." Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, p.4.
[501] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p.40.
[502] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, p.54.
[503] Treaty of Westphalia, Article LXIV. Contrary to the Peace of Augsburg, the Treaty of Westphalia and its call for non-interference in religious matters were accepted and practiced. Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," pp.580-81.
[504] Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 1 (1948): p.28. Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 34, 121-22 and Ch. 3.
[505] Stephen D. Krasner, "Westphalia and All That," in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 235. Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003). Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.90.
[506] Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority, and International Society," p.579. For the critique of the conventional wisdom, see Krasner, "Westphalia and All That." Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20, no. 3 (1995). Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," *International Organization* 55, no. 2 (2001). For a good overview of the debate, see Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, pp.55-57.
[507] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*, p.89.

During the 17th century, the creation of powerful territorial states was accompanied by the hope that the newborn political communities would supply modern men with their basic material and spiritual needs, marginalising in turn religious primordial loyalties.[508] It was believed that religious legitimacy would become supererogatory since the state would be legitimised through the divine status of earthly rulers and later through the inherent reasonableness of the ruler's authority.[509] In this mission to establish the supremacy and autonomy of the state, the Protestant Reformation played an important role by facilitating the creation of a political liturgy to replace that of the Church. In particular, it provided Thomas Hobbes with essential resources to develop a political theory independent from God.

To the modern student of politics, Hobbes is the thinker who finally curtailed the influence of religion in public life and envisaged how to make peace and stability possible in a secular environment free from superstition and supernatural fancies. Hobbes's methodological materialism, nominalism, and rationalism expounded in the first half of *Leviathan* led most scholars to denounce the book as a piece of atheist erudition legitimating the demise of the Church and the use of religion as a tool of the state. Likewise, his anti-sacerdotal and anti-papal thinking – yet not anti-clerical - made him, in the eyes of many of his contemporaries, an atheist if not the incarnation of the Antichrist.[510]

In the following sections, I explain that Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* to provide a solution to the religious strife of 17th century England. Not only did he comprehensively tackle the issue of Church-state relations, but more importantly, he did so within a theological and quasi-religious framework influenced by the Reformist tradition of the Church of England. His take on religious and political issues clearly embodies the transition in political thought that took place under the process of secularisation. More specifically, Hobbes' philosophy exemplifies to the perfection the modelling and translation of religious dogmas into political theory. Unfortunately, Hobbes' importance in this regard is rarely acknowledged. This omission is principally due to "the fact that the religion of Hobbes has not been the object of

[508] Fox and Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations*, p.3.
[509] J. S. McClelland, *A History of Western Political Thought* (London: Routledge, 1996), Part IV.
[510] F. C. Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes: An Interpretation of 'Leviathan'* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p.247. In the 17th century, the term 'atheist' was used to refer to those suspected of heresy. It did not refer to the denial of God. Patricia Springborg, "Hobbes on Religion," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, ed. Tom Sorell (cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.347-48.

serious study but has been commented upon by scholars primarily interested in his politics."[511] This one-sided and incomplete take on Hobbes's philosophy is a further proof of the secularist bias that pervades modern International Relations Theory.

2) Hobbes's Religion and the Reformation

The fact that Christianity, and the study of religion in general, occupy more than a third of Hobbes's writings is rarely mentioned, if ever noticed. His masterpiece, *Leviathan*, is evenly split between an outline of a materialist philosophy and religious exegesis. Also, a third of the book is devoted to the sketch of his utopia, the Christian Commonwealth.[512] Even though "Scriptural and religious questions occupy more space in *Leviathan* than any other topic discussed in the work," the theological and religious dimensions of Hobbes's thinking remain barely recognised.[513] As David Johnston explains,

> The traditional interpretation has been that the theological views developed in parts III and IV of *Leviathan*, however interesting they may be in themselves, are of no real significance for his political philosophy…[and] appear to be mere appendages to the true work…mere trappings, designed to make Hobbes's doctrines palatable to a nation of Christian believers.[514]

As a result, this allowed many to uphold the erroneous idea that Hobbes's aim is "nothing less than the total destruction of the religious view of life which, it is suggested, he detested."[515]

However, a number of scholars have come to agree that the theology Hobbes develops is essential to any proper understanding of his political philosophy.[516] As

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[511] Willis B. Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," in *Hobbes Studies*, ed. K. C. Brown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), p.146.
[512] Barbier, *Religion & Politique Dans La Pensée Moderne*, p.89.
[513] David Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p.115.
[514] Ibid.
[515] Paul J. Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," in *Thomas Hobbes in His Time*, ed. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider, and Theodore Waldman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p.103.
[516] Christopher Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century* (London: Panther, 1968), p.285. A. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," *Philosophy* 13, no. 52 (1938); James Howard Warrender, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p.146; Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes." Negretto, "Hobbes' Leviathan. The Irresistible Power of a Mortal God." Barbier, *Religion & Politique Dans La Pensée Moderne*, p.90.

Taylor argues, "a certain kind of theism is absolutely necessary to make [Hobbes's] theory work."[517] And "[w]e get a wrong impression of the man if we overlook, as is now commonly done, his personal piety and religious beliefs."[518] Yet, those scholars who emphasise the importance of Hobbes's theology struggle to agree on the denomination to which the English thinker belonged. It ranges from the religion of the Gentile or of the Socinians, to orthodox Calvinism and Anglicanism.[519] Nevertheless, what comes out of the debate is that Hobbes was neither an atheist nor a disguised atheist pretending to be a faithful Christian by fear of the consequences.[520] "Despite his materialism…Hobbes believed in God" and was a pious man.[521] In Herbert Schneider's words, "he was clearly an orthodox Christian and, far from being an atheist, was devout. He was a sincere Anglican."[522]

Once Hobbes' Anglican background is acknowledged, the Protestant flavour of his philosophy becomes indubitable and the "conflict between Hobbes the pious believer and Hobbes the author of a completely naturalistic science of body, man, and societies" withers away.[523] In effect, it is only through the recognition of his Anglican affiliation and Protestant convictions that "his skeptical assaults on traditional religious ideas and doctrines and … his changing interpretations of many of these latter matters" can be reconciled "without having recourse to theories about Hobbes's sincerity or lack of it."[524]

Among other themes, Hobbes's conception of God, human nature, and earthly government, his individualism, his elimination of miracles and other supernatural fancies, and his vision of human salvation, all start to make sense if one recognises his Protestant inclination instead of some sort of illusive atheism.[525] The Hobbesian

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[517] Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," p.420.
[518] Herbert W. Schneider, "The Piety of Hobbes," in *Thomas Hobbes in His Time*, ed. Ralph Ross, Herbert W. Schneider, and Theodore Waldman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p.85.
[519] David P. Gauthier, *The Logic of 'Leviathan': The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.206. P Geach, "The Religion of Thomas Hobbes," *Religious Studies* 17, no. 4 (1981). Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, p.284. Aloysius Martinich, *Thomas Hobbes* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p.75. Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.142. Schneider, "The Piety of Hobbes," p.96.
[520] Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*, p.285. As Hill argues, Hobbes's "expressed views were so heretical as to make this [atheism] unlikely."
[521] Ibid., p.284. Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," p.125.
[522] Schneider, "The Piety of Hobbes," p.96.
[523] Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," p.125.
[524] Ibid., p.122.
[525] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.143. Bryan S. Turner, *Religion and Social Theory: A Materialist Perspective* (London: Heinemann 1983), p.161. Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution*.

challenge to the authority of the Church as a necessary mediator between God and men was not fuelled by atheism but by his Protestant allegiance.

In fact, "to close students of Reformation theology … what is striking about Hobbes' formal theology is not its uniqueness or its virtuosity, but its orthodoxy within Reformation tradition, especially that articulated during the English Reformation."[526] For Michael Oakeshott, it is evident that "the immediate background of his thought was the political theology of the late middle ages and the Reformation; and, of course, scripture was the authoritative source to which he went to collect the religious beliefs of his society."[527] As Eldon Eisenach points out,

> the doctrine of election, the importance of the invisible church and the centrality of the millennial promise are not unique to Hobbes, but defined the major themes of Reformation theology, and are the source of its critique of sacerdotal authority…[Hobbes's] scepticism was matched and often exceeded first by the Anglican and then by the Puritan clergy. And to doubt Hobbes' reliance on revelation as the ground of this scepticism would be to doubt the sincerity of almost the entire body of Reformation churchmen in England from the late sixteenth century onward….[528]

In reality, Hobbes was not the only one to be charged with atheism. Not only was Hobbes agnostic where theologians such as Aquinas and Calvin had been agnostic too,[529] but more importantly, "[m]any of the most respected divines of the English Church in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, including an Archbishop of Canterbury, … faced the same charges [of atheism]."[530]

For example, if one considers the statement that "it is with the mysteries of our Religion, as with wholsome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole, have the vertue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect," one is drawn to conclude, from a modern perspective, that these are the words of a sarcastic atheist. [531] However, as Paul Johnson reminds us,

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[526] Eldon Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," *History of Political Thought* III, no. 2 (1982): p.222. Martinich, *Thomas Hobbes*, p.63. Springborg, "Hobbes on Religion," p.350.
[527] Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, p.70. Likewise, Oakeshott pointed out that Hobbes's *Leviathan* reflects "the changes in the European intellectual consciousness which had been pioneered chiefly by the theologians of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries." p.58. This view is also developed in Lilla, "The Persistence of Political Theology," p.44.
[528] Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," p.223.
[529] Ronald Hepburn, "Hobbes on the Knowledge of God," in *Hobbes and Rousseau: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p.85.
[530] Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," p.223.
[531] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1914), p.199. Ch.32.

> Our own impressions of the tone of a remark, as well as our assessment of its force, must be corrected by familiarity with the conventions of its historical origins. Hobbes's image of mysteries chewed, swallowed, and cast up would have carried little emotive impact in his own day.[532]

On the contrary, such a statement was a full-fledged "part and parcel of a doctrine of salvation and a theory of Christianity which formed the mainstream of Anglican doctrinal development in the seventeenth century."[533] The irony of Hobbes being branded an atheist "is heightened by the fact that the charge (or credit) of atheism has frequently rested on those of his opinions which are closest to important developments in the history of Christian thought."[534] As such, Ian Tregenza concludes that "it may well have been his Christian outlook itself that gave rise to his atheistic reputation."[535]

Even though he was criticised during his lifetime, it is only during the 19th century that "Hobbes was completely secularized and then even made a materialist, Epicurean atomist, mechanist, in addition to being an atheist."[536] As Aloysius Martinich argues, "Hobbes was never so much an atheist as he was during the first half of the twentieth century."[537] In his own time, Hobbes might have been closer to being a Reformation theologian.[538] Overall, it seems that Hobbes is both a theologian and a political philosopher and he must remain so to secure the unity of sovereignty.[539]

The acknowledgment of Hobbes's theology opens a whole new field of enquiry concerning religion, politics, and the secularisation of political thought. The importance of Hobbes's scriptural exegesis should not be underestimated. In fact, the theological argumentation of the English thinker is essential in that it points toward what Richard Sherlock described as the "refounding of Christianity."[540] As Johnston argues, what Hobbes attempted was to "turn Christianity into a civil religion,

[532] Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," p.105.
[533] Ibid., p.104.
[534] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.157.
[535] Ian Tregenza, *Michael Oakeshott on Hobbes: A Study in the Renewal of Philosophical Ideas* (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), p.136.
[536] Schneider, "The Piety of Hobbes," p.100.
[537] Martinich, *Thomas Hobbes*, p.55.
[538] Leopold Damrosch, "Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications of the Free-Will Controversy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40, no. 3 (1979).
[539] Joshua Mitchell, "Luther and Hobbes on the Question: Who Was Moses, Who Was Christ?," *The Journal of Politics* 53, no. 3 (1991): p.698.
[540] Richard Sherlock, "The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion," *Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy* 10, no. 1 (1982).

compatible with sovereign authority as [he] conceived it, but leaving man essentially what he had been before, a *homo religiosus*."[541] Such a claim is echoed by Patricia Springborg who argues that Hobbes tried "to form from Christianity a civic religion like that of the great empires on which his Leviathan is modelled; an aspiration that also lay at the birth of Anglicanism."[542] In such a context, the Hobbesian theology must be taken seriously, not only in itself, but more importantly as a prominent landmark in the secularisation of European thought. Far from solely rationalising religion, *Leviathan* translated Christianity into political doctrines and mystified political authority. The result was the creation of politics as 'a secular theology.'[543]

3) Leviathan as a Secular Version of Papal Sovereignty

The political philosophy of Hobbes was thoroughly concerned with the English Civil War and the troubles caused by sectarian strife. The religious dimension of the conflict did not escape his attention since he ultimately believed that "the dispute between the spiritual and the civil power [had], more than any other thing in the world, been the cause of civil wars in all parts of Christendom." [544] As a consequence, Hobbes's political philosophy was concerned to a large extent with settling the age-old conflict between the Church and the state.[545] His *Leviathan* was designed as "a solution to the political and theological problems at the heart of the Civil War by demonstrating that reason and revelation mandated the rule of the sovereign over both church and state as the basis for a lasting peace."[546] To achieve this, Hobbes had to draw extensively on medieval and Reformation literature.

In *Hobbes on Civil Association*, Michael Oakeshott argues that "*Leviathan*, like any masterpiece, is an end and a beginning; it is the flowering of the past and the seed-box of the future."[547] Far from being a completely original piece of work, some arguments employed in *Leviathan* are 'precisely the same' as those developed in the

[541] Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan*, p.183.
[542] Patricia Springborg, "Thomas Hobbes and Cardinal Bellarmine: Leviathan and 'the Ghost of the Roman Empire'," *History of Political Thought* 16, no. 4 (1995): p.509.
[543] Negretto, "Hobbes' Leviathan. The Irresistible Power of a Mortal God," p.190.
[544] Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes*, p.233.
[545] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.149.
[546] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.219.
[547] Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, p.58.

14th century by Marsiglio, Dante, and Ockham.[548] And it is based on this heritage, "especially as it [was] received and transmuted by the Reformation," that Hobbes translated Christianity into political theory and proceeded to the transformation of politics into a secular theology.[549] In particular, the English philosopher did so by creating his Leviathan as a reversed replica of the medieval doctrines of papal sovereignty.[550] Overall, Hobbes played a major role by facilitating the passage of hierocratic doctrines into the political theory of the secular state in the 17th century.[551]

The development of the notions of papal supremacy and papal sovereignty can be traced back to the 6th century when the Church began to develop a theory to legitimise its own authority and powers. As the legitimate holder of the 'keys of the kingdom of heaven,' the Roman Pontiff enjoyed complete jurisdiction in the care of souls.[552] These biblically expressed claims to power culminated in Innocent III's claim to absolute papal sovereignty. And even though the papacy was decreasingly able to control and command European monarchs, the process was "counterbalanced by the elaboration of a doctrine of power unparalleled since the days of imperial Rome."[553] As a result, arguing that the salvation of all people was entrusted onto the papacy, Innocent III requested the means to govern in such a way as to be able to halt and combat any hindrance to the salvation of Christian society. By the same token, the supremacy of the Church over secular rulers was strengthened and the Church-state issue was solved. Having already outlined the substance of the doctrine of papal supremacy in the previous chapter, in the following paragraphs, I will only focus on its form and structure as developed by Augustinus Triumphus.

Augustinus Triumphus (1243-1328) developed the theory of papal sovereignty in great detail and besides the usual reference to Petrine powers, he provided a meticulous outline of the nature and function of papal authority. The medieval scholar considered the sovereignty of the pope to be "the essence of the *Ecclesia*" and to be

[548] Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, p.57.
[549] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.209.
[550] I do not claim any intellectual lineage between papal theorists and Hobbes. Rather, I simply note that there is an unmistakable resemblance between the schemes developed in the two camps. Superficial similarities mask fundamental metaphysical and theological divergences. In this regard, Hobbes' nominalism, materialism, and Reformist allegiance stand in diametrical opposition to the convictions of the papal supporters. This is why his Leviathan is only a 'reversed' replica.
[551] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.151.
[552] "And I say unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shalt be loosed in heaven." St Matthew 16: 18-19.
[553] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.151.

universal, "perpetual, and incorruptible, and common to all the society."[554] Mirroring Innocent III's doctrine, Augustinus Triumphus thought that human salvation could only be achieved through "an absolute obedience to the ruler's will."[555] And as part of this unconditional obedience, all subjects were said to "act as one man," with the resulting 'artificial' or 'fictitious' entity being "portrayed by the ruler."[556] The need for total obedience that human salvation enjoined meant that "all Christians [came to] form the body of the pope."[557] This participation in the Juggernaut - i.e., Michael Wilks' term for the papal government - did not entail the division of papal sovereignty.[558] Rather, "[t]he inclusion of all in one means the supremacy of one over all: unity entails monarchy. The incorporation of all in the head involves no division of sovereignty (which would thereupon cease to be sovereignty)." [559] This indivisibility of sovereignty was dear to Augustinus.

To the modern scholar of International Relations, this succinct description of the form and structure of papal sovereignty as being embodied in an all-powerful and artificial body bears resemblance to that developed by Thomas Hobbes. [560] It seems that in his depiction of papal government, Augustinus is describing the front-cover of the original edition of *Leviathan*. Besides these superficial and structural similarities, both Juggernaut and Leviathan share some functional similarities. Mirroring the Juggernaut's role as the guide of "the body of the faithful from its transitory and earthly existence towards salvation and eternal life," Hobbes's Leviathan, "is an artificial man made for the protection and salvation of the natural man."[561] In fact, Hobbes's motto is that of "*Salus populi suprema lex*," since "forasmuch as eternal is better than temporal good, it is evident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are by the law of nature obliged to further the establishing of all such doctrines and rules, and the commanding of all such actions" necessary to human salvation.[562]

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[554] Ibid., p.35.
[555] Ibid., p.37.
[556] Ibid., p.38. If one agrees that the Roman Church was the first state, Van Creveld's argument that Hobbes was the inventor of the state as an 'artificial man' is thus mistaken. Martin L. Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.178-79.
[557] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.37.
[558] Ibid., p.63.
[559] Ibid., p.39.
[560] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.95. Ch. 18.
[561] Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, p.91. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, p.72.
[562] "Let the salvation of the people be the supreme law." In the Preface to the Latin edition Hobbes declares: "This great Leviathan, which is called the State, is a work of art; it is an artificial man made for the protection and salvation of the natural man, to whom it is superior in grandeur and power." Quoted in Kenneth H. Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and*

However, what separates them is that the Juggernaut draws its substance from God and the descending theme of government while the Leviathan draws its substance from nature and the ascending theme.[563] As Wilks argues, Augustinus Triumphus' theological theory of the sovereign Juggernaut only embodies "in an unfamiliar form what a modern writer would immediately recognise as a theory of State-sovereignty."[564] By unfamiliar, one has to understand 'theo-centric.'

4) Hobbesian Theology and the State-Church Issue

The solution Hobbes offered to the issues of Church-State relations and of sovereignty is not limited to a simple reversal of the papal doctrine of absolute sovereignty based on his engagement with science and nominalism. Rather, Hobbes's Protestant confession led him, through Biblical exegesis and theological 'ratiocination,' to transfer and translate religious concepts from the field of theology to the newborn field of secular politics. As Willis Glover argues, the switch from the Juggernaut to the Leviathan was much more problematic "than has been realized by interpreters who assume too easily that [Hobbes] cut the Gordian knot by assigning an absolute and completely arbitrary religious authority to the sovereign."[565] The picture is much more complex. In this section, I explain how the authority of the secular sovereign was legitimised along Reformist lines.

For Hobbes, Leviathan's religious authority is by no means absolute or completely arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the English thinker argues that the sovereign must be obeyed only as long as he does not jeopardise the salvation of his subjects – and it is up to the subjects themselves to decide whether the sovereign's orders contravene to their salvation. Being "a wholly human contrivance, not in the least an outcome of God's providence," the state can only legitimise its authority through "the

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Institution (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), pp.188-89. Hobbes quoted in Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," pp.151-52.

[563] The term 'nature' here refers to Hobbes' strictly materialist metaphysics as well as to his empiricism. His political project is not founded on revelation but on a naturalistic understanding of man and reality. Contrary to the Aristotelian notion of nature, Hobbes' is not teleological but based on the mechanistic vision of reality that was developing under the impulse of the scientific revolution. In this sense, his notion of nature is very much in tune with the Renaissance view of nature as studied by Collingwood in R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1960), pp.111-12.

[564] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.42.

[565] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.157.

consent of every one of the Subjects."[566] These limitations on Leviathan's power led Patricia Springborg to argue that

> Hobbes's doctrine of the union of civil and ecclesiastical power does not depart much from Marsilius's, or from Luther and Hooker's formulations of 'the Godly Prince,' more or less canonical on the post-Reformation role of the sovereign as God's deputy in the kingdom of this world.[567]

For orthodox Calvinists and Lutherans as for Hobbes, an all-powerful and coercive state was justified by the violence that followed the Original Fall of Adam and Eve. As Paul Dumouchel argues, it is the Fall that led "to the erection of Leviathan, the mortal god, under whose protection men seek security from each other."[568] Such a position was reminiscent of Calvin's argument developed in *The Homily against Disobedience and Wilful Rebellion* in which the French theologian argued that

> after the fall God 'did constitute and ordain…governors and rulers…for the avoiding of all confusion which else would be in the world'. Without the state 'there must needs follow all mischiefs and utter destruction…of souls, bodies, goods…'[569]

Likewise, following earlier Reformists, Hobbes upheld the 'spiritual statuses' of rulers and Commonwealth as well as the Anglican fusion of Church and state.[570] For Hobbes, a Church

> is the same thing with a Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a *Civill State*, for that the subjects of it are *Men*; and a *Church*, for that the subjects thereof are *Christians*. *Temporall* and *Spirituall* Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their *Lawfull Soveraign*…There is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governor both of the State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governor must be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth, between the *Church* and *State*; between *Spiritualists*, and *Temporalists*; between the *Sword of Justice*, and the *Shield of Faith*; and (which is more) in every

[566] Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science*, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.204. Hobbes, *Leviathan* Ch. 28, 42.
[567] Springborg, "Hobbes on Religion," p.353.
[568] Paul Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization: Christianity and the Political Problem of Religion," *Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture* 2(1995): p.48.
[569] Christopher Hill, "Popular Religion and the English Revolution," in *Religion, Rebellion, Revolution: An Interdisciplinary and Cross-Cultural Collection of Essays*, ed. Bruce Lincoln (London: Macmillan, 1985), p.50.
[570] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.150.

> Christian mans own brest, between the *Christian*, and the *Man*. The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; so also are Civill Soveraigns…Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign.[571]

By defining the Church as simply "*A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign*," Hobbes unified it to the state under the sole authority of the secular ruler.[572] "As head of the national church, the sovereign becomes *de jure* Vicar of Christ on earth" and acquires "supreme ecclesiastical power" within his territory.[573] The king becomes the "sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements" and thus possesses "ecclesiastical supremacy as God's lieutenant, after Moses and Christ."[574] Ultimately, "he which heareth his Soveraign, being a Christian, heareth Christ."[575]

Hobbes seems to be continuing the transfer of the Church's halo of sanctity to the state initiated by Luther. By uniting Church and state, Hobbes makes the Commonwealth the legitimate successor to the apostolic church. Moreover, because the sovereign is the representative of God on earth and "the soul of an artificial body which is both State and Church," he ultimately acquires the status of "the person of God born now the third time."[576] Consequently, Hobbes's Christian sovereign,

> as head of the Christian church, is responsible for the salvation of his subjects. Far from making religion or the church a mere tool of the state, Hobbes defines the Christian state as a church and ascribes to it a religious mission which takes precedence over its legitimate worldly concerns.[577]

As a result, it is not too far-fetched to argue, as Hood does, that "*Leviathan* represents an attempt to support by a new method a traditional doctrine of Divine politics adapted to serve the purpose of a national sovereign."[578] This new method, though modelled on Christianity along Protestant lines, is secular.

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[571] Hobbes, *Leviathan* pp.252-53. Ch. 39.
[572] Ibid., p.252.
[573] Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," p.217. Johnston, *The Rhetoric of Leviathan*, p.175. The king's ecclesiastical powers include the right to exercise all apostolic functions (baptism, administration of the Eucharist, and ordination…)
[574] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.256. Ch. 40. Springborg, "Hobbes on Religion," p.362.
[575] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.307. Ch. 42.
[576] Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes*, p.240. Patricia Springborg, "*Leviathan*, the Christian Commonwealth Incorporated," *Political Studies* XXIV, no. 2 (1976): p.180.
[577] Glover, "God and Thomas Hobbes," p.149.
[578] Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes*, p.253.

5) Hobbes's Doctrine of Salvation

Hobbes's theology is of great importance for understanding the role that his political philosophy played in the broader secularisation of Europe. To take his theology seriously leads one to acknowledge the Reformist dimensions of his work and to consider the crucial issue of state-Church relationship. However, the solution Hobbes found in the Leviathan brings up the issue of salvation for which the Commonwealth is supposed to be responsible. And the Englishman was well aware of this. Hence, at the heart of the second half of *Leviathan* lays some sort of doctrine of human salvation or soteriology. Were we to overlook Hobbes's Anglicanism and his religious beliefs, we would remain blind to the fact that his "theory of personal salvation was an essential part of his philosophy and a major issue in the bitter conflicts of his time."[579] In this section, I look at one more dimension of Hobbes' secularising influence, his re-evaluation of the traditional Christian soteriology.

The Hobbesian doctrine of salvation was by no means controversial or hotly-debated in the 17th century. In fact, it "was substantially identical with that held by leading Anglican thinkers in the first decades of the century" and corresponded to "the essence of the covenant theology that was favoured by some early Stuart Calvinists."[580] As such, Hobbes only asserted "the Reformed protestant doctrine that Biblical Christianity compels us to believe in a doctrine of salvation by faith and election, not 'works.'"[581]

His soteriology is simply and clearly stated: "All that is NECESSARY *to Salvation*, is contained in two Vertues, *Faith in Christ*, and *Obedience to Laws*;" i.e., "Laws of Nature, and the Laws of our severall soveraigns."[582] The first part of Hobbes' soteriology requires men to accept a single precept: "The (*Unum Necessarium*) Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh simply Necessary to Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST."[583] Besides, faith is said to be a divine gift, a gift of God that cannot be given, taken away, or imposed by force. As for the second part of his soteriology, Hobbes seems to vindicate the Lutheran and Calvinist principles of non-resistance to earthly rulers, Vicars of Christ.

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[579] Schneider, "The Piety of Hobbes," p.85.
[580] Johnson, "Hobbes's Anglican Doctrine of Salvation," p.122. Martinich, *Thomas Hobbes*, p.77.
[581] Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," p.216.
[582] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.319, 20. Ch.43.
[583] Ibid., p.322.

Hobbes's doctrine of salvation enables him to solve the conflict between state and Church. Effectively, while he argues, following Luther, that "Obedience to the laws of commonwealth is commanded by Christ," he is careful to add that faith in Christ does not require any public or political proclamation or engagement, for "it is internall, and invisible."[584] As a consequence, there is no more conflict between a sovereign's command and the essence of Christianity. The Leviathan cannot, by definition, jeopardise his subjects' salvation.

However, Hobbes's doctrine of salvation has deep consequences that differentiate his work from that of his forerunners. While the papalists and Protestants conceived of salvation as other-worldly, Leviathan is made into a source of human salvation in 'this world' and for "men that are yet in the flesh."[585] For Hobbes, "at the beginning of the world God's rule over *Adam* and *Eve* was not only natural but also by *agreement*."[586] This divine covenant granted eternal happiness to both inhabitants of the Garden of Eden. However, the breaking of the covenant led to the Fall. From a state of grace, humans fell into a natural state of *bellum omnis contra omnem*.

In this context, Christianity corresponds to "God's promise to men of a new covenant to replace the divine kingdom which was lost through Adam and Eve's fault."[587] Through the creation of the Commonwealth, the Kingdom of God is reinstituted for

> by the *Kingdome of God*, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another.[588]

For Hobbes, "the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome" and "Salvation shall be on Earth."[589] By the same token, Hobbes argues that "the elects shall not ascend" for "the promise of eternal life, [is] an eternal life here on earth."[590]

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[584] Ibid., p.328.
[585] Ibid., p.315. Ch.42.
[586] Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.188. Ch. 16.
[587] Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization: Christianity and the Political Problem of Religion," p.49. Hobbes believed that the Kingdom of God would only be instituted with the Second coming of Christ. Hence, participation in Leviathan is not entirely the same as participation in the ultimate Kingdom of God. Rather, like the Eucharist, it should be considered as the "eschatological anticipation of heavenly banquet." William T. Cavanaugh, "The Liturgies of Church and State," *Liturgy* 20, no. 1 (2005): p.28.
[588] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.221. Ch. 35.
[589] Ibid., p.222. Ch. 35; p.49. Ch. 38. It should be noted that Hobbes secularises the concept of salvation itself by putting emphasis on Rom 5.12. For Hobbes, "To be saved is to be secured" against evil and

Hobbes does not "merely temporalize Christian salvation," he also "politicizes it."[591] While the responsibility for the salvation of mankind in the other world was entrusted to the Church, Hobbes entrusted it to the Leviathan and turned the eternal kingdom of God into a this-worldly place. As a result, "Heaven is radically temporalized into a mere extension of the earthly commonwealth."[592] Or as Leo Strauss put it, Hobbes replaced "the state of grace by the state of civil society."[593]

For Strauss, Hobbes "asserted that what is needed for remedying the deficiencies or the 'inconveniences' of the state of nature is, not divine grace, but the right kind of government."[594] Accordingly, politics is believed to offer, to say the least, "something of value to [human] salvation. It offers the removal of some of the circumstances that, if they are not removed, must frustrate the enjoyment of Felicity."[595] By monopolising 'the profound feelings' and 'the most impassioned ideals sought by men,' politics came to 'dethrone God' and take the place of religion.[596]

It is obvious that following the Protestant tradition, Hobbes did shed a this-worldly light onto Christianity and participated in the secularisation and politicisation of theological and biblical precepts.[597] Hobbes succeeded in handing over "the keys of the kingdom of heaven" to the secular ruler and made the political realm, through the Commonwealth, the institution responsible for the salvation of its subjects. By turning the civil government into a 'mortal God' with quasi-divine powers and a saviour of a mankind trapped in the state of nature, Hobbes's *Leviathan* may well be said to be "the first great achievement in the long-projected attempt of European thought to re-embody in a new myth the Augustinian epic of the Fall and Salvation of mankind."[598] It is in this sense that Hobbes managed to transform politics into a secular theology.

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death. Besides, "Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing." ———, *Leviathan* pp.247-49. Ch. 38.

[590] Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization: Christianity and the Political Problem of Religion," p.49.

[591] J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (London: Methuen, 1972), p.187.

[592] Sherlock, "The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion," p.55. The Commonwealth exists for temporal ends, but through the conduct of secular affairs, it is participating in the salvation of its subjects and fulfilling its divine purpose.

[593] Strauss, "On the Spirit of Hobbes's Political Philosophy," p.15.

[594] Ibid.

[595] Oakeshott quoted in Ian Tregenza, "Leviathan as Myth: Michael Oakeshott and Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and the Critique of Rationalism," *Contemporary Political Theory* 1(2002): p.356.

[596] Larner in Corrigan and Sayer, *The Great Arch*, p.80.

[597] Martinich, *Thomas Hobbes*, pp.79-80. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.364.

[598] Oakeshott quoted in Tregenza, "Leviathan as Myth: Michael Oakeshott and Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and the Critique of Rationalism," p.356.

6) Conclusion

I devoted the first part of this chapter to the 17th century creation of a secular political liturgy to match that of Christianity. Through the study of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, I looked at the second step of the secularisation process which resulted in the translation of Protestant theological principles into political dogmas and in the sacralisation of politics. Though a layman, Hobbes furthered the project of the Reformers through scriptural exegesis. By arguing that the principles of Christian politics were to be derived from the Bible "by wise and learned interpretation, and careful ratiocination…without Enthusiasm or supernaturall inspiration," Hobbes promoted what he considered to be "the natural outcome of Christianity in history," namely, "the disenchantment of the world, the decline of magic, the rationalization of belief, and the exclusion of spiritual agencies in favour of natural explanations."[599] Through scriptural exegesis, Hobbes turned God into "a natural cause among causes" and thus played an important role in the secularisation process.[600]

The secular project developed by Hobbes did not imply the divorce of theology and politics.[601] Rather, it brought about a shift from 'a *Priesthood of Kings*' to 'a *Kingdome of Priests*' and from a "*Sacerdotall Kingdome*" to a "*Royall Priesthood*."[602] Religion, being innate to man, had to be taken into account and incorporated. The preservation of the Church's 'halo of sanctity' was done through the second step of the secularisation process, namely, the modelling of politics on religion. It was transferred to the sovereign and justified on a secular and immanent foundation.

As a consequence, Hobbes's *Leviathan* is profoundly metaphysical in that it substituted all theological and religious myths with the political myth of the Mortall God. In Hobbes's scheme Leviathan is the imitation of the Kingdom of God to come with the civil sovereign playing the role of "God's personator."[603] But at the same

[599] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.202. Ch. 33. Dumouchel, "Hobbes and Secularization: Christianity and the Political Problem of Religion," p.40, 54.
[600] Charles Taylor, "Modes of Secularism," in *Secularism and Its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.108.
[601] Ronald Beiner, "Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau on Civil Religion," *The Review of Politics* 55, no. 4 (1993): p.630.
[602] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.222. Ch. 35.
[603] R. J. Halliday, Timothy Kenyon, and Andrew Reeve, "Hobbes's Belief in God," *Political Studies* XXXI, no. 3 (1983): p.432.

time, Leviathan "is also antimetaphysical since the new god it creates is transcendent in only a juristic, not a metaphysical, sense." [604] Hobbes's political myth is of a secular nature since it originates from within the heart of men. As Carl Schmitt argues, Leviathan "is supreme, it possesses divine character. But its omnipotence is not at all divinely derived: It is a product of human work and comes about because of a 'covenant' entered into by man."[605] The new political myth embodies the very spirit of the ascending theme of government.

The cultural transformation implicit in Hobbes's *Leviathan* did not simply reside in the rationalisation of theology and religious beliefs. Indeed, the corollary of Hobbes's challenge to "the supernaturalistic elements of Christianity was the mystification of political authority." [606] As Gabriel Negretto explains,

> Hobbes argued that God was absent in this life but only to transform the civil sovereign into a "lieutenant" and representative of an utterly transcendent God. Fear of powers invisible is then transformed into the fear of a visible omnipotent authority that resembles the image of an omnipotent God." [607]

Negretto concludes that "the cultural transformation initiated by Hobbes was not simply aiming at the rationalization of religion but, essentially, at the transformation of politics into a secularized theology."[608] Through biblical exegesis and philosophical 'ratiocination,' Hobbes turned "Christianity into a civil religion and the political sovereign into God's lieutenant on earth…a current mediator between God and man."[609] Ultimately, *Leviathan* created politics as a secularised, temporalised, and politicised form of theology. [610]

However, even though Hobbes participated in the secularisation of theology, he did not equate politics to theology or the State to the Church. While he considered the sovereign to be 'the soul of the commonwealth,' "Hobbes never called the sovereign the soul of the Church. The sovereign is the soul of an artificial body which is both State and Church; but the commonwealth is no more than an artificial body,

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[604] Dyzenhaus, D., quoted in Tregenza, "Leviathan as Myth: Michael Oakeshott and Carl Schmitt on Hobbes and the Critique of Rationalism," p.364.
[605] Carl Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol* (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), p.33.
[606] Negretto, "Hobbes' Leviathan. The Irresistible Power of a Mortal God," pp.189-90.
[607] Ibid.: p.190.
[608] Ibid.
[609] Sherlock, "The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion," p.48, 50.
[610] Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time*, p.187.

and the Church is."[611] At rock bottom, there remains an ultimate difference between the two. But who is to judge what difference there is between religion and politics? If both realms are being sacralised, how can religion and politics be separated? This issue was dealt with by the very scholars who carried out the modelling and translation of Christian dogmas into political theories. The solution was to redefine religion in order to establish the supremacy of the secular. Upon its success in acquiring the Church's role in the salvation of the souls and the ordering of the world, the political realm reinvented religion as a private matter to secure its hegemony in this world. This exclusion of religion from the public realm went hand in hand with the establishment of a political soteriology. These by-products of the second step of the secularisation process are the subject of the second part of this chapter.

[611] Hood, *The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes*, pp.239-40.

B. The Modern (Re-)Definition of Religion

1) The Re-Definition of Religion

The term *religio* was scarcely employed prior to the Reformation and was only used to refer to monastic life and the different orders and congregations that formed the medieval religious mosaic. At the beginning of the 14th century, the term came to refer to a virtue in the work of Aquinas and it is only during the 17th century that it acquired its modern meaning and that its use spread. From a virtue and a community of faithful, *religio* was turned into a set of private beliefs. The 12th century Renaissance, and in a subsequent stage the Protestant Reformation, had a great impact on the evolution in the use and meaning of the term.

In fact, emancipation from the ecclesiastical authority in the Middle Ages was only achieved by accepting "that the purpose of society was no longer the achievement of salvation but the preservation of security on earth."[612] Because a political society could be governed independently from the Church, Marsiglio and Dante deduced that the pope's authority, and more broadly religion, could "be reduced to matters of faith and doctrine [that could not be] enforced unless the lay ruler lends jurisdictional support for this purpose."[613]

During the Reformation, in his *Temporal Authority: to what extent it should be obeyed,* Luther further developed the Marsiglian theme and argued that all humans are subjects to the rules of two realms, the temporal and the spiritual. But because force has only been given by God to secular rulers to enforce peace, security, and justice, the Church is left with the sole authority over matters of doctrine. Luther's central concern was that of disentangling the Church from secular works. However "[w]hile apparently separating civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, the effect of Luther's arguments was in fact to deny any separate jurisdiction to the Church."[614] As a result, in accordance with his doctrine of salvation through faith alone and not works, Luther denied any public role for religion.

[612] Wilks, *The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages*, p.102.
[613] Ibid., p.105.
[614] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.24.

The Wars of Religion that followed the Reformation led to the implementation of this new definition of religion. As John Bossy points out, under Lutheran and Calvinist impulses, the Reformation led to the evolution of the word 'Christianity' from a "community of believers," that is "a body of believers," to a "body of beliefs."[615] The practical, pragmatic, and communal dimensions of religion – i.e., the liturgical dimension of religion - were transferred to the nascent state and to the nation. In John Figgis's words, "the religion of the State has replaced that of the Church, or, to be more correct, that religion is becoming individual while the civil power is recognised as having the paramount claims of an organized society upon the allegiance of its members."[616]

From a Church defined by Aquinas as a community composed of all the faithful, 'past, future, and present, actual and potential,' we witnessed, on the one hand, the redefinition of religion as a set of private beliefs, and on the other, the birth of the political community defined as a secular contract among "the living, the dead and those who are yet to be born."[617] The social functions that had matured within the Church for centuries were finally transferred to the state.[618] The nation, taking over the role religion once played, became 'a soul, a spiritual principle' and "the fruit of a long past spent in toil, sacrifice and devotion."[619] By the same token, "the rise of the modern concept of religion is associated with the decline of the Church as the particular locus of the communal practice of religion."[620] In this redefinition and privatisation of religion, Hobbes played an important role since he demonstrated, through theological arguments, that salvation required only private worship and the acceptance of the sovereign. The English philosopher rejected all public expressions of faith as unnecessary and affirmed the Protestant argument that obedience is due to the civil government on religious grounds.

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[615] Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400-1700*, pp.170-71. Charles Taylor, "The Future of the Religious Past," in *Religion: Beyond a Concept*, ed. Hent de Vries (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp.176-77.
[616] Figgis, *Studies of Political Thought*, p.96.
[617] Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, p.195. Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9, no. 3 (1980): p.211.
[618] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1938), p.8.
[619] Ernest Renan in what is a nation quoted in Connolly, *Why I Am Not a Secularist*, p.75.
[620] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.33.

2) The Privatisation of Religion in Hobbes

In accordance with his Reformist and Anglican background, Hobbes put emphasis not on works but on faith as the key to salvation. In effect, his soteriology did not require any outward action but only obedience to law and faith in Christ. However, while obedience to law is a public act, faith in Christ does not need to be expressed publicly for "it is internall, and invisible."[621] Furthermore, Hobbes developed the distinction between inner faith and outer confession. In matters of religion, an individual has the right to believe whatever he wishes to believe. Hobbes supported universal freedom of thought as long as it was done privately, however, "as soon as it comes to public confession of faith, private judgment ceases and the sovereign decides about the true and the false."[622] The interiorisation of faith and the absolute control of the public sphere by the civil sovereign are Hobbes' solutions to the Wars of Religion. Faith is privatised and the public expression of religion is transferred to the political community.[623] Hence, it was not through the rejection of religion that modern secular politics was produced, but through "the theological demonstration of religion's irrelevance for life in this world."[624]

Besides this process of interiorisation, Hobbes separates religion from theology and thus "sets the stage for the modern understanding of religion as an ideology on which men rely to give meaning to their own lives and to the communities in which they live."[625] Hobbes's redefinition of religion as a private matter subordinated to public politics became so influential that "[a] brief survey of eighteenth – and early nineteenth-century proposals regarding church-state relationships highlights the fact that Hobbes codified the framework regarding the relationship of liberal politics to religion."[626] As Mill would later come to argue,

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[621] Hobbes, *Leviathan* p.328. Ch. 43.
[622] Schmitt, *The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes*, p.56.
[623] Ian Harris, "La Communauté Chez Hobbes Et Kant," in *Kant Et Hobbes: De La Violence À La Politique*, ed. L. Foisneau and D. Thouard (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p.153. Hobbes' redefinition of the notion of 'religion' was part of a broader cultural movement. For Attila Molnar, "'religion' was created from the point of view and interests of politics and political society by lay 'politicians' and by political theology…[it] was created by worldly people…whose main interest was the peace of political society, control from within and without, and obedience rather than eternal truth and salvation." Molnar, "The Construction of the Notion of Religion in Early Modern Europe," p.48, 57.
[624] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.210.
[625] Sherlock, "The Theology of Leviathan: Hobbes on Religion," p.59. One could argue that as a result of this differentiation of religion and theology, the liturgical dimension of theology is taken away from religion and given to the state and that religion remains as a purely experiential/spiritual state of being.
[626] Eisenach, "Hobbes on Church, State and Religion," p.237.

liberal politics - and the corresponding redefinition of religion as a private matter - "owes its success to this dialectic of leading religious ideas. Earlier liberalism, he asserts, was the beneficiary of a shift from 'Christianity' to 'Protestantism.'"[627] In fact, this definition of religion became paradigmatic and came to constitute a central tenet of the "political mythology of liberalism."[628] For example, Hobbes's redefinition of religion was taken over by John Locke in his *Letter Concerning Toleration* and Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the last part of his *Social Contract*.[629]

Overall, building on the works of Calvin, Luther, and others, Hobbes redefined religion from a community of believers to a body of belief and enshrined this change in the political sciences. He redefined religion by privatising it, by subordinating it to reason, and by boiling it down to a few tenets that required no public action to be taken whatsoever on the part of the believer. The second step in the secularisation process meant that "the whole of Christology and ecclesiology were taken over by the secular power; they were secularized, but without their ties with the religious world being cut."[630] By passing over into the realm of the profane, religious concepts were progressively emptied "of their religious content while at the same time pretending to preserve their religious dynamism. In the end, we see patriotic worship substituted for religious worship."[631] This unacknowledged continuity and lineage means that the modern concept of the fatherland, with all its emotional and religious features is but one of the most conspicuous inheritor of Europe's Christian legacy. Because of its importance in our assessment of the nature of the secular foundation of international politics, this continuity needs to be further studied. Being broadly accepted in the field of International Relations, its Westphalian expression is the subject of the final sections of this chapter.

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[627] Ibid.: pp.240-41.
[628] Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion*, pp.22-26. Michael Walzer went a step further and equated Puritanism and liberalism: "Puritanism *is* liberalism in theological garb, that is, in a primitive and somewhat confused form." Michael Walzer, "Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology," in *The Protestant Ethic and Modernization*, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (London: Basic Books, 1968), p.109.
[629] Locke "divested religious actions of their embodied, practical, and political meanings" and reduced religion to a "speculative matter of faith." Derek R. Peterson and Darren R. Walhof, *The Invention of Religion: Rethinking Belief in Politics and History* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p.4.
[630] Mehl, *The Sociology of Protestantism*, p.62.
[631] Ibid., p.63..

3) State Soteriology and Political Liturgy

In *Two Worlds of Liberalism,* Eldon Eisenach explains that Hobbes outlined two forms of prophetic belief. The first form of belief is developed in the first half of *Leviathan* and is described as 'humane politiques' and the second form, outlined in the second half of *Leviathan,* is described as 'divine politiques.'[632] Because most scholars of International Politics have only explored the corollary of the human form of prophetic belief, that is, the unconditional obedience due to the Leviathan, they have overlooked the divine source and raison d'être of this obedience contained in the second half of *Leviathan*. In fact, the Hobbesian "attack on priesthoods, rituals, and church establishments" contained in Part I deterred many "from recognising that the basis of [Hobbes's] critique was often itself religious, and from seeing how the theological perspectives of Reformed Protestantism were consciously incorporated into" his political philosophy.[633] Thus, the Hobbesian translation of Protestant doctrines into a secularised form was overlooked and the soteriological dimension of his politics implicitly concealed.

However, this concealment has recently come under criticism from William Cavanaugh. In *Theopolitical Imagination,* Cavanaugh argues that modern political theory, like theology, "is founded on certain stories of nature and human nature, the origins of human conflict, and the remedies for such conflict."[634] He argues that both disciplines are engaged in the establishment of 'foundational stories of human cooperation and division' based on the enactment of some sort of social body; Leviathan/ the state for politics and the body of Christ/ the Juggernaut for theology. Cavanaugh thus concludes that political theory and theology should be identified as comparable and analogous "acts of the imagination," that should be put on an 'equal footing.'[635] After all, politics is only believed to be superior to theology from within the political soteriology and vice versa.

In the Holy Scriptures, it is said that Adam and Eve, as symbols of humanity, were living in a state of grace and in unity with God. But one day, "the harmonious participation of humanity in God" was disrupted by Adam's "attempted usurpation of

[632] Eldon J. Eisenach, *Two Worlds of Liberalism: Religion and Politics in Hobbes, Locke, and Mill* (London: University of Chicago, 1981), p.56.
[633] Ibid., p.6.
[634] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.9.
[635] Ibid., pp.2-3.

God's position."[636] Disunity, corruption, and conflict ensued, and "the earth was filled with violence."[637] The restoration of the primeval unity, so the story goes, would only come about through humanity's participation in the Body of Christ, i.e., the Church. Through Christ's crucifixion, the scattered children of God were once again gathered 'together in one' and all humans and warring factions came to be reunited.[638]

Cavanaugh's depiction of the Christian story is to be compared to that developed by Hobbes. Like the biblical story of the Genesis, the story of the English philosopher begins with an original state of peace and unity. For Hobbes, the primeval unity and peace were enshrined in God's covenant with Adam and Eve.[639] However, Adam's disobedience ushered humanity into this state of nature of *bellum omnis contra omnem*.[640] For Hobbes, the resulting constraints on, and obstacles to, men's enjoyment of life, property, security, and freedom required that a solution be found; for the harshness of the war of all against all made life in the state of nature unbearable. Salvation required the reunification of humanity and this came through the enactment of a social contract and the creation of a governing body. As in the Christian story, the scattered children of God were reassembled 'together into one.' Through the subjects' participation in Leviathan, unity was restored. The similarities between the Biblical story on the one hand and Hobbes' political philosophy on the other led Cavanaugh to argue that it is in soteriology "that the ends of the Christian *mythos* and the state *mythos* seem to coincide…As in Christian soteriology, salvation from violence…comes through the enacting of a social body."[641]

Besides their joint commitment to some form of soteriology, both religion and politics accept some sort of liturgy. Originally, the term *leiturga* referred to "an action by which a group of people become something corporately which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals."[642] As Cavanaugh puts it, a liturgy "enacts and maintains community by the ritual remembering or re-presentation of foundational narratives, thereby helping to construct the perceived reality in which each member of

[636] Ibid., p.12.
[637] Genesis 6:11.
[638] St John 12:52.
[639] Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, p.188. Ch. 16.
[640] Interestingly, Leviathan is said to be the 'King of the proud,' the beast that can tame the pride of its subjects. Also, Hobbes considers pride to be the 'passion to be God-like.' This is to be related to the fact that Adam and Eve were banned from the Garden of Eden because of their attempt to become God-like. In both cases, the human passion to be God-like is the source of violence and death. And in both cases it must be tamed. See Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, p.122.
[641] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, pp.18-19.
[642] Schmemann quoted in ———, "The Liturgies of Church and State," p.25.

the community lives." [643] For example the acts of authorisation through which individuals give up their rights to the Leviathan correspond to liturgical acts. And by extension, the idea of social contract, and secular politics in general, embody complex forms of liturgy and soteriology.[644] In the following section, I offer to consider one the most explicit form of soteriology to be embodied in much of International Relations Theory, the Westphalian soteriology. I focus on this specific soteriology for the sake of simplicity and brevity but the broader study of the remaining soteriologies established at the heart of IR necessitates further research.

4) The Westphalian Soteriology

Within the field of International Relations, the Westphalian enactment of the state as the sole solution to the barbarism of the 'Wars of Religion' that were raging throughout Europe is a highly liturgical and soteriological act. According to the state soteriology, the Reformation broke down the once universal and unified ecclesiastical order of the Church and ushered humanity into bitter conflicts about doctrinal issues. Religious disputes were the sources of the Fall and the cause of the ensuing state of war of all against all. In such a context, the establishment of the modern secular state and the curtailment of religion were essential for peace to return and for mankind to be saved.[645] This view of events came to override historical evidence and finally managed to establish itself as the common wisdom.

In fact, the state soteriology is so widely accepted that the "one-sided portrayal of the Thirty Years' War as a war of religion … persists to this very day."[646] However, it is increasingly being acknowledged that the Wars of Religion were not so much about religion than about politics. While religion certainly played a role, the core issue was the quest for independence of the state from the Church. The Wars of Religion were wars of state-building that marked the birthpangs of the state.[647]

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[643] Ibid.
[644] These political liturgy and soteriology remain influential in the political sciences and in a way Foucault pointed at their limits when he claimed that "We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done." Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: The Harvester Press, 1980), p.121.
[645] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, pp.20-21.
[646] Johannes Burkhardt, "The Thirty Years' War," in *A Companion to the Reformation World*, ed. R. Po-chia Hsia, *Blackwell Companions to European History* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p.275.
[647] Ibid., p.273. Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.22.

If we go back to the rise of the modern state in Europe, we observe that the empowerment of national units across Europe preceded the Wars of Religion and that the Wars themselves only correspond to the final challenge of these territorially defined entities to the universal order of the Church; it corresponded to the "definitive triumph of secular authority in a struggle with the Church already centuries old."[648] The Wars of Religion were about the total domination of the state over religion and their promoters were the "kings and nobles with a stake" in the rise of an hegemonic state.[649] The dominance of the state over the Church that was antecedent to the Wars of Religion "allowed temporal rulers to direct doctrinal conflicts to secular ends."[650] Indeed, the "Reformation maintained itself wherever the lay power (prince or magistrates) favoured it; it could not survive where authorities decided to suppress it."[651] Ultimately, in terms of motivation, "doctrinal loyalties were at best secondary to their stake in the rise or defeat of the centralized state."[652]

At the heart of the Wars of Religion lies this attempt to substitute the state for the Church. And as states emerged, the role of religion was altered with "the political ideologian [taking] his place alongside and overlapping the man of religion."[653] Effectively, as David Martin argues, the development of political soteriology and liturgy marked the embodiment, within political theory, of "much the same components as those comprising religion."[654] And thus, to legitimise its newly-acquired authority and to justify its supremacy, the political realm had to displace its predecessor and redraw the boundaries of its sphere of influence. Through its attempt to differentiate and separate out what pertained to the 'secular' from religion, politics redrew the boundaries of the religious sphere.[655] But also, by painting a bleak picture of religion as a threat to the peace and unity of mankind, the secular realm affirmed its hegemony at the cost of misrepresenting and twisting the historical record. While the secularisation of politics may have been a necessity in the 17th century, the endurance of this quasi-theological Westphalian soteriology is no longer warranted.

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[648] Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, p.xiii.
[649] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.31.
[650] Ibid., p.42.
[651] Elton quoted in Ibid., p.26.
[652] Ibid., pp.27-28.
[653] Martin, *The Religious and the Secular*, pp.5-6.
[654] Ibid., p.5.
[655] Ibid., pp.5-6.

Conclusion

In the wake of the Protestant Reformation and following the legitimisation of the 'secular' from within theology, a second move in the secularisation of Europe was accomplished through the translation of religious dogmas into political theories. The 17th century witnessed the full transfer of many Anglican theological concepts to the field of politics. Under the pen of Thomas Hobbes, Reformist theology, liturgy, and soteriology were translated into political doctrines. The redrawing of the boundaries between the secular and religious realms implicit in the process marked the disenchantment of theology and the sacralisation of politics.[656] The modern civil religion of the state was born out of the redefinition of Christianity. Through scriptural exegesis and philosophical ratiocination, Hobbes separated religion from the Church and turned it into a set of speculative beliefs that could be scrutinised through the use of reason. Religion was redefined and privatised. As Cavanaugh notes, "what we call 'religion,' a fundamentally interior disposition of the individual toward the transcendent, was also an invention of fairly recent origin."[657]

When one looks at the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, one sees obvious similarities with Christian liturgy and Biblical stories. Through the enactment of the Leviathan the philosopher developed a new and this-worldly soteriology. The main difference between his political doctrine and that of the Christian Church being their respective foundation, the ascending theme of government and immanence for the former, and the descending theme and transcendence for the latter. As a result of this modelling, political theory became "an alternative soteriology to that of the Church."[658] Likewise, the so-called 'secular' realm has invented "its own liturgies, with pretensions every bit as 'sacred' as those of the Christian liturgy…such liturgies are not properly called 'secular.'"[659]

Finally, this brings us back to the functionalist tradition and to Emile Durkheim's claim that "[t]here is something eternal in religion."[660] By 'enveloping'

[656] In a neo-Durkheimian fashion, Thompson argues that processes of secularisation and sacralisation are "in an ongoing dialectical relationship." Kenneth W. Thompson, "Secularization and Sacralization," in *Rethinking Progress: Movements, Forces, and Ideas at the End of the 20th Century*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Piotr Sztompka (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p.179.
[657] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.2.
[658] Ibid., p.9.
[659] ———, "The Liturgies of Church and State," p.25.
[660] Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p.427.

itself in the particular symbols of the nation and of the king, religious precepts have survived. Knowing that "religious answers have been privatized, but not the questions to which they have been proposed," the human need for religion remains either wanting or fulfilled by the political soteriology. [661] As a result, what is purported to be a secular, rational, and objective age, that is, a "death-of-God era" can also be understood as being "a god-building era."[662]

The argument developed in this chapter goes a long way in answering our first research question concerning the impact of secularisation on the foundation of international politics. However, the process did not end with Hobbes but continued to influence politics for centuries. Therefore, the following chapter deals with the third step in the process. As we will see, through a second shift in sources of morality, the secularisation of Europe took a new turn and led to the emergence of the legitimate order that mostly influences our modern outlook. After the separation of religion from politics, and following the processes of usurpation, modelling, and translation, secularisation took one last form: the autonomous development of a secular eschatology.

Following the demise of the Church and the loss of sacred order, Europe blindly embarked "on an attempt to discover a new illumination, a new happiness, and the face of the real God."[663] Eric Voeglin explained that as God disappeared, "the contents of the world will become new gods; when the symbols of transcendent religiosity are banned, new symbols develop from the inner-worldly language of science to take their place." [664] This process of disenchantment resulted in 'modernity's wager' to reconstruct the idea of the sacred and sacrality on a rational foundation.[665]

[661] John Mansfield, "Comment on Holmes, "Jean Bodin: The Paradox of Sovereignty and the Privatization of Religion"," in *Religion, Morality, and the Law*, ed. Roland Pennock and John Chapman (London: New York University Press, 1988), pp.74-75.
[662] Hadden, "Desacralizing Secularization Theory," p.18.
[663] Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p.91.
[664] Voegelin, *Modernity without Restraint*, p.60.
[665] Seligman, *Modernity's Wager*, pp.12-13.

6. Secularisation, Act III: The Enlightenment

Whirl is king, having deposed Zeus.

Aristophanes

According to Benjamin Nelson, the shift from faith to reason-based structures of consciousness resulted in a profound change in sources of knowledge, truth, and morality. From the 12th century onwards, the rationalisation of theology led to the founding of new moral sources based on the Book of Nature (Chapter 4). Alongside the Book of Creation, the Book of Nature became the most authoritative source of morality, and accordingly, the idea of God became "predominantly this-worldly, tending towards a fusion with the conception of 'Nature.'"[666] However, from the 17th century onwards, under the impact of the same process of rationalisation, the notion of nature was divested of its divine dimension. Its predominance faded and reality came to be mediated and accessed through the process of cogitation and the exercise of one's thinking faculties, namely, reason. This inward and internal source of truth and knowledge emerged as a result of the search for 'subjective certitude' and 'objective certainty' that characterised the shift from faith to reason-based structures of consciousness.[667] It relied mainly on sensory perception supplemented by logical reasoning in a view to dominate and control the material world.[668]

At first nature and reason co-existed side by side, but soon the former succumbed to the latter. The scientific revolution of the 17th century slowly disenchanted nature and gradually turned it into inert matter the mastering of which

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[666] Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p.316.
[667] Benjamin Nelson, "Sources of 'Probabilism' and 'Anti-Probabilism' in 16th and 17th Century Science," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.115.
[668] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1970), pp.228-29.

was no longer impious but was promoted as a human duty.[669] Eventually, through the Enlightenment spiritual "struggle to impose man's rational will on the environment," nature became the object of man's intellectual abilities and yielded to his reason.[670] The free exercise of one's reasoning faculties became the fundamental legitimating principle behind authority.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, this immanentisation of moral sources ultimately resulted in the culmination of political orders legitimised by the will of the people. Also, following the increasing interest in the rational mastering of both outer and inner nature, political communities became the arena for the establishment of civilisation through rational progress. The intellectual transformations that were taking place at the time thus established two new legitimate orders: 'the will of the people' and civility or 'civilisation.'[671] As the "most dramatic step toward secularization and rationalization in Europe's history" and as the last seminal period to profoundly shape the secular foundation to political legitimacy, the Enlightenment cannot be neglected.[672] Also, as "one of the principle expressions, as well as one of the principle vehicles, of the new consciousness," the French Revolution needs to be considered.[673]

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[669] In the 5th century, St Augustine argued that "to seek out the hidden powers of nature" is a "perverted aim" and theologians should "rest content to be ignorant of the mysteries of the heavens and the earth." Alan D. Gilbert, *The Making of Post-Christian Britain: A History of the Secularization of Modern Society* (London: Longman, 1980), p.22.

[670] Roy Porter, *Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World* (London: Penguin, 2001), p.142. J. C. D. Clark, "Providence, Predestination and Progress: Or, Did the Enlightenment Fail?," in *Ordering the World in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Diana Donald and Frank O'Gorman (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p.28. Peter Gay, *The Party of Humanity: Studies in the French Enlightenment* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), p.130. This will to control and master nature was already present in the work of Roger Bacon. However, it remained a mostly intellectual project. As Peter Gay argues, "The Middle Ages practiced rational science and, to a limited degree, sought power over nature, but it is significant that the pronouncements of Roger Bacon had to wait three centuries until they were fitted into a program for action." Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.247.

[671] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*. ———, *A Secular Age*, pp.112-14, 76.

[672] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750*, p.vi. Barraclough, *History in a Changing World*, p.11, 60. Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). By taking the Enlightenment to be the last seminal period, I do not mean that nothing has changed between Hume and Rawls, or Sartre. Instead, I hold that modern forms of secularism find their most direct and vital roots in the Enlightenment and that even though the 'secular' has undergone further transformations in the 19th and 20th centuries, these changes either correspond to variations on the same theme rather than revolutionary and original proposals or are part of the current transformations towards a post-secular order. As such, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl and others will be considered in the following chapter.

[673] Krishan Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p.81. I understand that the relationship between the Enlightenment and the French Revolution is rather complicated and needs to be dealt with carefully. This issue is addressed in subsequent sections.

An important thread that runs through this thesis is that the secularisation of Europe was characterised by the 'transfer' of religious power, property, and functions from the Church to secular elites. Through the study of the changes in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and forms of legitimacy, I have traced this process inherent to secularisation but that contradicts secularism's self-proclaimed neutrality, superiority, and objectivity. So far, I have explained how the secular foundation of international politics emerged and was established through the appropriation, usurpation, modelling, and translation of religious and theological resources. Yet, there remains to outline the last step in the secularisation of Europe: re-sacralisation. In this chapter, I demonstrate that a by-product of the above-mentioned shifts in moral sources and legitimate orders was the establishment of a new eschatology that resulted in the sacralisation of the world on purely immanent and secular grounds. Through the use of reason, heaven was created here on earth.

This chapter expands on the themes developed in previous chapters and continues to trace the establishment of the secular foundation of international politics. In the first part, I focus on the 17th century scientific revolution and on its impact on the disenchantment of the world and the demystification of 'nature.' Drawing on existing scholarship and interpretations, I reject the belief that the inherent superiority of reason and logic dispelled religious superstitions and I explain that the intellectual movement had "other than purely secular origins."[674] I argue that the scientific revolution, like Protestantism, emerged from within Christianity and acted as some sort of Trojan horse in its downfall.[675] However, instead of looking at the transformations in the field of theology, the advancement of the secularisation of Europe requires us to focus on the impact of discoveries in the natural sciences and philosophy.[676]

Through studies of the thinkers that very much shaped the 'climate of opinion' or 'mental style' of their age (i.e., René Descartes, John Locke, etc), I trace the shift in moral sources that took place between the mid-17th century and the French

[674] Dale Van Kley, "Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest," in *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France and Germany*, ed. Alan Charles Kors and Paul J. Korshin (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1987), p.69.
[675] John Henry, "Science and the Coming of Enlightenment," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004). James Dybikowski, "The Critique of Christianity," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004).
[676] Roth and Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History*, p.159. Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*.

Revolution.[677] Following Charles Taylor, I argue that the radical inwardness and immanence of these thinkers strongly influenced the development of the modern form of secular legitimacy.[678] Despite their explicit attempt to safeguard Christianity, Descartes and Locke developed ideas that ultimately challenged the Church, rationalised theology, and established the omnipotence of man in all realms. Overall, the first part of the chapter provides a sketch of the shift in moral sources that led to the overthrow of the once uncontested moral sources of Christianity and made man the measure of all things.[679]

In the second part of the chapter, I look at the key ideas that the Enlightenment helped to enshrine in new international legitimate orders. Starting with the humanitarian dimension of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy, I demonstrate how new legitimating principles came to be accepted. Building on the work of Mlada Bukovansky, I outline the ways in which the notion of popular sovereignty came to replace previous forms of dynastic authority. In fact, under the intellectual impulse of the Enlightenment, the ascending thesis of government finally reached maturity and "democratic republicanism…[became] the most legitimate form of politics."[680] As Walter Ullmann argues, the American and French Revolutions resulted from the last and final "resistance of the traditional-conservative forces to the attempted translation of the ascending theme of government into practice."[681]

Finally, I demonstrate that with the Enlightenment and the triumph of the ascending theme of government, the seeds of a new set of legitimating principles were sown. In effect, while enshrining the shift in moral sources from God to Man, the Enlightenment paved the way for the development of legitimating principles that revolved around the notions of progress and civilisation. As a result of this process, the world was sacralised and an immanent eschatology was developed on rational and secular terms. This marked the third and last step of the secularisation of Europe.

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[677] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, pp.1-31. Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.37.
[678] Taylor, *Sources of the Self*
[679] Erich Kahler, *Man the Measure: A New Approach to History* (New York: George Braziller, 1956).
[680] Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, p.866. Mark Philp, "Enlightenment, Republicanism and Radicalism," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004).
[681] Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, p.145. See also Plongeron for the final shift between ascending and descending orders in the 18th century: Bernard Plongeron, *Théologie Et Politique Au Siècle Des Lumières (1770-1820)* (Genève: Droz, 1973), p.55.

A. Moral Sources, Man the Measure

Thro' Nature up to Nature's God

The proper study of mankind is man.

Alexander Pope.

1) The Enlightenment and the *Philosophes*

The last seminal period to shape the secular foundation of international politics is the 'Enlightenment.' It corresponded to an intellectual and cultural movement that radiated outward from Paris and spread to most of Europe between the mid-17th and the late 18th centuries.[682] The internal variety and diversity of the movement was immense and it is essential to emphasise the existence of a multiplicity of Enlightenments. Far from referring to a homogenous, cohesive, and well-defined group of thinkers, it revolved around a core of *philosophes* whose differences could be profound and wide-ranging and agreement rare.[683]

What united them was a shared commitment to criticism in all spheres of life. In *The Rise of Modern Paganism*, Gay argues that "[t]he principle of the Enlightenment was not the omnipotence of reason… [but] a claim for the 'omnicompetence of criticism,' understood as the assertion that everything is properly subject to rational criticism."[684] Besides this shared critical spirit, Gay demonstrates that Enlightenment thinkers agreed on three important points: "from Edinburgh to Vienna, Philadelphia to Milan, [the *philosophes*] were hostile to what they were pleased to call 'superstition,' advocated a comprehensive humanitarianism, and deprecated the accepted legitimations of power."[685] This tension between unity of spirit and division over most issues led Peter Gay to compare the *philosophes* to the members of some sort of 'family;' a family ridden with disputes and disagreements,

[682] Knud Haakonssen, "Enlightened Dissent: An Introduction," in *Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.1.
[683] To cite but the most famous members of this inner core of *philosophes*, the Enlightenment was mainly driven by Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Montesquieu, Rousseau. Peter Jones, "Introduction," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004), p.3.
[684] Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, p.141.
[685] Peter Gay, "Why Was the Enlightenment?," in *Eighteenth Century Studies: Presented to Arthur M. Wilson*, ed. Peter Gay and Arthur M. Wilson (New York: Russell & Russell, 1975), p.65.

but a family nonetheless.[686] In light of this complexity and diversity, an exhaustive study of the intellectual movement is impossible. In this chapter, I will only concentrate on the strand of thought that celebrated and established the secular source of morality at the heart of our modern form of consciousness. Overall, I believe that my account of this facet of the Enlightenment is in tune with the more comprehensive accounts of the seminal period developed by Jonathan Israel or Peter Gay.

Many of the ideas and values the *philosophes* cherished were neither new nor original. In fact, as the final phase of the 'long Reformation,' the Enlightenment drew to a very large extent on the works of medieval and Renaissance scholars.[687] For Hegel, the *philosophes* were carrying out "the Lutheran Reformation in a different form."[688] Because the issue of the separation of Church and state persisted until the 18th century, the *philosophes* unavoidably drew on the Reformation for "its vocabulary, its philosophical method, and much of its program."[689] Thus, despite their use of the scientific method, "the *Philosophes* were nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than they quite realized or we have commonly supposed."[690] In a sense, the Reformation was the 'prehistory' of the Enlightenment.[691]

As for all intellectual movements, it has often been argued that the *philosophes* formed an elite whose ideas did not reach much further than the most educated members of the aristocracy of Western Europe. And therefore, it is frequently claimed that an intellectual history of the Enlightenment cannot be taken to be representative of the broader mood or mentality of 18th century Europe. I believe that while this argument is important, it does not apply to the *philosophes* who were influential throughout society and "were deeply embedded in [its] texture."[692]

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[686] Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*.
[687] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*. Peter George Wallace, *The Long European Reformation: Religion, Political Conflict, and the Search for Conformity, 1350-1750* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[688] Hegel quoted in Dorinda Outram, *The Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.111.
[689] Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.256, 48. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.130. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p.vi. See also Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), p.48.
[690] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.29.
[691] Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, p.256. Donald Atwell Zoll, *Reason and Rebellion: An Informal History of Political Ideas* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.137.
[692] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.119.

As important cultural intermediaries and members of the 'mediatorial elite,' the *philosophes* were not so much "interested in communicating a specific body of knowledge" as in "effecting a fundamental revolution in the prevailing pattern of thought."[693] And in their will to change and adopt new ideas, "[t]he world was very much with the philosophes."[694] Far from being isolated thinkers sitting in their ivory tower, Voltaire, Turgot, and their colleagues were public figures engaged in social and political activities and "it was precisely these elites which moulded, supervised and fixed the contours of popular culture."[695] As Roy Porter argues, they "were men of the world: journalists, propagandists, activists, seeking not just to understand the world but to change it."[696] Their connection to the wider society was self-evident and they were "the bearers of public opinion."[697] In light of the above, it seems appropriate to grant the *philosophes* "their claim that they were speaking, not for a segment of society, but for all of it."[698]

2) Theology, Science, and the Rationalisation of God

There exists a widely believed 'heroic mythology' that the Enlightenment corresponded to the logical triumph of secular and scientific outlooks over religious superstitions.[699] It is often said that in the 18th century people were rationally and logically compelled to abandon Christian fancies for the true reality discovered by scientific methods and empirical observation. Accordingly, the religious view of the world naturally withered away and left barren reality open to objective scrutiny.

However, this 'subtractive' approach to religion, science, and secularisation is erroneous and unhistorical.[700] As S. J. Barnett argues, this "characterization of the Enlightenment as the Age of Reason, in which reason was diametrically opposed to religion, cannot be sustained."[701] The climate of opinion was such that the function of intelligence was exclusively geared towards the demonstration of the truth of revealed

[693] Gerald R. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason, 1648-1789* (Bristol: Penguin, 1962), p.236.
[694] Gay, "Why Was the Enlightenment?," p.69.
[695] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750*, p.5.
[696] Roy Porter, *The Enlightenment* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.3.
[697] Mona Ozouf, "'Public Opinion' at the End of the Old Regime," in *The Rise and Fall of the French Revolution*, ed. T. C. W. Blanning (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996).
[698] Gay, "Why Was the Enlightenment?," p.64.
[699] Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion*, p.26.
[700] Taylor, *A Secular Age*.
[701] Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion*, p.26.

knowledge and the reconciliation of empirical observation "with the rational pattern of the world as given in faith."[702] In such a context, people did not possess the adequate analytical toolbox for the development of atheism and religion did not fade away under the pressure of science.[703]

As a matter of fact, rivalries did not begin between theology and science but between Christianity and some unintended consequences drawn from scientific discoveries. At core, the Church was not opposed to science *per se*, and many of the key discoveries of the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries were either made by members of the Church or had successfully been incorporated within Christianity. As Geoffrey Hawthorn argues, "nothing in the gradual intellectual evolution from the medieval period to the eighteenth century necessarily implied a challenge to religious faith."[704] And in particular, the 17th century Scientific Revolution "marked no break with the Christian view of the world."[705]

Far from working from outside to bring down the Church, scientists worked from within. Effectively, "[u]p to the Enlightenment, and indeed beyond it, nearly all the scientists professed to be devout Christians. Many claimed to be motivated chiefly by the desire to understand God's handiwork in nature."[706] Ultimately, their principle aim was to prove the truth of the Bible through the newly discovered scientific method and based on their empirical observation of nature. And therefore, "rather than acting as a secularizing force, [science] more often sustained the idea of a world governed by providence."[707]

All the great scientists believed that they were rendering the highest service to both religion and science, for science corresponded to the exploration of the *works* of God, a pursuit almost as pious as the study of his *word*.[708] For Nelson,

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[702] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.7.
[703] Lucien P. V. Febvre, *Le Problème De L'incroyance Au Xvie Siècle: La Religion De Rabelais* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1947).
[704] Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair: A History of Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.9.
[705] Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, p.140.
[706] Gilbert, *The Making of Post-Christian Britain*, p.23.
[707] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, p.14.
[708] Basil Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies in the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period* (London: Chatto&Windus, 1949), p.4. Margaret C. Jacob, *The Enlightenment: A Brief History with Documents* (Bedford St.Martin's, 2001), p.18. For example, the Baconian science became the "avenue not only to right service of God in our use of his creation but also to his greater glory, as we come to understand his purposes and can render him knowledgeable and fitting praise for the marvels of his design." Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.232.

> The founders of modern science and philosophy were anything but sceptics. They were, instead, committed spokesmen of the new truths clearly proclaimed by the Book of Nature which, they supposed, revealed secrets to all who earnestly applied themselves in good faith and deciphered the signs so lavishly made available by the Author of Nature. [709]

Historically speaking, "religion and science moved in parallel tracks, supporting rather than hindering one another."[710] But the paradox of the discoveries of the great scientists lay in the fact that "whatever their motives or their values, their work contributed to the secularization of the European 'world.'"[711]

By working within "a distinctly religious spirit and with clerical support," "seventeenth-century scientists concealed from themselves, as much as from others, the revolutionary implications of their work."[712] And as a result, secularisation took place 'behind the century's back,' as it were.[713] It is not until the 18th century that this marriage of Christianity and science was dissolved, and that the scientific method was pushed to its logical conclusion: "Newton's physics without Newton's God."[714]

The tensions between science and theology are best exemplified by the case of the Copernican scientific discoveries. [715] In 1543, Copernicus, a Polish priest, developed a new theory that displaced the earth from the centre of the universe and put the sun in its place. This heliocentrism was developed by a member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and was tolerated for more than seventy years before it began 'to pose a significant threat' to Christian orthodoxy. In 1616, the theory was proscribed and condemned.[716] For Benjamin Nelson,

> the fundamental issue at stake in the struggle over the Copernican hypothesis was not whether the particular theory had or had not

[709] Benjamin Nelson, "The Early Modern Revolution in Science and Philosophy," in *On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations: Selected Writings*, ed. Benjamin Nelson and Toby E. Huff (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), p.132.
[710] Wallace, *The Long European Reformation*, p.194.
[711] Gilbert, *The Making of Post-Christian Britain*, p.23.
[712] Wallace, *The Long European Reformation*, p.194. Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, pp.122-23.
[713] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, pp.122-23.
[714] Ibid., p.123.
[715] While Newton had a much greater influence on the *philosophes*, I prefer to give the example of Copernicus. As Nelson argues, "It was not Francis Bacon or the members of the Royal society, nor even Newton who set the wheels in motion [of the scientific and philosophic revolution]; it was Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, and many others who had been bred in Catholic schools and had to struggle to win their way to a conviction that they had discerned new *truths* about the Book of Nature's Revolution." Nelson, "The Early Modern Revolution in Science and Philosophy," p.136. See also Nelson's discussion of Edward grant's claim that it is Copernicus' quest for reality that inspired the Scientific Revolution. ———, "Certitude and the Books of Scripture, Nature, and Conscience," pp.153-54.
[716] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, pp.14-15.

> been established, but whether in the last analysis the decision regarding truth or certitude could be claimed by anyone who was not an officially authorized interpreter of revelation.[717]

The hostility of the Church towards Copernicus - and towards Galileo for that matter - rested upon 'the politics of epistemology.' By cultivating "a field of human awareness in which 'religious' consciousness was epistemologically irrelevant," the natural sciences developed a new foundation for knowledge that was independent not only from Christian revelation but also from any type of ecclesiastical or lay hierarchy.[718] The Church's privileged access to divine knowledge was "fatally weakened by an alternative institution, science, being able to reveal that divine purpose in nature by describing nature in what we would now call straightforwardly naturalistic ways." [719]

The new focus on the natural world that accompanied the spread of the natural sciences unintentionally removed the need for revelation. The foundation of ultimate knowledge and truth in nature was given a solid scientific grounding since its laws could now be proven through empirical observation. Besides, this divine truth "born of a *faith* in the mathematical interpretation of Nature" was much more accessible and certain than its revealed counterpart.[720] For men like Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton, the Book of Nature

> was written in numbers and never lied, whereas the testaments were written in words which were both easy and tempting to misconstrue. Men like Galileo and Descartes were vastly more certain about the truth *revealed* to them by number than they were by the interpretations placed upon Scriptures in the commentaries of theologians.[721]

This process of gradual reliance on nature and exclusion of the supernatural from the material world has been vividly described by John Randall. Beginning with the idea of a universe sustained by God, the Columbia Professor traces the steady withdrawal of the deity from the cosmos in the thought of key scientists and ends up his account with Laplace's suggestion to Napoleon that a process of cooling and condensation had led to the formation of planets. Famously, to the Emperor's query about the role of

[717] Nelson, "The Early Modern Revolution in Science and Philosophy," p.133.
[718] Gilbert, *The Making of Post-Christian Britain*, p.23.
[719] Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*, p.9.
[720] John Herman Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind: A Survey of the Intellectual Background of the Present Age* (New York Columbia University Press, 1976), p.235.
[721] Nelson, "The Early Modern Revolution in Science and Philosophy," p.132.

God in his theory, the French scientist replied, "Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis."[722]

Besides its sources in the 16th and 17th century natural sciences, the Enlightenment philosophy also drew on medieval advances in the field of theology. For example, the anti-clericalism dear to the *philosophes* had its roots in the Reformation and the Protestant critique of the papacy. By accusing each other of being the incarnation of the Antichrist and of "using superstition and pagan forms of worship to hoodwink the masses into quiescent obedience to a false religion," Protestants and Catholics alike developed the seeds of the Enlightenment critiques of both religion and papacy.[723] It is in such circumstances that the anticlerical polemic of the Reformation unintentionally "provided the core of the anticlerical historical critique advanced by the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment."[724]

Moreover, atheism was also invented by orthodox theologians as a critical philosophy. In an age of religious ebullition, the 'atheist' was conceived as an imaginary interlocutor whose role was to question Christianity in order to demonstrate its truth and to perfect it.[725] And the same applied to the atheism of the Enlightenment. In fact, most *philosophes* of the first generation "were not atheists, never claimed to be atheists, and only 'discussed atheism' in order to refute it."[726] On the contrary, since "almost all philosophes and their supporters continued to believe in one form or another," the 17th century "ended with a confident affirmation of belief in God."[727]

In light of the above argument, if the secularising impulse of the Enlightenment is to be studied, one must trace its origins in the development of the scientific outlook and of the more naturalistic, immanent, and rational moral sources it entailed. Because "[t]he philosophical and the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century were one and the same," I study these changes in moral sources through the work of two of the most important philosophers of the 17th century, René Descartes

[722] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.919.
[723] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, p.viii.
[724] Ibid., p.xii.
[725] David Wootton, "New Histories of Atheism," in *Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment*, ed. Michael Hunter and David Wootton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.21. Also, atheism used to refer to those who thought that God's existence was not relevant for men. Wootton, "New Histories of Atheism," p.27.
[726] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.197.
[727] Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion*, p.26. Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.76.

and John Locke.[728] I demonstrate that despite their attempts to support Christianity, the two thinkers developed ideas that made religious mediation superfluous, condoned the rationalisation of theology, and ultimately established the omnipotence of human reason. As such, Descartes' secularising influence is found in his attempt to develop a mathematical science that could present a true image of reality and prove the existence of God.

3) René Descartes and the Inward Turn

The origin of the shift in sources of morality is to be found in the writings of 'The Father of Modern Philosophy,' René Descartes (1596-1650), and more precisely, in his 'epoch-making' interiorisation of the moral sources within man.[729] The Cartesian 'inward turn' is based on his philosophical demonstration that all knowledge is necessarily mediated by the self and that the only source of truth is thus to be found in the very process of cogitation: 'I think therefore I am' or '*cogito ergo sum*.'[730]

Charles Taylor argues that this Cartesian epistemology leads in turn to the disengagement of the subject from the outside world and to the focus on representations and images of reality as conceived by the human mind, i.e., *cogitare*. For Descartes, the world is no longer something we can discover 'out there' but becomes a mental construction based solely on the workings of the mind. As a result, in contradistinction to the Augustinian belief that men could access the Beyond by turning inward, Descartes argues that the only truth that could be demonstrated by doing so is the reality of the human *cogito.* Consequently, in place of God, Descartes posits the existence of a purely secular and temporal source of morality within the vicinity of the self. While the Cartesian philosophical revolution had countless consequences and repercussions, for the sake of conciseness, I only focus on its implications for the shift in moral sources that characterised the secularisation of the European consciousness.

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[728] Peter Schouls, "The Quest for Philosophical Certainty," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004). Peter Gay, *Deism: An Anthology* (London: D. Van Nostrand, 1968), p.21. Taylor, *Sources of the Self*

[729] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.143.

[730] Descartes' discovery was part of his project to develop a proof of the existence of God and of the soul, a project for which he had received a commission from a cardinal of the Church.

This new sense of inwardness had four important implications in the spheres of government, religion, and the natural sciences. First of all, the interiorisation of the source of morality led to the affirmation of political atomism. In fact, the rational disengagement advocated by Descartes begged for the shattering of the cosmic hierarchy to which humans belonged. For now that truth was to be found within, the order could not be imposed from outside or be revealed by God; it could only be inferred. The political consequences of this philosophical affirmation yielded "a picture of the sovereign individual, who is 'by nature' not bound to any authority. The condition of being under authority is something which has to be *created.*"[731] This 'declaration of the Independence of Man' posed a direct challenge to Christian notions of legitimacy and authority and the chasm that was opened in this field called forth the creation and institutionalisation of a new set of legitimating principles. [732]

The second and more far-reaching consequence took place in the realm of religious legitimacy. By affirming that truth was accessible to all those endowed of the ability to 'cogitate,' the Cartesian epistemology proved challenging to the Catholic orthodoxy. As Jacob argues, "[g]uided by the Cartesian method of reasoning, anyone could arrive at knowledge about nature and society and deduce the simple, basic laws at work in the universe."[733] Thus, like the Copernican revolution, the Cartesian philosophy was not atheistic in content, but instead, unintentionally "obviated the necessity for organised Christian worship and for the authority of the clergy."[734] As a result, it fuelled critics of the mediatorial role of the Catholic priesthood and strengthened the Puritan focus on human consciousness and the 'ordinary life.' Luther's priesthood of all believers was taken a step further and with Descartes, the self began to be secularised.[735]

Thirdly, this 'inward turn' clashed with Christian orthodoxy in the redefinition of God it entailed. The validity of the Cartesian epistemology was dependent upon a belief in a benevolent God. For ultimately, what could make the human ability to cogitate any reliable or true if it were not for God? The human idea of God was the way Descartes found out of his solipsism. Because only an infinite and perfect being

[731] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.194.
[732] J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth* (London: Macmillan, 1920), p.65.
[733] Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p.46.
[734] Ibid.
[735] Roy Porter, *Flesh in the Age of Reason* (London: Penguin, 2004).

could have implanted the idea of God in his mind, and because this being could not have been deceitful by creating such an elaborate hoax, Descartes established the existence of God based on the idea of the deity that dwelled in his mind.[736] Relegating the reality of God to an impossible quest, Descartes inferred his existence from human cogitation. And because God was now to be inferred from man's ability to cogitate and think for himself, human reason became the Archimedean point. Descartes took upon himself God's power and "thereby opened up the hope and aspiration for human omnipotence."[737]

Finally, the Cartesian emphasis on 'this-world' provided a propitious environment for the development of the natural science and of the 17th century scientific revolution.[738] Indeed, there was a clear elective affinity between Descartes' religious rationalism and the scientific spirit of the growing middle class. In accordance with the new epistemology, many thinkers began to look at reason as a potential way out of conflicting interpretations of the Scriptures. Advances in geometry, mathematics, and the ensuing mechanical and instrumental approaches to the world were taken up by Christian thinkers. As Randall explains

> for every physicist concerned to discover the secrets of nature there were a dozen theologians puzzling over vortices and infinite extension in the interests of humanizing and rationalizing the religious tradition. Thus the Cartesian philosophy became deeply involved…in that long theological debate which lasted without cessation from the Reformation struggles of the sixteenth century to the indifference and secularism of the eighteenth. For a generation it seemed to those who prided themselves on being forward-looking that a common Christianity might be established on the firm foundation of reason.[739]

As such, Descartes provided a context hospitable to the extension and spread of rational criticism of the scriptures and of Christian theology.[740] Furthermore, his religious rationalism made a scientific understanding and control of the material world mandatory to the understanding of the divine *telos*. It is in these terms that the French philosopher can be taken to have secularised the legacy of the Reformation and to

[736] Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment* p.43.
[737] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.206.
[738] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* pp.230-31.
[739] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.396.
[740] It should be noted that rational criticism of the Holy Scriptures was already widespread in the Middle Ages (Chapter Four). What Descartes achieved was the establishment of a new mechanistic materialist foundation from which to criticise theology. The Cartesian and scientific mindset had an important impact on theology since they obviated the necessity for God and the Church. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment* pp.44-47. Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.374.

have opened the road to the complete rationalisation of Christian theology.[741] Brand Blanshard summarises the impact of Cartesianism on human consciousness by pointing out that "[b]efore his time, the truths regarded as most certain were those accepted from revelation; afterwards these truths were subject to the judgment of human reason, thus breaking the hold of authority on the European mind."[742]

4) Locke, Empiricism, and the Study of Nature's Laws

John Locke (1632-1704) played a central role in the development and deepening of the 'inward turn' fostered by Descartes. His great influence in England and across all of Europe made him "the moving spirit of the eighteenth century."[743] In effect, as Cragg argues, Locke not only "epitomized the outlook of his own age," but also "anticipated the thought of the succeeding period."[744] My aim in this section is not so much to summarise his philosophy as to consider the impact and the implications of the Lockean epistemology in the spheres of religion and government. In particular, I will consider the importance of his thought for the shift in moral sources away from God and towards human reason.

Like Descartes and Hobbes, John Locke was a firm believer whose faith was very significant to his philosophy. Despite widespread charges that his devotion was hypocritical, in the 17th century, not even David Hume doubted the sincerity of his faith.[745] Even though his theology was not orthodox, it was by no means heretical. Rather, his religious thought was marked by two revolutionary characteristics. On the one hand, building on the inwardness of the Cartesian philosophy and its emphasis on the *cogito*, Locke made the principle that "*Reason* must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing" central to his theology.[746] And on the other, inspired by the emerging faith in the new Book of Nature, Locke developed his theology in a this-worldly and

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[741] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.157.
[742] Brand Blanshard, "Rationalism," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online* (Retrieved March 27, 2009: 2009).
[743] Cragg, *Reason and Authority in the Eighteenth Century*, pp.5-6. ———, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, p.114.
[744] Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, p.77, 114.
[745] David Hume, *The Natural History of Religion and, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, ed. A. Wayne Colver and John Valdimir Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p.79.
[746] John Locke and Peter H. Nidditch, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.704. Book IV, Ch. 19, § 14.

naturalist direction. It is for these reasons that his new epistemology conflicted with the orthodox emphasis on the Holy Scriptures as the sole source of truth. Although Locke was not an atheist, his philosophy eventually rationalised religion and individualised faith.

Inspired by the new science, Locke based his political philosophy on an empiricist and materialist epistemology. To the English thinker, all knowledge was derived from experience. Ideas either came from the sensation of 'sensible objects without' or from reflection and "what we feel within ourselves, from the inward workings of our own spirit."[747] Accordingly, Locke strongly believed that the existence of God was a most obvious truth that reason could discover with mathematical certainty.[748] Not only did he believe that "[t]he works of Nature everywhere sufficiently evidence a Deity," but more importantly, he claimed that it was through reason, the very voice of God in man, that the design of God could be deciphered in Nature.[749] In tune with the new naturalism, Locke came to equate the Laws of Nature with the divine will as understood by human reason.[750] As he put it in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*,

> *Reason* is natural *Revelation*, whereby the eternal father of Light and Fountain of all Knowledge, communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has laid within the reach of their natural Faculties
>
> [Revelation is] natural *Reason* enlarged by a new set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which *Reason* vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from GOD.[751]

Consequently, Locke made the use of reason within the sphere of religion inevitable and necessary.[752]

Far from rejecting the need for revelation, Locke simply argued that truth could be attained in clearer and more direct ways and that henceforth revelation was

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[747] Locke quoted in Christopher J. Berry, *Social Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p.91.
[748] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.75.
[749] Quoted in Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background*, p.7. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p.15.
[750] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.236.
[751] Locke and Nidditch, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, p.704. Book IV, Ch. 19, § 4.
[752] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.76. In this, Locke was mirroring Benjamin Whichcote, a leading figure amongst the Cambridge Platonists, who had argued that there was nothing as intrinsically rational as religion and that to go against reason was to go against God himself. Porter, *Enlightenment* p.99.

to be subjected to the standards of proof of empirical observation.[753] He explained that "[i]n all things…*Reason* is the proper judge; and *Revelation*…cannot…invalidate its Decrees. [Faith] can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of *Reason*."[754] Because it made sense to follow the clear light of reason rather than the sallow glow of an 'invisible' star, reason and scientific investigation came to take precedence over faith and revelation as sources of knowledge.

Likewise, the significance and utility of the Book of Creation began to pale before the newly-acquired splendour of the Book of Nature and Book of Reason. And only a single step remained to be taken before reason could eclipse revelation completely. But before I move on to considering this last step taken by the Deists, it is necessary to look at the implications of Locke's philosophy in the spheres of religion and government.[755]

What kept Locke from accepting the logical implications of his argument and from falling into atheism was his belief in the inherent compatibility of his approach with Christian theology. In *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, Locke argued that all rational beings must be Disciples of Christ, for Christianity's central doctrines are absolutely consonant with reason and experience. Locke's emphasis on the human reason meant that no reasonable believer could possibly be required to accept the religious tenets that contradicted his reason. No irrational leap of faith was deemed essential to salvation. And therefore, Locke boiled down Christianity, in the name of true and rational religion, to a few dogmas acceptable to all educated persons.[756] Thus, by attempting to merge and combine his rational commitments with the Holy Writ, the English thinker redefined the Christian religion.

The revolutionary implications of such a redefinition of Christianity were unmistakably understood in the 18th century. In his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* Hume considered Locke to be

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[753] G. A. J. Rogers, "John Locke: Conservative Radical," in *The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660-1750*, ed. Roger D. Lund (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.103.

[754] Locke and Nidditch, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, pp.693-94. Book IV, Ch. 18, § 6.

[755] Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, p.124.

[756] Porter, *The Enlightenment*, p.33. Locke differentiated 'speculative' from 'practical' articles of faith. The former corresponds to those articles of faith that do not require any sort of action to be taken and are useful only as means to human understanding and belief. They correspond to Hobbes's claim that only belief in the divine nature of Christ is necessary to salvation. The latter, the practical articles of faith, require action to be taken. Therefore, Locke argued that these articles of faith were to be governed by reason since in reason laid the key to social harmony.

> the first Christian who ventured openly to assert that *faith* was nothing but a species of *reason*, that religion was only a branch of philosophy, and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed.[757]

And for Voltaire, "Mr. Lock's reasonableness of Christian relligion [was] really a new religion."[758] In effect, by building on the Cartesian heritage, Locke had built "an entirely new foundation for Western religion."[759] But interestingly enough, this impetus to further the theological debate came not from the professed theologians but from within the periphery of Christianity. Locke was a layman whose wit and critical spirit "created a new mentality among intelligent people, and instantly affected religious thought."[760] But this influence did not come from within but came from without, for religion was no longer a matter reserved to the sole clergymen.[761]

In the sphere of government, the Lockean epistemology entailed a twofold implication. His individualisation of the access to truth and his affirmation of the calling of reason posed a direct threat to divinely-sanctioned forms of authority. In fact, the immanence and naturalism of both his theology and philosophy proved to be radical, not only in their anti-clerical implications, but more broadly in their questioning of the foundations of legitimate authority.

In both religious and political matters, Locke's individualism meant that because every man had access to the truth of God through nature and reason, regardless of social status, class, or religious belief, no one could impose his will or opinions on another.[762] In turn, this paved the way for a relentless critique of all social groups that arrogated to themselves the authority to guide and educate mankind in both lay and spiritual matters.[763] Because God had granted humans a direct access to His design through the use of their individual ability to reason, the discovery of the laws of nature through reasoning became some sort of 'calling' and reasoning was

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[757] Hume, *The Natural History of Religion and, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, p.156.
[758] Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.321.
[759] Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment* p.50.
[760] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.75.
[761] ———, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason*, p.147. Funkenstein, *Theology and the Scientific Imagination*. Dybikowski, "The Critique of Christianity."
[762] John Locke, *The Works of John Locke* (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823), p.359.
[763] Richard Aschcraft, "Anticlericalism and Authority in Lockean Political Thought," in *The Margins of Orthodoxy: Heterodox Writing and Cultural Response, 1660-1750*, ed. Roger D. Lund (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.82.

turned into a religious duty.[764] It followed that industriousness, discipline, and the human drive for improvement became spiritual qualities.[765]

But the inadequacy of existing forms of authority in enabling humans to exercise freely their ability to reason begged for the establishment of new institutions. And accordingly, the legitimacy of lay and religious authorities had to be reconsidered. Locke argued that the new raison d'être and function of all forms of authority should be the creation of a propitious environment that would facilitate men's "struggle to discharge the religious assignments for which God created them."[766] And hence, the individual exercise of reason free from alien guidance had to become institutionalised in all spheres of life (i.e., religious, political, economic…).

Locke came to argue that power could only be wielded to assist individuals in the execution of their calling. And correspondingly, social institutions were legitimate to the extent that "they facilitated physical ease and purity of motive in men's performance in their callings." [767] In this context, Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* corresponded to a manifesto for the establishment of a new form of legitimacy that was considerate of man's religious duties and in tune with the relocation of the locus of morality from the Church to the individual and his reasoning ability. With Locke, the "necessary individuality of the religious relationship became an epistemological axiom and the force with which it was asserted reduced all human authority to a purely instrumental status." [768] Because individual faith was sufficient to secure one's salvation, the Church only played a role in the performance of ceremonial functions and the development of a richer religious culture but held no authority or right to coerce.

The new political order enshrined the Lutheran priesthood of all believers as "the primary definitional mode of all human duties."[769] And by setting up adequate forms of authority, Locke hoped that man's "material and spiritual regeneration might be speedily accomplished."[770] The Calvinism of Locke's childhood had unmistakably influenced his approach to government, but his location of the sources of morality in

[764] John Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government'* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
[765] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p.15.
[766] Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*, p.125.
[767] Ibid., p.248 and Ch. 10.
[768] Ibid., p.249.
[769] Ibid., p.250.
[770] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.138.

humans *qua* rational individuals led him away from the Puritan location of morality in the Bible and of authority in earthly rulers.[771]

Locke's theory of government was tremendously influential all over Europe and provided the immediate context to much Enlightenment thinking. Short of falling into atheism, Locke's philosophy provided all the tools necessary for the complete submission of God to human reason and his epistemology helped to give currency to the intellectual movement that confirmed the supremacy of human reason over God, namely, Deism.[772] As the last stage in the rationalisation of Christianity and as the bridge to modern atheism, Deism is "the key to the whole modern development we gesture at with the word 'secularization.'"[773] Because of its connection to the shift in moral sources from the Book of Creation to the Book of Reason, the intellectual movement deserves to be scrutinised.

5) Deism, from Rational Christianity to Atheism

The Deist school of thought was established at the end of the 17th century and reached its apex during the middle of the next. Since its worldview became widely accepted and its arguments taken for granted, the movement finally disappeared before the French Revolution.[774] However, the concept of Deism has been challenged and the importance of the Deists as "powerful agents of modernity" criticised for being over-rated and greatly exaggerated.[775] Like the concept of 'Enlightenment,' the notion of 'Deism' needs to be defined and its use qualified.

In *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, the term refers to "the belief that by rational methods alone men can know all the true propositions of theology which it is possible, necessary, or desirable for men to know…[Deists] have ranged widely from Christian rationalists or fideists to atheists."[776] Such a broad definition stretches the notion to include all the thinkers who played a major role in the rationalisation and

[771] Dunn, *The Political Thought of John Locke*. Paul Hazard, *The European Mind, 1680-1715* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p.115.
[772] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.244.
[773] Ibid., p.309.
[774] Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.375.
[775] ———, *Deism*, p.13. Barnett, *The Enlightenment and Religion*.
[776] Philip Paul Wiener, *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p.647.s.v. 'Deism'.

naturalisation of the Christian dogma. As a result, most, if not all of the *philosophes*, were to some extent Deists (Locke, Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, etc.).[777] Also, thinkers such as Hobbes and Descartes can be said to have had Deist leanings. Even though Deism can be traced back to Cicero or the Greeks, I will solely focus on its spread between the 17th and 18th centuries and especially on its Golden Age that began at the end of the 1690s with the publication of John Toland's *Christianity Not Mysterious*.

To do justice to Barnett's claim that the influence of Deism has been exaggerated, I offer to qualify my claim that the Deists played an important role in the development of Western consciousness. I do not believe that Deism *per se* was central to or responsible for this great civilisational mutation. Instead, following Peter Gay, I argue that Deism only 'reflected and articulated' this important transition in forms of consciousness.[778] As Cragg notes, even though "the deists were not a large group, and never formed a party in any formal sense, it was clear that they appealed to an extensive reading public."[779] And it is in this quality that they hastened the transition in mentality.[780]

Building on the Lockean epistemology, this group of 'physico-theologians' set to find out the essential and true propositions of religion by means of reasoning. The first influential exponent of Deism was Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) who listed the five tenets fundamental to this new theology, namely, that (1) God exists; (2) he must be worshipped; (3) worship takes place through the practice of virtue; (4) men should repent for their sin; and finally, (5) rewards or punishments follow death.[781] The boiling down of the true religion to these five tenets turned most Christian dogmas into mere superstitions and Jesus Christ into an impostor.[782]

In 1696, the publication of *Christianity Not Mysterious* by John Toland (1670-1722) - a Presbyterian-minded Dissenter but not yet a Deist – led to the spread of Deism and marked the beginning of the "final facet of the crisis of the Church

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[777] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.248.
[778] Gay, *Deism*, p.10.
[779] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.161.
[780] Gay, *Deism*, p.10.
[781] While the existence of God was affirmed, the Trinity was rejected in a Socinian manner. This was expressed by Voltaire in the following tirade: "I believe! I believe in you! Powerful God, I believe! As for monsieur the Son, and madame His mother, that's a different story." Quoted in ———, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.122.
[782] Abraham Anderson, *The Treatise of the Three Impostors and the Problem of Enlightenment* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

initiated by the Reformation." [783] Drawing upon anti-Catholic and Protestant historiography, Toland's pamphlet was designed as a theological exercise and critique of the Roman Church and its aim was to offer a Presbyterian solution to the decadence of Christianity. Luther and Calvin had questioned the historical and theological legitimacy of the Church, but in the 17th century, the Dissenters took one last step and questioned "the very fundamentals of Christianity."[784]

As a student of Locke, Toland only drew out the teachings of his mentor to their logical conclusions. In fact, Locke had retained some sort of belief in the truth and authenticity of revelation. But in accord with the new inwardness and naturalism, Toland held logically that all revelation must be set against 'common Notions' and assessed in the light of reason; for "the true religion must necessarily be reasonable and intelligible."[785] Because reason is that faculty of the soul by which "we arrive at the Certainty of God's own Existence…we cannot otherwise discern his *Revelations* but by their Conformity with our natural Notices of him, which in so many words, to agree with our common Notions."[786] For Toland, reason was the new benchmark in matters of religious truth.[787] But far from being anti-Christian, Toland combined his rational approach to Christianity and claimed that all "these requisite conditions are found in Christianity."[788]

The ground was now clear from all remaining forms of beliefs unsubstantiated by some sort of ratiocination. Reason was made foundational to religion and access to God was from then onward to be mediated by this human attribute. By drawing out the Protestant emphasis on the individual and the 'ordinary life' to its logical conclusion, the Deists decisively completed the 16th century revolution of Luther and Calvin.[789]

The rationale behind putting reason on a pedestal was outlined in a book that reached the status of Deist Bible. In *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, Matthew Tindal (1657-1733) argued that "God, at all times, has given mankind sufficient means of knowing whatever he requires of them."[790] And thus, God must have made

[783] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, p.13.
[784] Ibid.
[785] John Toland, *Christianity Not Mysterious* (London: Sam. Buckley, 1696), p.xxvii.
[786] Ibid., Section 2, Ch. 1: 5.
[787] Porter, *Enlightenment* p.117.
[788] Wiener, *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, p.651.
[789] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, p.12.
[790] Tindal quoted in Porter, *Enlightenment* p.112.

his message accessible to all humans without need for ecclesiastical mediation. These means were to be found in rationality and his message in nature. Tindal came to conclude that "All divines, I think, now agree in owning that there's a law of reason, antecedent to any external revelation, that God can't dispense, either with his creatures or himself, for not observing."[791] This new rationalism and focus on individual reason provided great support to the ascending theme of government. Indeed, it eventually established human reason as the new mediator of divine knowledge. As one Deist argued, "*the voice of the people is the voice of God*."[792]

Besides the fact that knowledge of nature was unambiguous, the universality and timelessness of reason made it a surer source of truth than the Bible - a book that was after all only expressing a 'local' and time-bound version of the eternal truth. For the Deists, "it was not in Holy Writ, but in the great book of nature, open for all mankind to read that the laws of God had been recorded."[793] For centuries religion had rested upon revelation, but in the 18th century, it came to rest "largely upon Nature."[794] As Basil Willey sums it up, Nature came to "furnish the principal evidences of religion, while a somewhat embarrassing Revelation [had to] be harmonized with it as best might be."[795] On the one hand, most Deists claimed to represent true Christianity and to have eliminated the superstitious accretions and primitive misconceptions that had accumulated around the Church. And on the other, orthodox Christians felt the need to ground their faith firmly upon nature before having recourse to the supernatural. In such a context, the Word of God could only be rationalised, from within.

The Deists were without doubt religious men and their ties to Christianity are unmistakable; but "in their natural religion, nature was primary and religion evaporated."[796] And in this, Deism embodied the very process of transition and change in consciousness that was taking place across Europe. For Peter Gay, the proof of the secularising influence of the new natural religion was to be found in the fact

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[791] David Nicholls, *God and Government in an 'Age of Reason'* (London: Routledge, 1995), p.145.
[792] Ibid., p.150.
[793] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.51. This idea would be found in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For example, the philosopher argued in the Vicar that "I closed all my books. There is one book opened to all eyes, that of nature. It is in this great and sublime book that I learned to serve and worship its divine author." In Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, p.547.
[794] Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background*, p.3.
[795] Ibid.
[796] Gay, *Deism*, p.12.

that while humans had been religious animals for most of their recorded history, after Deism, and partly because of it, they were so no longer.[797]

The importance of the movement is not so much to be found in its creed which had Protestant roots but in the application of the new rational method to religion and personal faith.[798] And this is where the sources of Deism's own downfall are to be found. In fact, Deism corresponded to one of many levels of rationalisation of Christianity. Deism attacked Christianity, only to be attacked in turn by atheism. As Jacob argues, many thinkers and philosophers "started their religious odyssey from orthodoxy, slipped over into Deism, and then quickly made their way to pantheism, or what most people would have called atheism."[799] For example, "Diderot moved from Catholicism to theism, from theism to deism, from deism to scepticism, and from scepticism to atheism."[800]

The *siècle des Lumières* saw the glorious rise of a Deist theology on rational and natural foundations but also the beginning of its end under the pen of David Hume. [801] Hume's most significant insight was to point to the limits of reason and to criticise the idea of a rational order of nature. Contrary to the Deists, the Scottish thinker argued that in light of God's silence, man had to find the way by himself. Humans lived in a disenchanted world in which neither nature nor the cosmos were alive and intelligent. Man had to resign himself to submit everything to criticism, for ultimately, he was alone in a meaningless world. And accordingly, Hume made all the sciences, "*Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion…*dependent on the science of MAN," for ultimately, "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences."[802] And for Hume, "Human Nature [was] the only science of man."[803] Paving the way for generations of thinkers, Hume argued that such a science had to be discovered in the study of history: "mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human

[797] Ibid., p.10.
[798] Barnett, *Idol Temples and Crafty Priests*, p.viii.
[799] Jacob, *The Enlightenment*, p.19.
[800] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.125.
[801] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.169.
[802] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.xv, xvi.
[803] Ibid., p.273. Christa Knellwolf, "The Science of Man," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004).

nature."[804] History was the key, and it became so important that during "the latter half of the century Philosophers turned historians."[805] The function of the new historical approach was to distinguish between good and evil and to assess the compatibility of human custom with human nature. Ultimately, it became the new benchmark for truth and morality.

6) Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, the aim was to sketch out the shift in moral sources that marked the secularisation of Europe. Because this shift took place as a result of the disenchantment of the world and the demystification of nature, I began my enquiry with the 17th century scientific revolution. Far from having "purely secular origins," the scientific revolution, like Protestantism, emerged from within Christianity and acted as some sort of Trojan horse in its downfall.[806] Despite their explicit attempt to safeguard Christianity, philosophers developed ideas that ultimately challenged the Church, rationalised theology, and established the omnipotence of reason in all realms.

Through the study of important implications of the works of Descartes, Locke, and the Deists in the spheres of religion and politics, I explained that knowledge came to be individualised and philosophical reason became "the only and exclusive criterion of what is true."[807] The final source of authority came to be vested within man. In turn, this implied the necessity of political atomism, of religious individualism, and the obligation to look at nature through the lens of reason to decipher the laws according to which men were to live. Ultimately, the result was the overthrow of the once uncontested moral sources of Christianity and the replacement of the primacy of God and the Scriptures with nature – first as God's creation and subsequently as disenchanted matter with its own indwelling laws - and finally with

[804] David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch and L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), Ch. 8 Of Liberty and Necessity, § 7.
[805] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.92.
[806] Van Kley, "Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest," p.69.
[807] Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, p.866.

human nature and reason.[808] While in the 16th century "Ascetic Protestantism had championed the rationalism of world mastery 'in the name of God'; scientific rationalism now propagated it 'in the name of man.' Anthropocentrism takes the place of theocentrism, anthropodicy that of theodicy."[809]

But such changes had consequences for the place of man in the cosmic hierarchy. The withering of God as the source of morality in favour of nature and reason "seemed to imply the paradoxical thesis that man was at once the creature and the creator of society."[810] This change in moral sources eventually had repercussions in the realm of legitimacy. By making man responsible for his own welfare and salvation in an essentially disenchanted world, the new philosophy called forth the creation of new legitimate orders. Man withdrew himself from nature and recreated himself in and through history. At the heart of this shift was the birth of new legitimate orders.

In the second part of this chapter, I show that with the Enlightenment and the triumph of the 'inward turn' fostered by Descartes and Locke, the seeds of a new set of legitimating principles were sown. In effect, while enshrining the shift in moral sources from God to Man, the Enlightenment paved the way for the development of legitimating principles that revolved around the notions of 'the people,' progress, and 'civilisation.'[811] As a result of this process, the world was sacralised and an immanent eschatology was developed on rational and secular terms. This marked the third and last step of the secularisation of Europe.

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[808] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.314. This shift was not as clear-cut as is here suggested. The intermingling of reason, nature, and God in the writings of 17th and 18th-centuries philosophers made the transformation much more complex and tedious. Yet, when one abstracts and looks at a longer time span, the shift from God to man becomes clearly discernable.

[809] Roth and Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History*. p.50.

[810] Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*, p.27.

[811] The connections between the change in moral sources and the emergence of new legitimate orders are outlined in the second part of the chapter. But as Bury reminds us in the case of 'progress,' "[i]t was in the atmosphere of the Cartesian spirit that a theory of Progress was to take shape." Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p.65.

B. Legitimacy After the Enlightenment

> 1. What can I know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man? Metaphysics answers the first question, ethics the second, religion the third and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally all this could be reckoned as anthropology, since the first three questions are related to the last.
>
> *Immanuel Kant.*

Besides a strong critical spirit, all the *philosophes* shared a comprehensive humanitarianism, some sort of hostility towards 'superstition,' and a strong opposition towards the related legitimisation of power.[812] The inwardness, naturalism, and immanence of the new moral sources as expounded and expressed in the rational philosophies of Descartes and Locke became widely accepted. And accordingly, the establishment of new legitimate orders upon the new moral foundations was called forth. In this, the Enlightenment paved the way for the implementation of new forms of legitimacy based on humanitarian principles. In the second part of this chapter, I deal explicitly with the emergence of the international legitimate orders of popular sovereignty and 'civilisation.' These have been central to the secular foundation of international politics since the Enlightenment.

The climate of opinion that surrounded the development and growth of the new cultural rationales was characterised by a growing preoccupation with the improvement of society and of its political government. The Enlightenment epistemology made it conceivable for humans to attempt some sort of spiritual regeneration through large-scale social engineering and the creation of an earthly order compatible with human reason. The goal was to make life in this world the foundation of politics.[813] In the words of Voltaire, man had been endowed with reason "not that he may penetrate the divine essence but that he may live well in this world."[814]

Scientific discoveries and their 'this-worldly' spirit were central to the socio-cultural transformations that Europe was experiencing. The discovery of the laws of nature entailed implications in the spheres of religion and government. As Isaac

[812] Gay, "Why Was the Enlightenment?," p.65.
[813] Israel, *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity, 1650-1750.*
[814] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.236.

Barrow argued, the 'world natural' was believed to provide a template for the working of the 'world politick.'[815] And Newton (1642-1727), following his mentor, argued in his *Optics* that his scientific method could be used to enlarge the bounds of the social sciences.[816] As a result, many thinkers attempted to undertake such a quest and applied the Newtonian principles to the study of human societies. In Europe, economics, politics, and history became some sort of 'social physics' and an extension of the natural sciences.[817]

In *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*, Peter Burke demonstrates that this new approach resulted in a shift in popular attitudes towards "the 'politicisation' of popular culture, or the spread of political consciousness."[818] It corresponded to a 'systematic attempt' by the intellectual and social elite to change the values and attitudes of the people. This reform was advocated by the clergy and the laity alike and it accompanied the "major shift in religious mentality or sensibility" mapped out in the first part of this chapter.[819] The new cultural pattern that was gaining influence eroded the religious legitimisation of monarchical rule and made the cult of the king obsolete if not repulsive.[820] And it is in opposition to this traditional notion of legitimacy that rested upon divine right and divine power that a rational, republican, constitutional, and humanitarian international legitimate order emerged following the French Revolution.[821] The relationship between the Enlightenment and the Revolution is complex and many of the *philosophes* were horrified by the violence and chaos it created. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment contributed to the events in France by facilitating the emergence of a 'public opinion' as well as alternative forms of legitimacy.[822]

As the 'intellectual father' and 'master of morality' of the French Revolution, Rousseau is our entry point for the study of the establishment of new legitimate orders

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[815] Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment* p.30.
[816] In matters of religion, "Newton, like most of his British predecessors, turned the assumptions of mechanics into religious principles. Mechanics and theology were fused into one…[and] religion inevitably vanished." Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.592.
[817] Cragg, *The Church and the Age of Reason*, p.236.
[818] Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1978), p.259.
[819] Ibid., p.212.
[820] Outram, *The Enlightenment*, pp.42-43. Daniel Roche, *France in the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), p.251, 66.
[821] Joseph Klaits, *Printed Propaganda under Louis Xiv: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.24. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested*, p.866.
[822] Outram, *The Enlightenment*, p.140.

based on the principles of popular sovereignty.[823] His impact on European consciousness was so important that Henri Bergson declared that

> the most powerful of the influences which the human mind has experienced since Descartes – however we may assess this – is undeniably that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The reform he operated in the realm of practical thought was as radical as that of Descartes in the realm of pure thought.[824]

Rousseau's importance for our subject is twofold. On the one hand, he played a central role in the rationalisation and immanentisation of Christianity. In the words of Jacques Maritain, "[i]t was Jean-Jacques who completed that amazing performance, which Luther began, of inventing a Christianity separate from the Church of Christ: it was he who completed the *naturalization* of the Gospel."[825] And on the other, Rousseau's philosophy was essential to the shift in legitimate orders during the 18th century. Indeed, despite his distrust of the notion of rational progress, the Genevan scholar "contributed more than any other individual in his century to the progress of society" and to the project of social regeneration.[826] Also, his theory of popular sovereignty gave "the first signal of a universal subversion."[827] After two centuries, his work remains most relevant to the understanding of "the fundamental political ideas of our world."[828]

1) Rousseau on Theodicy and Legitimacy

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is a very controversial figure amongst students of the Enlightenment. The work of the Swiss thinker proved very significant for the French and American revolutionaries, the Romantics, and some would argue,

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[823] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.186. F. A. Aulard, *Culte De La Raison Et Le Culte De L' Etre Supreme (1793-1794)* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1892). "le maitre de morale de la Révolution française." p.1. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.83, 87-88.

[824] "Mais la plus puissante des influences qui se soient exercées sur l'esprit humain depuis Descartes, — de quelque manière d'ailleurs qu'on la juge, — est incontestablement celle de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. La réforme qu'il opéra dans le domaine de la pensée pratique fut aussi radicale que l'avait été celle de Descartes dans le domaine de la spéculation pure." Bergson, "La Philosophie Française," pp. 8-9. Electronic copy accessed on 1 July 2009 at http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/bergson_henri/la_philo_francaise/Bergson_philo_francaise.pdf

[825] Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, p.147.

[826] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.964. McDonald, *Rousseau and the French Revolution, 1762-1791*, p.164.

[827] Acton, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, pp.15-16.

[828] Alfred Cobban, *Rousseau and the Modern State* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1934), p.22.

for 20th century authoritarianism.[829] His status as a member of the enlightened *philosophes* has often been questioned but despite tensions with the '*Encyclopédistes*,' Rousseau was certainly a man of the Enlightenment.[830] In this section, two facets of his work that are deeply representative of the 18th century changes in legitimacy are considered. First of all, I look at the way Rousseau secularised the Christian theodicy and thus advanced the project of social regeneration. And secondly, I look at the way he laid down the theoretical foundations for a popular legitimate order based on the naturalism and inwardness of Descartes and Locke.

In the famous opening paragraph of his *Social Contract*, Rousseau pondered on the following paradox: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains…How has this change come about? I do not know. What can render it *legitimate*? I believe that I can settle this question."[831] In these introductory sentences, Rousseau expressed his determination to tackle the issue of oppression and inequality in the world and hinted at a solution based on a reconsideration of the principles of legitimacy behind authority.

Throughout his work, Rousseau developed a notion of the state of nature in which humans were free, peaceful, and naturally innocent.[832] In opposition to the Christian doctrine of the original sin, his 'noble savage' was by nature pure and good. Largely as a result of 'accidents of nature' humans were drawn to interact with each other and it is by passing from the state of nature to the civil state that they came to chain themselves.[833] Through the creation of private property, social life made people the prisoners of greed, jealousy, and selfishness. Thus, according to Rousseau, the human Fall from the benevolent state of nature took place upon men's entering society.

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[829] McGovern and Sait, *From Luther to Hitler*.
[830] Mark Hulliung, *The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes* (London: Harvard University Press, 1994).
[831] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1998), p.5. Italics added. "L'homme est né libre, et partout il est dans les fers…Comment ce changement s'est-il fait? Je l'ignore. Qu'est-ce qui peut le rendre légitime? Je crois pouvoir résoudre cette question." ———, *Du Contrat Social: Ou, Principes Du Droit Politique*, ed. C. E. Vaughan (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1918), p.4.
[832] Maritain explains that for Rousseau "man originally lived in a *purely natural* paradise of happiness and goodness, and that Nature herself will in future perform the function which grace fulfilled in the catholic conception…It is only a cutting down of the Christian dogma of adamic Innocence to fit the scheme of romantic naturalism." Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, p.144. This line of argument is also developed by Cavanaugh: Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*.
[833] Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.193.

In *Emile*, Rousseau claimed that "[e]verything is good as it leaves the hands of the author of things, everything degenerates in the hands of man." [834] And in the second part of his *Discourse on Inequality* he also argued that "it was iron and wheat which first civilized men, and ruined the human race."[835] Besides drawing a powerful interpretation of history as some sort of secular Fall, these two quotes exemplify the intellectual process through which Rousseau "*removed the problem of evil from religion into politics*." [836] Through the location of the source of injustice in the corrupting nature of private property, Rousseau solved the problem of theodicy by "removing the burden of responsibility from God and putting it on human society."[837] And because the Fall had taken place in this world, the solution had to be found here on earth. Human salvation could not be achieved through divine intervention and instead, man had to "become his own savior and, in the ethical sense, his own creator." [838] In turn, this separation of heaven and earth resulted in the sacralisation of "a finite set of temporal arrangements."[839] Heaven being cut off, transcendence was relocated in earthly matters.

Rousseau's solution to the issue of theodicy made up only half of the *Social Contract* for the second half was devoted to the justification of political order and the establishment of appropriate principles of legitimacy.[840] As a matter of fact, now that the sources of the Fall had been located, a way out could be sketched. And in accordance with the secular nature of the Fall, Rousseau believed that the solution was to be found 'in and through the state.'[841] As Albert Camus explained, since God had been denied, the king had to die. [842]

The solution Rousseau offered to the above human dilemma was the creation of a community founded on a social contract, a new society to which humans surrender themselves completely while preserving their natural freedom. This new

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[834] "Tout est bien sortant des mains de l'Auteur des choses, tout dégénère entre les mains de l'homme." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Émile :Ou De L'éducation," in *Oeuvres Complètes De J. J. Rousseau Avec Notes Historiques*, ed. G. Petitain (Paris: Lefèvre, 1839), p.7.
[835] "ce sont le fer et le blé qui ont civilisé les hommes et perdu le genre humain." ———, *A Discourse on Inequality*, ed. Maurice William Cranston (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p.116.
[836] José Guilherme Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p.18. Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963), p.76.
[837] Cassirer and Gay, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, p.77.
[838] Ibid., p.76.
[839] Elshtain, *Sovereignty*, p.142.
[840] Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, pp.19-20.
[841] Cassirer and Gay, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, p.82.
[842] Camus, *The Rebel*, p.84.

community is guided by the combination of the will of all the citizens engaged in doing what is good for all, namely, the general will. The general will is inalienable, indivisible, 'absolutely general,' and thus 'absolutely moral.'[843] Morality is no longer to be found in God or Nature, but in humans through the general will. As an essentially religious concept that has been immanentised, the general will becomes the new benchmark for good and evil and is turned into an object of sacred devotion.[844] Through the will of the people, "[t]he new God is born" and the corpus mysticum of Christianity is turned into a liberal body politic.[845]

By making the general will the repository of moral authority, Rousseau finally completed the process initiated by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*. While Christendom had made the Church both sovereign and holder of moral authority, the English thinker had separated the sovereign from the moral sources altogether. And in this process, Rousseau finally completed the circle. By arguing that the community created moral authority, he thus rejoined "moral authority and the state, this time in a secular setting."[846] To the secular Fall, Rousseau thus offered a secular solution based on a secular moral source.

But the connection between Hobbes and Rousseau is deeper since the two thinkers followed the same unilateral contractarian logic and stressed the absolute character of sovereignty.[847] And the 'only' difference between them was that "*Leviathan* assigned undivided power to an individual sovereign, the absolute prince, whereas the *Social Contract* put it in the hands of the 'collective sovereign', i.e. the people."[848] Rousseau's emphasis on the absoluteness of sovereignty led Henry Maine to criticise him for establishing a 'collective despot' that corresponded to an 'inverted copy of the King…the French King turned upside down.' For ultimately, as Maine put it, "[t]he mass of natural rights absorbed by the sovereign community through the Social Compact is, again, nothing more than the old divine right of kings in a new dress."[849]

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[843] Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right*, pp.25-34. Nelson, *Western Political Thought*, p.199. Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, pp.549-50.
[844] Elshtain, *Sovereignty*, p.131.
[845] Camus, *The Rebel*, p.86.
[846] Leon P. Baradat, *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Their Impact* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2000), p.81.
[847] Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, p.27.
[848] Ibid., pp.28-29.
[849] Henry Sumner Maine, *Popular Government: Four Essays* (London: Murray, 1909), p.160.

This inversion and the location of moral authority in the popular community was a major transformation. In effect, legitimacy could now spring directly from the people without any reference to outside authority.[850] Rousseau's *Social Contract* was the source from which "sprang the People (with a capital P), the Sovereign People, the People the sole source of all legitimate power."[851] Camus went further and argued that

> *The Social Contract* amplifies and dogmatically explains the new religion whose god is reason, confused with Nature, and whose representative on earth, in place of the king, is the people considered as an expression of the general will…with *The Social Contract,* we are witnessing the birth of a new mystique – the will of the people being substituted for God Himself.[852]

By arguing that man's original goodness had been perverted by society and that political association was the only way to salvation, Rousseau secularised and solved the issue of theodicy and paved the way for the modern social imaginary of popular consent.[853] With the *philosophes* and in particular with Rousseau, man was placed at the centre of the moral universe and the idea of the superman took the place of the representation of kings as God's lieutenants.[854]

2) Legitimate Order and Popular Sovereignty

The broad shift in structures of consciousness and the concomitant changes in moral sources found their utmost political expression in the late 18th century. Because of the widespread socio-political disagreements over the status and power of monarchs all over Europe, the sources of political legitimacy came to be scrutinised from the beginning of the century onwards. The ideas and philosophical debates of the Enlightenment found a ready-made audience since they generally tended to provide a suitable discourse through which grievances could be successfully expressed. As a result, Enlightenment ideas, by facilitating a transformation in approach towards

[850] And it is in this regard that Rousseau was the founder of the modern theory of democratic legitimacy. Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, p.57. For Peter Gay, "Rousseau is the philosopher of the democratic movement." Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.260.
[851] Maine, *Popular Government*, p.158.
[852] Camus, *The Rebel*, p.85.
[853] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p.115. The notions of social imaginaries and legitimate orders overlap to a large degree.
[854] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.289. Eric Voegelin, "Science, Politics, and Gnostocism: Two Essays," in *Modernity without Restraint*, ed. Eric Voegelin and Manfred Henningsen (London: University of Missouri Press, 2000), p.303.

legitimate authority, provided the template and parameters, delimited the boundaries, and set the rules of interaction for emerging forms of political organisation.[855]

Many of the ideas of the *philosophes* had slowly trickled down and spread throughout European societies and finally, at the end of the *siècle des Lumières*, Enlightenment principles managed to penetrate and to fundamentally transform international affairs. Far from corresponding to localised or individual struggles, the revolutions and socio-political transformations of the late 18th century corresponded to deep challenges mounted against the ideals of dynasty and divine monarchy and corresponded to attempts to achieve systemic change and epochal transformation.[856]

In *Legitimacy and Power Politics*, Mlada Bukovansky explores the ways in which theocratic-dynastically legitimated forms of sovereignty ceased to be dominant and came to be replaced, through the French and American revolutions, by forms of national sovereignty legitimated in terms of popular will. She argues that the key element behind this shift was the development of the Enlightenment discourse of popular will that penetrated and transformed international politics and cradled the ascent of a new hegemonic form of legitimate authority. By rejecting and condemning kingship by divine right, the French revolution marked a further step in the secularisation of Europe.[857] Because Bukovansky has already provided a detailed account of this shift in legitimacy, my aim is not so much to summarise it as to draw out the full conclusions concerning the secularisation of European consciousness. In particular, I look at the most important and telling dimension of the change in legitimate orders, namely, the rise of public opinion as an important source of authority in domestic and international politics.

In 1789, the French Revolution discourse was infused with certain ideas and ideals of the Enlightenment. Starting in the 12th century, the ascending theme of government finally culminated in a Europe-wide overhauling of the structures of legitimacy. Up until the late 18th century, monarchical rule was founded on a notion of legitimacy that saw "the king as a benevolent paternalistic ruler who [stood] at the apex of a rigidly hierarchical social order and rules by religious sanction in

[855] Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*, p.3.
[856] Ibid. p.16. Hall, *National Collective Identity*.
[857] "Up to now God played a part in history through the medium of the kings. But His representative in history has been killed, for there is no longer a king. Therefore there is nothing but a semblance of God, relegated to the heaven of principles." Camus, *The Rebel*, p.90.

accordance with the law."[858] But in opposition to these widespread standards of legitimacy that sanctioned authority in dynastic, territorial, and divine terms, the Enlightenment discourse offered a new benchmark based on democratic ideals and the broad consent of the governed, i.e., the people.[859] The notion of 'the people' did not refer to a fixed entity and its changing character makes it very difficult to define. Also, not all *philosophes* were democrats and many of them very much feared the consequences of empowering and educating the *populace*.[860] Nevertheless, some sort of socio-cultural movement in this direction took place.[861]

Because the Enlightenment discourse had to be translated and negotiated in accordance with the socio-political situation of the century, the legitimating principles that gathered most support were those based on some sort of popular sovereignty. Effectively, Enlightenment ideas of freedom, equality, and universal rights did not spread thanks to their inherent attractiveness and force, but were rather taken up by actors and classes that had elective affinities with them. For example, they were supported by the bourgeoisie to further the commercial and political interests of the class. Also, the scientific principles of the *philosophes* were summoned by the king whose aim was to centralise, bureaucratise, and rationalise the government of the country. As Marsak points out, the idea of reason became under Richelieu "a source or sanction for power, both political and philosophical."[862]

On a continental scale, the advantages and success of the new political organisation soon spread and all sides began to find great interest in adopting the Enlightenment ideas. The power of state armies staffed by citizen-soldiers, whose allegiance to the nation-state was based on the notions of popular sovereignty and on the equality and fraternity of all Frenchmen, forced rivals to adopt a similar form of legitimisation.[863] The power of the mass armies constituted in the wake of the French Revolution required the creation of similar armies based on similar sources of political legitimacy to stop the spread of French imperialism.

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[858] Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*, pp.70-71. Bukovansky outlines another view of monarchical legitimacy based on the image of the king as being "a military figure whose glory lies in extending his holdings and defending his people in war." However, this image is not rooted in a potent ethic of conviction and is thus secondary and derived from the paternalistic approach to legitimacy.
[859] Ibid., p.70.
[860] Roche, *France in the Enlightenment*, pp.322-32.
[861] Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*.
[862] L. Marsak, "The Idea of Reason in Seventeenth-Century France: An Essay in Interpretation," *Journal of World History* 11(1968): p.409.
[863] Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993): p.83.

The intellectual notion of popular sovereignty found its utmost expression in the European-wide "rise and increasing influence of public opinion as a source of political authority."[864] The great transformations of the public sphere in the 18th century and the concomitant boost in importance of public opinion had a tremendous impact on the structures of legitimacy of the then legitimate order.[865] In effect, many *philosophes* claimed that "[i]n order for public opinion to appear as a supreme authority, the world had to be swept clean of other, inherited authorities."[866]

The authority of the kings suddenly came under challenge by the new voice from below. And while "[t]here was no public opinion under Louis XIV, for the brilliance of the monarch outshone it… when public opinion had become king, it left no place for royal authority."[867] By the late 18th century, public opinion acquired the status of some sort of 'supreme court' that was, as the French statesman Malesherbes claimed, "independent of all powers and respected by all powers…that tribunal of the public…the sovereign judge of all the judges of the earth."[868]

Besides being an expression of the ascending theme of government, the emergence of public opinion marked the secularisation of the legitimate order. From God and dynastic principles, the new source of legitimacy was now to be found in the people. And this far-reaching reversal corresponded to the "substitution of public opinion for divinity."[869] From then onwards, the people – as opposed to the mob or the populace - became the most qualified social strata to interpret the laws of God. Through the people, the voice of God was heard, thus making popular sovereignty a similarly religious source of legitimacy.[870]

On the international stage, the French revolution changed the nature and rules of interaction between states. By defining the state as the embodiment of popular will, "the Revolution presented a challenge to the whole legal and conceptual basis of international politics."[871] As Schroeder argues,

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[864] Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics*, p.181.
[865] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).
[866] Ozouf, "'Public Opinion' at the End of the Old Regime," p.98.
[867] Ibid., p.99.
[868] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p.167.
[869] Ozouf, "'Public Opinion' at the End of the Old Regime," p.99.
[870] Ferenc Fehér, "The Cult of the Supreme Being and the Limits of the Secularization of the Political," in *The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity*, ed. Ferenc Fehér (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p.183.
[871] Paul Walter Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp.70-71.

> Instead of international claims and transactions being argued and fought out on the basis of treaties and legal rights, the popular will was now to be the decisive factor. This vastly increased the potential for international conflict, magnified uncertainties, and elevated quarrels over concrete interests into struggle over fundamental principles and world views.[872]

The legacy of this epochal transformation is to be found in the great importance conferred upon popular sovereignty in our modern political conscience. As Thomas Franck argues, the notion of popular sovereignty has rapidly become, since the end of the Second World War, a normative rule of the international system.[873] The will of the people is increasingly being considered as a condition of legitimacy for a government.[874] Now that the first facet of our modern legitimate order has been outlined, we can move on to the second facet, the notion of civilisation.

3) Rational Progress and Social Regeneration

By enshrining the shift in moral sources from God to Man, the Enlightenment not only facilitated the spread of popular sovereignty but also paved the way for the development of legitimating principles that revolved around the notions of progress and civilisation. Based on the increasing interest in the mastering of both outer and inner nature that accompanied the scientific revolution, political communities became the arena for the establishment of civilisation through rational progress.[875] Following the withering away of God, man was made responsible for his own welfare and salvation in an essentially disenchanted world and became the creator of society.[876] Thus, the Enlightenment epistemology made it conceivable for humans to attempt some sort of spiritual regeneration through large-scale social engineering and the creation of an earthly order compatible with human reason. For Alexis de Tocqueville, the French Revolution embodied the ideal of the total "regeneration of the whole

[872] Ibid.
[873] Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 1 (1992): p.46.
[874] Ibid.
[875] Stephen Eric Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p.20.
[876] Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair*, p.27.

human race."[877] These socio-cultural changes called forth the institutionalisation of an ascending legitimate order but also supported the concept of civilisation. In this section, I look at the roots of this civilising order in the Enlightenment shift in the notion of 'Chain of Being.'[878]

For centuries, the idea of 'Chain of Being' had been central to medieval consciousness and the descending theme of government. The notion provided a definite structure for all things natural and painted the cosmic order as some sort of top-down hierarchy that included all beings, both material and invisible. God was obviously at the top of the chain and was followed by archangels, angels, and down to men, animals, plants, etc. During the Enlightenment, the idea attained its broadest diffusion and its implications were accepted in all spheres of life. "[N]ext to the word 'Nature,' 'the Great Chain of Being' was the sacred phrase of the eighteenth century, playing a part somewhat analogous to that of the blessed word 'evolution' in the late nineteenth."[879] However, in line with the new climate of opinion, the concept was reinterpreted and came to be reconciled with the idea of slow historical progress and gradual development. As Arthur Lovejoy demonstrated, in accordance with the metaphysical principles of natural theology and Deistic thought, "the once immutable Chain of Being" was converted "into the program of an endless Becoming."[880]

As a result of this tilting process, God was temporalised and came to be identified with the very process of historical progress. Creationism was replaced by evolutionism and the Christian eschatology was revised accordingly.[881] In the political

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[877] Quoted in Krishan Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society* (London: Allen Lane, 1978), p.19.

[878] Taylor connects the emergence of 'civilisation' to the medieval notion of civility and changing forms of intimacy. While his account presents one facet of the story, I believe that it neglects the importance of the project of social regeneration fostered by the scientific revolution. Taylor, *A Secular Age*, pp.112-14. Ultimately, the two approaches are complementary.

[879] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, p.184.

[880] Ibid., p.259.

[881] Ibid., p.317. This rationalisation of the cosmic order is clearly articulated in the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and in his idea of the mechanical process of Nature - '*die teleologische Naturlehre*' – that purposively ensures a "steadily advancing but slow development" of men from the self-satisfied noble savage to a state of civilisation and high culture. Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in *Kant, Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.41. ———, "Perpetual Peace," in *Kant, Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss and H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.108. And this march towards civilisation is said to correspond to the teleological unfolding, by Nature, of "man's original capacities." Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose." p.48. As Siegel argues, the setting of nature and human civilisation in such a frame "allowed many traditional ideas and expectations, both philosophical and religious, to survive in new forms." Jerrold E. Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.298.

realm, this tilting process resulted in the emergence of a horizontal "conception of the destiny of man as an unending progress."[882] The main challenge sprang from inter-civilisational encounters with China, a people that was civilised but that, contrary to Europe, had none of the superstitious beliefs preached by ecclesiastics. The great achievements of this non-Christian empire provided Voltaire and other *philosophes* with the decisive proof that the Christian hopes of salvation could safely be replaced with secularised hopes in the indefinite ability of man to improve his lot and to become ever more civilised. As Robert Nisbet puts it, Providence-as-Progress was gradually replaced by Progress-as-Providence.[883]



Figure 3: From the Great Chain of Being to Civilisation

In *Meaning in History*, Karl Löwith demonstrates that this new approach to human existence marked the secularisation of the Judaeo-Christian belief in the 'End of Time' as well as the immanentisation of the eschatological pattern. In particular, the *Lumières* marked a turning point since they began to develop a natural philosophy of history by secularising Christian theological principles. Slowly but surely, the Christian consciousness came to be replaced by historical consciousness.[884] For example, Voltaire, among others, managed to emancipate "secular history from sacred history, subjecting the history of religion to that of civilization."[885] And accordingly,

[882] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, p.246.
[883] Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, p.182. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.48.
[884] Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949), p.197.
[885] Ibid., p.192. I wonder to what extent the difficulties we nowadays face in distinguishing the religious from the political spring from our historical conscience. As Peter Gay notes: "In the ends of these disenchanted historians, the two great sacred subjects, religion and politics, became, for all practical purposes, one; religion, the philosophic historian demonstrated, was a form of politics, and, in many cultures, politics was a form of religion." Gay, *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*, p.390.

the new benchmark for comparison was no longer religion but civilisation, the realisation of "the supremacy of reason, first, over the forces of nature, and, secondly, over the dispositions of men."[886] The main facets of the ideal of civilisation were the achievement of progress (including fairness, reciprocity, common decency, and compassion), freedom from necessity, the perfecting of the human race, and the fulfilment of every individual's potential and needs.[887] From then on the scheme of redemption through Christ was fully temporalised and came to be replaced by a historical process of progress and civilisation. Far from corresponding to a monolithic expression of a divine plan, the various notions of progress corresponded to competing postulates.[888] In the 19th century, the "belief in the progress of mankind, with Western civilization in the vanguard, [became] virtually a universal religion."[889] Even though many Enlightenment thinkers had been suspicious of the idea of progress as perfectibility, it became "the animating and controlling idea of western civilisation."[890] Following the Enlightenment and the spread of the idea of earthly progress, a new legitimate order based on civilisation emerged.

4) Legitimate Order and Civilisation

Overall, the socio-political upheavals of the 18th century paved the way for the rise of new legitimate orders not only based on the notion of popular sovereignty but also based on the notion of civilisation. The Enlightenment faith in social regeneration and progress facilitated a gradual shift in legitimating principles from the divine sanction of earthly authority to a more legalistic sanction according to standards of civilisation.[891] As Ian Clark notes, Europe witnessed "the emergence of a notion of civilization, initially as an adjunct of Christendom, but finally as a displacement of the latter as the operative basis of international society."[892] In fact, Clark argues that "the

[886] Albert Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization: The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization* (London: A.&C. Black, 1923), p.36.
[887] Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment*, p.20.
[888] Ibid., p.22. Clare Jackson, "Progress and Optimism," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004).
[889] Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, p.7. Roy Porter remarked that "Progress proved the ultimate Enlightenment gospel." Porter, *Enlightenment* p.445.
[890] Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p.vii.
[891] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.47. Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard Of "Civilization" In International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
[892] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.45.

shifting basis of legitimacy from a predominantly moral/theological one to one rooted in conceptions of legality" corresponded to a key phase of the secularisation of the notion of international society during the 17th and 18th centuries.[893]

From the 17th century onward, the gradual shift from Christendom to the notion of civilisation took place as the European state-system began to expand on a global scale. Christianity had been fundamental and foundational to the medieval conception of the world order. But after Westphalia, and most particularly following the Peace of Utrecht in 1713-14, it became obvious "how problematic a preoccupation with Christendom could become for an increasingly diverse and potentially greatly expanded international society."[894] The confessional schism and the religious wars had signalled that religion could no longer offer a universally acceptable identity. Instead, the main principles of legitimacy were "gradually transmuted from an emphasis upon Christendom and a common religion, to an emphasis upon due regard for appropriate standards of civilization."[895]

At first, the civilising mission went hand in hand with the spread of the good news of the Gospel. To be a good Christian meant to be civilised, and *vice versa*. But during the 20th century, the gap between the two widened and the balance shifted in favour of the latter.[896] In the words of Hedley Bull, "the assumption of a right to spread the Christian message and so realize the community of all men in Christ… [gradually gave way to the] assumption of a right to spread civilization and so bring into being a secular universal community of the civilized."[897]

The longing of the West to achieve progress and civilisation led it beyond the confines of its own borders and the standards of civilisation became embedded in colonialism.[898] Facilitated by the scientific and industrial revolutions, the civilising

[893] Ibid., p.49. When Clark maps "a gradual shift in the normative bases of legitimacy" and explains that "[i]n its earliest beginnings, legitimacy drew foremost from a moral-theological conception rooted in a divine cosmology" but came to be attached to notions of legality, he is directly dealing with the process of secularisation. ———, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.248. However, according to the argument developed so far, the secularisation of Europe and of the international order finds its roots in the 12th century. Westphalia and the Enlightenment correspond to major developments in a process already centuries-old.

[894] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.45.

[895] Ibid.

[896] Robert Jackson has noted that Europe's 'standard of civilisation' was "originally defined by the Christian religion" but slowly came to be based on 'secular Western values.' Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.290.

[897] Hedley Bull, "The Emergence of a Universal International Society," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.120.

[898] Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.143.

mission was extended to all continents. Besides the spiritual salvation of the colonised through the spread of the Gospel, European powers wanted to remedy the barbarism of primitive existence by introducing free trade and commerce.[899] Like Christianity, commerce was seen as a 'great engine of civilisation' and as William Bain explains, markets were considered to be

> productive not only of material wealth, but of great social energy, and individual improvement…[they] cultivate a sense of responsibility, discipline, industry, and all that was required of the virtuous citizen; and, consequently, moral refinement and material prosperity would naturally arise in human beings...[900]

Accordingly, a body of international law designed to facilitate the progress and civilisation of primitive peoples was developed in the aftermath of the French revolutionary wars but mostly during the 19th century.[901]

In the 26 February 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa "the moral and material well-being of native populations" was established as an international obligation and duty encumbered on the great and civilised powers.[902] The conference was based on "the belief that the nexus of commerce, civilization, and peace…would impart knowledge of science, Christian morality, and the virtues necessary to bring the light of civilization to the 'dark heart of Africa.'"[903] Chapter 1, Article VI of the Declaration bound the signatory powers

> to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being…They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, or which aim at instructing the natives and *bringing home to them the blessings of civilization*.[904]

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[899] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.736. William Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p.55.
[900] Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society*, p.56.
[901] Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.78, 83.
[902] Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," p.27.
[903] Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society*, p.68.
[904] Emphasis added. The full text of the 26 February 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa is available online through the website of the Australasian Legal Information Institute at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1920/17.html. The document was last accessed on 10 June 2009. Concerning the 'blessings of civilisation,' Quincy Wright has argued that "The three first gifts of white civilization to natives have usually been guns, gin, and Bibles. The first has an immediate educative effect. The natives can see that a gun is an improvement on means he already uses for ends he understands. The second he very soon begins to value for itself, but it is much more difficult for him to see the relevancy of Bibles." Quincy Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp.559-60.

Likewise, Article X called for the maintenance of peace as a means to encourage "the development of civilization."[905] But besides its legitimisation of Europe's civilising mission, the Conference remained committed to the spread of Christianity. As a matter of fact, the second part of Article VI established most explicitly the protection of Christian missionaries, scientists, and explorers as well as the right of foreigners to organise religious missions.

In the wake of the Great War, the 'sacred trust of civilisation' was institutionalised in the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to Article 22, advanced nations were entrusted with a responsibility for tutoring those territories "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."[906] As part of the Mandate system, Christianity no longer enjoyed a special status and freedom of conscience and religion was established for all. Obstruction and interference with missionary enterprise was still forbidden but missions were no longer 'the objects of special protection.'[907] Finally, following the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations Trusteeship Council, all references to missionaries had been erased and no special arrangements were made to facilitate the spread of Christianity.[908]

5) A New Eschatology

This new vision of human history that developed during the Enlightenment was connected to the *philosophes'* professed goal of ridding civilisation from the tyranny and barbarism of clerical superstitions. However, in the 20th century, it

[905] 26 February 1885 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, Ibid.
[906] The Covenant of the League of Nations is available online as part of the Avalon Project of the Yale Law School (last accessed on 10/06/09) at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22
[907] Concerning the Iraq mandate, Art. 12 established that "No measure shall be taken in Irak to obstruct or interfere with missionary enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religious belief or nationality, provided that such enterprise is not prejudicial to public order and good government." For the Palestine Mandate: Art. 15 "The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made…on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief." Similar closes of non-discrimination were included in the Mandates for Lebanon and Syria (Art. 6, 8, 10), Tanganyika (Art. 8), and British Cameroons and Togo (Art.7). Wright, *Mandates under the League of Nations*, p.597, 603, 09, 14, 18.
[908] Besides the article that establishes the freedom of religion, no mention or arrangements are made for the spread of the Gospel; though religious freedom is a way to assure the hegemony of Christianity.

became clearer that their aims had had most unintended consequences. Concerning the notions of civilisation and progress, Löwith noted that "the irreligion of progress is still a sort of religion, derived from the Christian faith in a future goal, though substituting an indefinite and immanent *eschaton* for a definite and transcendent one."[909] Likewise, Bury argued that "the Progress of humanity belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality…Belief in it is an act of faith."[910] And finally, Becker explained that through their concern with rational progress toward a 'better world,' many of the *philosophes* remained within "the line of prophetic and messianic monotheism."[911]

A similar point can be made concerning Rousseau's philosophical contribution. By developing what Cassirer called the 'one great principle,'– that man is good, that society makes him bad, but that *only* society, the agent of perdition, can be the agent of salvation – Rousseau secularised the issue of theodicy and paved the way for the modern social imaginary of popular consent. By tearing the Gospel "from the supernatural order and transposing certain fundamental aspects of Christianity into the sphere of simple nature," Rousseau proceeded to a "*naturalization* of Christianity."[912] However, this naturalisation and immanentisation of Western consciousness as well as the concomitant 'denial of the transcendent' led to the divinising of the self, politics, and the state.[913] For Elshtain, the Christian ideas and religious quest pursued by Rousseau in the *Social Contract* led to the infusion of "transcendence into politics rather than reserving it for the sacred."[914] Likewise, Daniel Bell concurs that "[t]his transfer of sacrality onto political and social values became a new legitimacy, the cult of mankind, and it was this cult that heralded a new era, a new secular religion."[915] Ultimately, the democratic culture that took hold in Western societies "culminated in the emergence of a new form of sacralised politics" and acquired the status of 'civil or political religion.'[916]

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[909] Löwith, *Meaning in History* p.114.
[910] Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p.4.
[911] Löwith, *Meaning in History* p.19.
[912] Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, p.142.
[913] Elshtain, *Sovereignty*, p.142.
[914] Ibid., p.131.
[915] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.xv.
[916] Emilio Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 1, no. 1 (2000): p.34. Jackson, *The Global Covenant* pp.366-68. Mark Juergensmeyer, "The New Religious State," *Comparative Politics* 27, no. 4 (1995). Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.367, 68.

In his *Heavenly City*, Becker explores these residues of the medieval sacred cosmology that paradoxically endured in Enlightenment philosophy. The Cornell professor argues that in their rejection of the Church, some *philosophes* forgot to reject the immortality of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being, in their rejection of the authority of the revealed word of God, some came to accept blindly the authority of reason and nature, and far from having dropped their hope of returning to the Garden of Eden, some developed a new historical view of progress tending towards peace and civilisation. In place of the City of God, they erected an Enlightened City, an earthly city made of secular material and whose gates would be guarded by men themselves.[917] And in so doing, "they used, along with much new material, some of the old Christian bricks."[918] As Peter Gay argues "the philosophes boasted that they were making all things new, but far from wholly discarding their Christian inheritance, they repressed, and retained, more than they knew."[919] Likewise, Roy Porter remarked that "Enlightened histories claimed to be replacing error with truth, but they were in reality trading new myths for old – their own mentalities were mythopoeic too."[920]

The mythopoeic spirit intrinsic to the human condition remained very much alive and the 18th century was 'enlightened' only in the sense that it had shifted "canons of proof and direction of worship" from God to Nature and Man.[921] The Enlightenment "view of the world should not be equated with skepticism or atheism."[922] It was only disenchanted to the extent that "[o]ne type of certainty (divine law) was replaced by another (the certainty of our sense, of empirical observation)."[923] As Bell explains, the language of the French revolution ""was political, deriving from the Enlightenment, the fulfillment of Reason, but the

[917] As Ozouf argues, it was enlightened posterity that provided the gate to immortality in this world since one could now hope to live eternally in the memory of his descendants. Ozouf, "'Public Opinion' at the End of the Old Regime," p.99. Man would now hold the key to an earthly paradise and play the role of judge and justifier of the enlightened ones. The judgement of the Almighty was replaced by the judgement of men and in very liturgical terms Diderot could exclaim: "O Posterity, holy and sacred! Support of the oppressed and unhappy, thou who art just, thou who art incorruptible, thou who wilt revenge the good man and unmask the hypocrite, consoling and certain idea, do not abandon me!" For the French thinker, "Posterity is for the Philosopher what the other world is for the religious." Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.150.
[918] Gay, *The Party of Humanity*, p.202.
[919] ———, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.59.
[920] Porter, *Enlightenment* p.233.
[921] Gay, *The Enlightenment : The Rise of Modern Paganism*, p.148.
[922] Ibid.
[923] Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.48.

underlying sentiments were religious."[924] And drawing on a 'spiritual energy' similar to that of Christianity, this new mythology justified a new hierarchy of power based on the new standards of civilisation and democratic legitimacy.[925]

6) A Shift in Worship

In the 17th and early 18th centuries, Mother Nature came to replace God the Holy Father as the ultimate source of legitimacy and truth.[926] And the most outspoken critiques of Christianity could praise nature in a most pious manner without passing for believers. The religious character of the new worship of nature resulted from the transfer of all divines attributes from God to the material world and was framed using very traditional forms of Christian devotion.[927] Hence, Shaftesbury (1671-1713) could pay tributes to the new deity and pray to it:

> O Glorious *Nature*! supremely Fair, and sovereignly Good! All-loving and All-lovely, All-divine!...O mighty *Nature*! Wise Substitute of *Providence*! impower'd *Creatress*! Or Thou impowering Deity, supreme Creator![928]

In the same vein Comte d'Holbach (1723-1789) addressed the new God in terms reminiscent of the medieval consciousness:

> Oh Nature! Sovereign of all beings. And you, her adorable daughters, Virtue, reason, and truth. Be forever our only divinities; it is to you that are due the homage and incense of the earth. Show us, then, Oh Nature, what man should do to obtain the happiness that you desire for him.[929]

But with the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, reason began to take the place of nature. And accordingly, the human attribute was incensed and glorified with the most religious terms:

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[924] Bell, *The End of Ideology*, pp.xiii-xiv.
[925] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.104. Becker called this new mythology the 'religion of humanity.' It held that man, solely guided by reason and experience, could emancipate himself from the domination of the Church and establish a perfect order on earth. Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, p.102.
[926] Randall, *The Career of Philosophy*, p.916.
[927] Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, p.104. Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason: Lectures and Essays since the End of World War Ii* (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp.34-50.
[928] Willey, *The Eighteenth Century Background*, p.63.
[929] Holbach quoted in Darrin M. McMahon, "Pursuing an Enlightened Gospel: Happiness from Deism to Materialism to Atheism," in *The Enlightenment World*, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, et al. (London: Routledge, 2004), p.174.

> Divine Reason, pure emanation of the supreme Being, thou who governest the destiny of men and empires, pray accept the homage which we come to render unto thee today in this august temple! This tribute may please thou, since it is inspired by the burning love of the Fatherland and by the sentiments of its goodness. Indeed, it is thanks to this that we reconquered our holy liberty, too long profaned under the abhorred yoke of a shameful servitude.[930]

From theologians and astrologists, educated men turned philosophers, scientists, and historians in their quest for a new basis for morality.[931] The Enlightenment faith in nature and in the Author of the Universe was soon rationalised, and with Darwin, disappeared altogether. Finally, with the notions of evolution, progress, and civilisation "God, and all the substitutes for that conception, could be ignored since nature was conceived not as a finished machine but as an unfinished process, a mechanistic process, indeed, but one generating its own power."[932]

[930] Aulard, *Culte De La Raison Et Le Culte De L' Etre Supreme (1793-1794)*, pp.104-05. "Raison divine, émanation pure de l'Etre suprême, qui règle à volonté la destinée des hommes et des empires, daigne accepter l'hommage que nous venons te rendre aujourd'hui dans ce temple auguste! Cet hommage doit te plaire, puisqu'il est inspiré par le brulant amour de la patrie et par le sentiment de ses bienfaits. En effet, c'est par lui que nous avons reconquis notre sainte liberté, trop longtemps profané sous le joug abhorré d'une honteuse servitude."
[931] E.J. Tapp, "Values in History," *Journal of World History* XI, no. 3 (1968): p.366.
[932] Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers*, pp.161-62.

Conclusion

I am an object of myself and of my representations.
That there is something outside me is my own product.
I make myself.

Immanuel Kant

In this chapter, I traced the development of the individualism and inwardness of the new consciousness from the 17th century onwards. Luther and Calvin had shifted the basis of faith from the traditional ecclesiastical hierarchy to the sole Scriptures. But Locke took this rationale to its logical conclusion and in a very Cartesian fashion rejected this external inspiration or foundation and argued that the only source of knowledge was the experience of the human reason. All forms of knowledge, both lay and religious, were said to subsist within, and to be mediated by, man.[933] With Rousseau, the Divinity was absorbed and assimilated in ourselves and happiness was possible to the extent that "we withdraw from things and draw closer *to ourselves: we are then sustained by our own substance*, but it is never exhausted."[934]

According to this alternative source of knowledge, new international legitimate orders were established. At the vanguard of civilisation, European states strove tirelessly towards progress and redemption. The eternal life was promised by René Descartes and Auguste Comte with the latter arguing that in a perfect society politically governed by industrial administrators and morally guided by natural scientists life would become infinite and death a remnant of the past.[935] Following the translation of Christian theology into secular terms, a purely natural and this-worldly eschatology was developed and parts of the eschatological hopes of Christianity were finally rehabilitated but in a purely secular gaze. Salvation was again possible, here on earth. Overall, the Enlightenment sacralised the worldly existence and thus completed the third step of the secularisation process.

[933] Cassirer and Gay, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, pp.117-18. Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.357.
[934] Rousseau quoted in Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau*, pp. 153-54.
[935] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.190. Auguste Comte and Harriet Martineau, *The Positive Philosophy* (New York: AMS Press, 1973).

In the 21st century, we clearly remain "the Enlightenment's children."[936] The ideas and values dear to the *philosophes* are very much present and still provide the foundation of much theorising within the Social Sciences. As Nisbet argues, "[a]ll of the social sciences without exception – political economy, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, cultural geography, and others – were almost literally founded upon the rock of faith in human progress."[937] And accordingly, we still approach social life through this "purely secular time-understanding" which allowed us to move "from a hierarchical order of personalized links to an impersonal egalitarian one; from a vertical world of mediated access to horizontal, direct-access societies."[938]

This conclusion has important implications for the legitimacy of the secular foundation of international relations. The endurance of a mythopoeic mentality poses a fundamental problem regarding the alleged objectivity and neutrality of the secular foundation of international politics. If the secularisation of Europe cannot be dissociated from the sacralisation of the world and from the development of a secular eschatology, the claim to superiority of secular politics over its faith-based counterpart is weakened. Besides, the return of religion on a global scale questions the universality and adequacy of this very foundation.

The argument developed in this chapter goes a long way in answering our first research question concerning the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international politics. However, before I summarise the argument and the main findings of this thesis, it is essential to consider the most recent transformations to have taken place in the secular foundation of international politics. Effectively, while the secularisation process reached its peak at the beginning of the 19th century, it seems that it underwent a reversal in the 20th century. Therefore, the following chapter deals with the socio-cultural transformations that followed the third step of the secularisation process. In particular, I look at the move away from the moral source and legitimate orders established after the Enlightenment and I outline the onset of a process of 'de-secularisation' or re-enchantment. Only then will it be possible to answer the two research questions set at the beginning of this thesis.

[936] Porter, *The Enlightenment*, p.69.
[937] Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, p.175.
[938] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, p.157, 58. ———, *A Secular Age*, p.209.



Figure 4: The 4 Levels of Secularisation after the Enlightenment

7. Globalisation and the "Return of the Gods"

Only a god can save us now.

Martin Heidegger

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the ideals of progress and civilisation enjoyed widespread authority amongst Western nations. By demonstrating the falsity of the teachings of treacherous and perfidious priests, the *philosophes* had paved the way for a civilisation free from dogma and supernatural nonsense. In turn, the saving powers of the Enlightenment and its ability to free humans from the barbarism and shackles of superstition and religious belief were beyond criticism. However, the 1900s saw the corrosion and questioning of this Enlightenment monument of Western legitimacy. In particular, following the two World Wars and the fall of all colonial empires, the cultural rationales inherited from the *Lumières* came under criticism. Having supposedly led to the horrors of the camps, the instrumental rational legacy of the *philosophes* was challenged from all sides of the political spectrum. Likewise, the civilising order that had emerged during the 18th century fell into disrepute. By the mid-20th century, the Enlightenment project of civilisation and progress had been reframed and the authority of reason reconsidered.

Students of structures of consciousness have depicted this reappraisal as some sort of limbo between epochs and different socio-cultural trends.[939] In *Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters*, Benjamin Nelson noted that

> *Today we are again at a turning point in the successive civil wars and revolutions of the cultures of conscience and consciousness. This time it is the Western rationalized consciousness which is on trial in all countries of the world*. The frightful events of our century have convinced great numbers that the civilizations reared on the so-called 'myth of the *objective consciousness*' are beyond repair.[940]

[939] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, p.625.
[940] Nelson, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," pp.102-03.

Based on this diagnostic of the socio-cultural turmoil, Nelson claimed that what we are currently witnessing corresponds to the reversal of the trends that led from the 12th century onward to the spread of rationalised structures of consciousness. The current turning point, Nelson thought, corresponds to a battle that "ranges between the existential structure of 'faith-consciousness' and the more objective 'rationalized-structures' of consciousness."[941] Accordingly, the cultural revolutions taking place the world over are "marked by intensive thrusts of collective process…to forge new collective identities and new collective forms of experience and expression…they are to be found wherever separatist groups pursue the right to collective identity."[942] Overall, this reversal means that the individual consciousness fostered by the Enlightenment is giving ground to a collective form of consciousness akin to that which was prevailing in the Middle Ages.[943]

Sharing this analysis of the present condition, Sorokin demonstrates in *Social and Cultural Dynamics* that the 'this-worldly,' rational cultural form that emerged after the fall of Christendom and reached its zenith in the 18th century is being slowly replaced by an ideational and 'other-worldly' culture in which knowledge is accessed through faith and intuition. For Sorokin, the self-defeating nature of modern culture means that through incessant rationalisation, values have "become still more relative and atomistic until they are ground into dust devoid of any universal recognition and binding power."[944] The Russian-American sociologist concludes that faced with a lack of foundation and meaning Westerners are returning to the cultural rationales that prevailed in the Middle Ages. To be more precise, instead of reversing completely to the medieval arrangements, they seem to be using the material vehicles and instrumentalities of modern culture as the mouthpiece of medieval ideational meanings and values.[945]

In *The Ever-Present Origin*, Jean Gebser develops a similar argument and comes to the conclusion that the structure of consciousness that is currently emerging is characterised by a greater consciousness of the spiritual.[946] Likewise, in *The*

[941] _____, "*Eros, Logos, Nomos, Polis*: Shifting Balances of the Structures of Existence," p.215.
[942] _____, "Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters," p.103.
[943] _____, "*Eros, Logos, Nomos, Polis*: Shifting Balances of the Structures of Existence," p.226.
[944] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, p.699.
[945] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age* (Oxford: Oneworld, 1992), p.243.
[946] Jean Gebser, *The Ever-Present Origin* (London: Ohio University Press, 1985). Georg Feuerstein, *Structures of Consciousness: The Genius of Jean Gebser* (Lower Lake: Integral Publishing, 1987), pp.219-20.

Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler had already predicted the return of religion. He had argued that

> the seed of a new resigned piety, sprung from tortured conscience and spiritual hunger, whose task will be to found a new Hither-side that looks for secrets instead of steel-bright concepts and in the end will find them in the deeps of the 'Second Religiousness.'[947]

From the highpoint of the rational spirit of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, Western culture has now reached its limits and is now returning "to its spiritual home."[948]

Gebser, Sorokin, Nelson, and Spengler saw the demise of the Book of Reason and the 'return' of religion as central to the 20th century.[949] Thus, at the turn of the 21st century, it is important to explore the reality and nature of this apparent reversal of trend. Knowing that the secularisation of Western Europe resulted from the inverse shift in consciousness, we could well wonder whether the current shift will lead to the 're-enchantment' of Europe or at least to the onset of a process of 'de-secularisation.'[950] Moreover, when one considers that a similar reversal seems to be taking place in the realm of international legitimacy and that it seems to be connected to the revival of religion, an understanding of the implications of this change in structures of consciousness becomes critical.[951]

Therefore, in line with the theoretical framework developed in chapter three, this last chapter deals with the most recent transformations in moral sources and structures of legitimacy and relates them to the return of religion. In the first part of the chapter, I outline the main facets of the driving force behind the current shift. I argue that 'globalisation' is challenging the modern source of morality and facilitating the emergence of an alternative moral source. Next, I assess the extent to which this 'post-modern turn' is paving the way for a new sense of identity propitious to

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[947] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West: Perspectives of World-History*, ed. Charles Francis Atkinson, vol. 2 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), p.455.
[948] _____, *The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality*, ed. Charles Francis Atkinson, vol. 1 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926), p.428.
[949] To this list, one could add Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, pp.356-57.
[950] Berman, *The Reenchantment of the World*. Berger, *The Desecularization of the World*. It should be noted that this process of de-secularisation does not correspond exactly to the reversal of the process of secularisation, especially in Europe. Gergely Rosta, "Secularization or Desecularization in the Work of Peter Berger and the Changing Religiosity of Europe," in *Communication across Cultures: The Hermeneutics of Cultures and Religions in a Global Age*, ed. Chibueze C. Udeani, et al. (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008). In the following two chapters, I prefer to use the term of 're-enchantment' or the idea of a movement towards a 'post-secular' society.
[951] Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," p.653. Scholte, *Globalization* p.187.

communal arrangements and the revival of religion.[952] I conclude that the changes outlined by Nelson and Sorokin do not seem to be taking place and that the return of religion has up until now been mostly a by-product and a reaction to globalising forces. Far from heralding a return to a notion of the good premised on the divine, recent changes have not fundamentally questioned the modern anthropocentric moral source.

In the second part of the chapter, I deal with transformations in the sphere of legitimacy. I look at the challenges posed to the civilising order and I map out the onset of new forms of international legitimacy after the Second World War.[953] I argue that the current shift in legitimate order is emphasising notions of self-determination and human rights and is leading to the weakening of secularism and to the accentuation of religious concerns. Ultimately, the return of religion is only connected to a process of de-secularisation in a very limited sense but remains nonetheless significant to the extent that it highlights the importance of reforming the secular foundation of international politics.

[952] The notion of 'post-modern turn' refers to a cultural transition that occurred during the 20th century. Anthony Giddens notes that post-modernity ordinarily refers to the fact "that we have discovered that nothing can be known with any certainty, since all pre-existing 'foundations' of epistemology have been shown to be unreliable; that 'history' is devoid of teleology and consequently no version of 'progress' can plausibly be defended; and that a new social and political agenda has come into being with the increasing prominence of ecological concerns and perhaps of new social movements generally." Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.46. For a comprehensive outline of the post-modern turn, of its origins, development, and reality, see Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*.

[953] I only deal with the collapse of the civilising order and not with that of popular sovereignty because the former became foundational to the international society following the Enlightenment while the latter gained influence post-1945, that is, after the major transformations in legitimacy outlined in this chapter.

A. Moral Sources, De-Centring the Self

> The idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system.
>
> *Sigmund Freud*

> The death of God is also the death of eternal truth
>
> *Max Horkheimer*

The last historical period I wish to study in this thesis is the 20th century, and more particularly, the radical wave of globalisation that spread from the 1960s onwards. The importance of the Reformation and the Enlightenment in history is well-known, but the significance of our own time is often overlooked due to the lack of historical hindsight. In this context, Bruce Mazlish has argued that "present-day globalization is the counterpart for our time of that earlier French Revolution" and that its scope and force are far greater than its predecessor.[954] Transformations in technology, the economy, industry, the information revolution, etc, have profoundly transformed historical experience and impacted the social and cultural arrangements of societies the world over. Whether the 20th century corresponds to the latest seminal period is a question which will have to be answered by historians in the coming decades. But the lack of hindsight should not stop us from studying those revolutionary trends in belief and attitudes that typify the current transitional challenge. While the future is unpredictable, the main contours of the emerging order can be derived from the availability of some powerful cultural resources.[955]

The aim of the following sections is thus to study the impact of this latest historical period on moral sources and to connect it to the resurgence of religion. If a process of de-secularisation is taking place, we should be able to discern its contours by looking at the transformation in the sources of morality brought about under the impulse of globalisation. Therefore, in the next section, I outline the main characteristics of the globalisation process. Then I look at the impact it has had on

[954] Mazlish, *The New Global History*, p.112.
[955] Richard A. Falk, "The Grotian Quest," in *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective*, ed. Richard A. Falk, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, *Studies on a Just World Order ; No. 2* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.40.

moral sources as well as its consequences on the way the self is conceptualised. And finally, I connect these changes to the current resurgence of religion.

1) Globalisation, a Seminal Period ?

Globalisation has been defined in various ways by different scholars and the scale of the process makes an exhaustive study impossible. Over the last two decades, the term has been used more and more frequently, and increasingly loosely. But simply put, it corresponds to the growing transcendence of borders as well as the expansion, acceleration, and deepening of interconnections on a global scale. It encompasses all spheres of life and is often associated with notions of 'global village,' 'complex interconnectivity,' space/time compression, the butterfly effect, etc. Also, it is related to Westernisation, liberalisation, McDonaldization, or neo-colonialism. Its causes are multiple but broadly speaking it is facilitated by the changes in information technology and in the economy as well as by the emergence of a global consciousness.[956] Because I am only interested in the changes globalisation has brought about at the levels of consciousness and moral sources, my account will be limited to the cultural dimension of the process. In particular, I will pay special attention to the challenge posed to the Enlightenment moral source as well as to the way people live and experience the world. Even though changes in the spheres of trade, finance, economics, and information technology are central to globalisation, they have not been included.

Far from being a recent phenomenon specific to the 20th century, globalisation is deeply rooted in a modernity which is 'inherently globalizing.'[957] Overall, three main waves of globalisation have been distinguished: "The first, after 1500, centred on the globalization of regional trade; the second, after 1800, gained impetus from industrialization; the third derived from the architecture of a new world order after 1945."[958] The roots of the process and the certain continuity between the waves should not obscure the fact that the profound systemic and holistic transformations of

[956] Scholte, *Globalization* pp.89-108.
[957] Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.63.
[958] Robbie T. Robertson, *The Three Waves of Globalization: A History of a Developing Global Consciousness* (London: Zed Books, 2003), p.4.

present-day globalisation are characteristic of a new epoch.[959] Compared to the first two waves, the scope and pace of the last wave denote a radical qualitative difference.[960]

Different dimensions of the associated cultural condition – variously termed late, high, reflexive modernity or post-modernity - have been captured in the notions of 'post-industrial' or 'post-Fordist' society, the development of the 'network society' or the emergence of a 'risk society.'[961] Overall, it seems that the information technology revolution, the economic crisis of capitalism and statism, and the blooming of cultural social movements have brought about, through their interactions and the reactions they triggered, a new social structure, economy, and culture.[962] This transition is characteristic of highly integrated and modernised countries but remains uneven and incomplete in many parts of the world.

Writing in the second half of the 20th century, numerous scholars commented on the socio-cultural changes that were taking place as a result of globalising forces. They demonstrated that the special character of change in late-modernity had an impact on culture and especially on the way identity is conceived. Overall, they found that the transformations and the compression of time and space led to the disembedding of the social system, to the creation of global interconnections, to the challenge of 'traditional' authority, and to the alteration of personal identity. Indeed, the pace and scope of change as well as an increased reflexivity meant that social practices became "constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character."[963]

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[959] Mazlish, *The New Global History*, p.107.

[960] Scholte, *Globalization* It is likely that over the longue durée, the 20th century will look like a major rupture in culture and consciousness. This is what Mazlish argues. Overall, I believe that the debate over the gradualness of this rupture is due to the diversity of historical frames of reference adopted by scholars.

[961] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society : A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1976). Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, vol. 1, *Information Age. Economy, Society, and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society : Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992). One of the first writers to use the word 'postmodern' was Bernard Bell. In the 20s and 30s, Bell argued that the postmodernist is the man who is disillusioned with the religions of democracy, science, of the superman, etc, and who is "seeking once more for a God quite beyond the limitations of those lesser deities too popular of late." Bernard Iddings Bell, *Religion for Living. A Book for Postmodernists.* (London: John Gifford, 1939), p.xiii. The postmodern was used to refer to this return to God and a deeper form of spirituality.

[962] Manuel Castells, *End of Millennium*, vol. 3, *Information Age. Economy, Society, and Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p.356.

[963] Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, pp.37-38.

This endless process of fragmentation and reconstruction of both societies and individualities is what characterises the nature of change at the turn of the 21st century.

Through its homogenising powers as well as its incessant need for re-actualisation, globalisation is questioning and thus eroding all forms of identity. The source of worry is not so much to find a solid identity but the suspicion that it might be torn apart or melt into air.[964] Effectively, as reality and existence are confronted to "the dialectical interplay of the local and the global," individuals are forced to reconstitute their identity in reference to the multiplicity of options offered by globalisation.[965] As shared identities are caught up within global flows, they tend to become the preeminent organising principle of postmodern societies.[966] In this way, globalisation is connected to the resurgence of religion.

In turn, this lack of continuity creates a sense of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety and individuals become tempted to dissolve their personal worries by belonging to a community.[967] In a fragmented, dislocated, and ever-shifting world, women and men look for communities to relieve their uncertainties: "Identity sprouts on the graveyard of communities, but flourishes thanks to its promise to resurrect the dead."[968] As Alain Touraine explains, "in a post-industrial society…*it is the defense of the subject, in its personality and in its culture, against the logic of apparatuses and markets, that replaces the idea of class struggle*."[969] The new primacy of identity is to grow and develop "*as prolongation of communal resistance*."[970] This resistance is against globalisation's dissolution of local institutions, the individualism and blurring of boundaries, and finally, against the crisis in patriarchal 'personality systems' and traditional mechanisms of social security.[971] This cultural resistance is also closely tied to the resentment of Western hegemony and injustice and this is the subject of the second part of the chapter.

The globalising character of our present situation, whether the mark of a seminal period or not, is profoundly affecting existence and experience. The

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[964] Zygmunt Bauman, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.147.
[965] Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p.5.
[966] "I understand by identity the process by which a social actor recognizes itself and constructs meaning primarily on the basis of a given cultural attribute or set of attributes, to the exclusion of a broader reference to other social structures." Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, p.22.
[967] Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*.
[968] Bauman, *The Individualized Society*, p.151.
[969] Quoted in Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, p.23.
[970] Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, vol. 2, *Information Age. Economy, Society, and Culture* (London: Blackwell, 1997), p.11.
[971] Ibid., pp.65-66.

transcendence of borders and the increase in interconnections are confronting individuals and societies to a growing flow of information. In turn, this leads to the fragmentation, hybridisation, and dislocation of worldviews and to a demand for greater fluidity and flexibility. However, it is also leading to insecurity and fears which are met by resistance and a return to the safety of traditional and communal sources of identities.

In light of the above account of the socio-cultural transformations brought about by globalisation, we could well wonder whether the moral sources inherited from the Enlightenment have remained unaffected. Indeed, if, "subjectivity and the social order are constituted *together*" and implicate one another, it is important to explore the potential repercussion of these changes on the notion that Man is the measure of all things.[972] In the following sections, I argue that globalisation and the advent of post-modernity, while increasing human powers technologically, question the sovereignty and self-sufficiency of the Enlightenment subject and participate in the dismantlement of the associated worldview.[973] It could be wondered whether this transition could open the door, in some cases, to an inflexion or redirection of the secularising process and to the emergence of a new religious consciousness.[974]

2) The Philosophical Limits of Modernity's Moral Sources

In the previous chapters, I argued that under the impulse of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment, the moral sources shared across Europe slowly shifted from God to Man. And in the early 19th century, Hegel could exclaim that

> never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence

[972] Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat, "The Subject of the Political," in *Sovereignty and Subjectivity*, ed. Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram, and Veronique Pin-Fat (London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p.5, 4.
[973] Raymond Barglow, *The Crisis of the Self in the Age of Information: Computers, Dolphins and Dreams* (London: Routledge, 1994), p.6. In fact, it seems that there is an elective affinity between 'de-centred' subjectivity and post-modern societies. Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, pp.112-21. Kenneth Thompson, "Social Pluralism and Post-Modernity," in *Modernity and Its Futures*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open University, 2001), p.230.
[974] Seligman, *Modernity's Wager*, p.7. Philippa Berry, "Postmodernism and Post-Religion," in *Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism*, ed. S. Connor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). James H. Olthuis, *Religion with/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo* (London: Routledge, 2002). John D. Caputo, Gianni Vattimo, and Jeffrey W. Robbins, *After the Death of God* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

> centres in his head, i.e., in Thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality…This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn.[975]

The outcome of this change was the creation of the sovereign, rational, and autonomous individual as the ultimate repository of meaning, morality, and political legitimacy. [976] In *The Question of Cultural Identity*, Stuart Hall defines this 'Enlightenment subject' as "a fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action."[977] The fact "that man becomes the center and measure of all beings…[and] at the bottom of all objectification and representation" marks the defining trait of modernity.[978]

Of course people were also individuals in pre-modern times, but this individuality was felt and experienced in a different manner. As members of a divinely ordered hierarchy with specific roles and duties in the Great Chain of Being, people were kept from enjoying individual sovereignty by the weight of traditional and religious structures. In this context, the emergence of the sovereign individual as a result of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was a major development in the history of mankind. Following the shattering of the Christian order, man was redefined in a threefold way. First, the existence of the Almighty and of a human soul was made unnecessary and their existence was dismissed as being a mere religious fancy spread by wicked priests. Second, emotions and the body itself were separated from the rational self and their possession became but a nuisance.[979] Bodies were atomised and became separated from one another other. And third, man began to control nature and thus separated himself from his environment. The Romantic reaction to the disenchantment of the world was characterised by a "sharp sense that human beings had been triply divided by modern reason – within themselves, between

[975]Quoted in Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, p.19.
[976] Though Hegel did not support this. Richard Ashley explains that "the heroic figure of reasoning man who is himself the origin of language, the maker of history, and the source of meaning in the world…[is] the modern *sovereign*." In Edkins and Pin-Fat, "The Subject of the Political," p.3.
[977] Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity and Its Futures*, ed. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with the Open University, 2001), p.275. The notion of 'Enlightenment subject' is a simplified conceptual device, an ideal type which enables me to explore changes in moral sources more accessibly.
[978] Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p.133.
[979] This "exaltation of disengaged reason as the royal road to knowledge" is what Charles Taylor refers to as 'excarnation.' Taylor, *A Secular Age*, p.746.

themselves, and from the natural world."[980] By centring the world within man, the ties between heaven and earth were cut.

This threefold separation had major implications. First of all, it made man a buffered and individual sovereign. The philosophical changes of the 17th and 18th centuries marked the arrogation of divinity by the man endowed of reason and thus made him his own creator and his own saviour.[981] But secondly, by becoming "a kind of prosthetic God" and acquiring a 'Godlike character,' man was assailed by troubles for there was nothing left that could give life the deep and powerful meaning it once had.[982] The individualism, bureaucratic, and instrumentalist nature of modern life dissolved traditional communities and superseded the once symbiotic relation that man had with nature and his environment. Man became insecure, homeless, "himself a stranger and solitary in the world."[983] This ultimately led to the destruction of "the matrices in which meaning could formerly flourish."[984] The Death of God left "only one remaining absolute, which is Nothingness."[985]

It is in this context that during the 20th century, processes of change associated with globalisation and the growing complexity of modern societies led to the emergence of a more social conception of man.[986] The transformation resulted from the realisation that identity is shaped through the interaction of the individual with his/her society and is transformed through dialogue and exchange with the 'outside.' According to this new understanding developed by the like of Talcott Parsons and George Herbert Mead, the individual was no longer seen as essentially "autonomous and self-sufficient" but as being "formed in relation to 'significant others', who mediated to the subject the values, meanings and symbols – the culture – of the worlds he/she inhabited."[987] The demarcation line between the inside, the 'self,' and the outside, society, became permeable and the individual came to be studied in his symbiotic relationship with the environment.

But soon this view of the subject was radicalised and through a series of intellectual ruptures and advances in social theory, the Cartesian source of morality

[980] Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), p.94.
[981] Cassirer and Gay, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, p.76.
[982] Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents* (London: W.W. Norton, 1989), p.44, 45.
[983] Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (London: Collins, 1973), p.164.
[984] Taylor, *Sources of the Self* p.500.
[985] Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (London: Continuum, 2002), p.157.
[986] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity."
[987] Ibid., p.275.

was finally 'de-centred.'[988] In opposition to the 'anthropologisation' of reality that made man the measure of all things, "[t]he second half of the twentieth century has been witness to a major shift in Western thinking, a shift that can be summed up in terms of the 'death of the subject' or the 'death of Man.'"[989] And according to our theoretical framework, if a process of de-secularisation is taking place it should be visible in this change in moral sources. Stuart Hall outlines five philosophical perspectives that facilitated this de-centring: psychoanalysis, Marxism, structural linguistic, feminism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism.[990] In this thesis, I would like to add one more such perspective to the list, namely, Existentialism. In the following section, through the outline of the philosophical rupture associated with Existentialism, i hope to ascertain the existence of a de-secularisation process.

Despite being neglected in the Anglo-American world, Existentialism deserves to be studied because of the role it played in the shift in moral sources.[991] After all, it is the tradition that addresses the sense of disorientation and confusion associated with modernity *par excellence*.[992] Besides, Existentialism was a powerful cultural trend in 20th century Europe and its impact on the intellectual scene cannot be ignored. As the most explicit statement of the Existentialist philosophy, the work of Sartre is considered at greater length.[993]

3) The Rationalisation of the Cartesian Self

In the 20th century, numerous authors came to the conclusion that in face of the growing complexity of modern societies and as a result of transformations brought about by globalisation, industrialisation, and two World Wars, the Enlightenment subject was 'de-centred.'[994] The Cartesian ontology according to which all knowledge

[988] Ibid., p.285.
[989] Christopher Falzon, *Foucault and Social Dialogue: Beyond Fragmentation* (London: Routledge, 1998), p.1. George Canguilhem, "The Death of Man, or Exhaustion of the Cogito?," in *The Cambridge Companion to Foucault*, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[990] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," pp.285-90.
[991] Taylor, *A Secular Age*.
[992] Robert C. Solomon, *From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds* (London: Harper and Row, 1972).
[993] Ibid., p.1.
[994] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," p.277. V. S. Peterson, "Shifting Ground(s): Epistemological and Territorial Remapping in the Context of Globalisation(s)," in *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Pinter, 1996). For a brief

is necessarily mediated by the 'cogito' was rationalised, thereby giving birth to a 'post-modern' form of subjectivity.[995] Many scholars explained that as a result, identity became fluid, impermanent, and unstable and the immutable and unified core of the Enlightenment 'self' became fragmented and ever-shifting. The subject came to be defined historically, "formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways [he/she is] represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround [him/her]."[996] Enlightenment reason fell from the status of unique source of truth to that of historically and socially constructed human ability.

Playing an important role as part of this broader process, Existentialist philosophers began to question the Cartesian assumption that consciousness faithfully mirrors reality. If the mind has not been created by a benevolent God, as Descartes assumed, how could one know that the mirror offers a perfect representation of the world? How could one know that the mind is not itself a variable in the perception of outer reality? Therefore, going beyond the sole focus on cogitation, philosophers turned to the study of consciousness itself. A new philosophical current began to develop, one that would extend from Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche to Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. For the sake of brevity, I focus solely on the latter phase of this development.

During the Middle Ages, it was commonly assumed that man was God's creation, that he was endowed with a soul, and that his purpose was the worship of God on earth. This theological conception of man saw "the human being from the point of view of his divine origin. Man is the creature of God and made in His image; he is part earthly, part spiritual…Human history is the history of man's preparation for salvation."[997] In this scheme, the existence of a specifically human essence is beyond doubt and identity is determined by one's position in the Great Chain of Being. With the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the divine purpose of man's existence was suppressed but the idea of a human essence remained implicit in the

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account of the impact of globalisation on ontology and epistemology: Scholte, *Globalization* pp.184-203.

[995] The historical narrative associated with the 'post-modern subject' emerged before post-modernity and corresponds to a backlash against the Enlightenment. It finds its roots in the work of thinkers such as Kierkegaard or Nietzsche but it only spread in the second half of the 20th century.

[996] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," p.277. It should be noted that this is a simplistic formulation of a more complex process and is useful to the extent that it allows us to study changes in moral sources. Ultimately, the notions of 'Enlightenment subject' or 'de-centred subjectivity' correspond to ideal types and are not faithful depictions of reality.

[997] Kahler, *Man the Measure*, p.8.

work of Voltaire, Diderot, or Kant. Human nature was still found in every man and each man was said to be an expression of that universal nature. The essence of man was said to precede his historical existence.

What existentialists achieved was the reversal of this state of affair. For example, Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) argued that if God is dead, man's essence cannot precede his existence.[998] Instead, the Frenchman demonstrated that "man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. If man…is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself."[999] The existential condition of man is thus one of radical freedom in which he is made responsible for the creation not only of his environment, but more importantly, of his self and its reality. Men must now take the place of the creator by ordering outer reality but also by taking responsibility for their inner world. In a soulless world in which he does not have an essence, man becomes the heart of his own transcendence.

This condition of infinite possibility and pure freedom makes man indefinable except in terms of what he has not already become. Hence one could say that "there is never any stable structure of being in which he can locate his identity. We are, in other words, creatures who can never catch up with ourselves…And there is no escaping the nothingness that is wrought into the very core of our humanity."[1000] However, as they were moving away from the Enlightenment subject in their quest for consciousness, existentialists drew closer to a new source of morality. By taking the rationalisation process to its very limits, 20th century philosophers paved the way for the complete de-centring of the Cartesian *cogito*.

4) De-Centred Subjectivity: From Nothingness to the Other

The radical subjectivism postulated by Sartre finds its roots in Descartes' '*cogito ergo sum*,' but contrary to the *cogito* that possessed an essence and an individuality, the existentialist subjectivity – if there is such a thing – is unbounded

[998] The absence of God is most 'embarrassing' "for there disappears with Him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven." Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1948), p.33.
[999] Ibid., p.28.
[1000] Nathan A. Scott, *Mirrors of Man in Existentialism* (London: Collins, 1978), p.174.

and only points beyond itself. The French thinker argued that consciousness does not exist independently from its object since to be conscious, one must be conscious of something: "consciousness has no 'inside,' it is nothing but the outside of itself."[1001] By rationalising the Cartesian *cogito*, existentialists made human existence a function of one's environment.

Moving away from the individualism and self-enclosed Enlightenment subjectivism, Sartre pointed to the fact that "it is not only one's own self that one discovers in the *cogito*, but those of others too."[1002] Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes or Kant, the existentialist emphasis on the *cogito* goes beyond the boundaries of the 'self.' Effectively, in a Hegelian fashion, Sartre noted that

> the man who discovers himself directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. He recognises that he cannot be anything…unless others recognise him as such…the other is indispensable to my existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself.[1003]

Martin Buber made a similar move based on his reading of Ludwig Feuerbach's conception of man. Contrary to the self-enclosed and rational individual that 18th century philosophers found so laudable, Feuerbach held that

> The individual man for himself does not have man's being in himself, either as a moral being or a thinking being. Man's being is contained only in community, in the unity of man with man – a unity which rests, however, only on the reality of the difference between I and Thou.[1004]

Likewise, Buber demonstrated that the mystery of human existence and consciousness cannot be resolved by looking at the individual. Instead, the Jewish thinker argued that "[o]nly when we try to understand the human person in his whole situation, in the possibilities of his relation to all that is not himself, do we understand man."[1005] Thus the search for the truth of consciousness took a whole new turn since the sources of the self led away from the individual and to the rest of the world. Buber transcended the emptiness of man's inner realm by demonstrating that the 'I' comes to exist "only through the relation to the *Thou*."[1006]

[1001] "car la conscience n'a pas de dedans; elle n'est rien que le dehors d'elle-même." Jean-Paul Sartre, *Situations I* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), p.33.
[1002] Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, p.45.
[1003] Ibid.
[1004] Feuerbach quoted in Buber, *Between Man and Man*, p.182.
[1005] Ibid., p.219.
[1006] Ibid., p.246.

In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, ideas similar to Sartre and Buber's have been developed by a variety of scholars. In *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Anthony Giddens argues that confronted to 'personal meaninglessness' and 'existential isolation,' the self has reached its limits as an 'internally referential system' and is leading back to the collective level.[1007] Likewise, one can find the perfect example of the externalisation of the 'self' by an excess of inwardness in the work of Judith Butler. In *Giving an Account of Oneself*, the American post-structuralist philosopher comes to the conclusion that "*I am only in the address to you*, then the 'I' that I am is nothing without this 'you,' and cannot even begin to refer to itself outside the relation to the other by which its capacity for self-reference emerges."[1008] Overall, these attempts to go beyond the 'Enlightenment subject' are part of the broader shift towards more de-centred accounts of subjectivity. While the emerging source of morality is not yet perfectly discernable, a definite move away from the Cartesian subject can be distinguished. Also, it should be noted that the de-centring of the subject is leading away from modernity's individualism and to a new opening on the social world and collectivism.[1009]

So far in this chapter, I have tried to sketch the conceptual shift by which the Cartesian notion of the individual, rational, and sovereign self was de-centred. I argued that this shift in moral sources was the result of globalisation and I sketched out its conceptual formation by looking at the rupture in modern knowledge carried out by Existentialism. By questioning the inside/outside dichotomy, the post-modern subject displaced a key tenet of modern subjectivity, namely, the existence of a universal essence of man which is shared by all individuals. In this, the Existentialist de-centring of the self can be connected to the other five 'great de-centrings'

[1007] Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, p.208. Yet Giddens stops short of drawing the necessary conclusions and evades all implications of the limits of the inner self. Mary Gluck, "Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age History and Theory " *History and Theory* 32, no. 2 (1993): pp.218-19.

[1008] Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), p.82.

[1009] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity." The modern condition, Buber argued, "is characterized by the union of cosmic and social homelessness, dread of the universe and dread of life, resulting in an existential constitution of solitude such as has probably never existed before to the same extent. The human person feels himself to be a man exposed to nature – as an unwanted child is exposed – and at the same time a person isolated in the midst of the tumultuous human world. The first reaction of the spirit of awareness of this new and uncanny position is modern individualism, the second is modern collectivism." Buber explained that "to escape his destiny of solitude" man tries to become "completely embedded in one of the massive modern group formations. The more massive, unbroken and powerful…the more…man is able to feel that he is saved from both forms of homelessness, the social and the cosmic." Buber, *Between Man and Man*, p.241, 42.

mentioned previously.[1010] And in accordance with globalising forces, the Existentialist view of the formation of the self through the 'other' is opening the door to a more fragmented, ever-shifting, and contextually constructed conception of identity and hence to a multiplicity of moral sources.[1011] However, the transformation of moral sources is not heralding a return to the medieval focus on God as the ultimate source of good but remains within an essentially anthropocentric frame of reference. Thus, it does not seem that a straight-forward process of de-secularisation is under way at the level of moral sources. Nevertheless, the simultaneity of globalisation, the de-centring of the subject, and the resurgence of religion seems to point the existence of an indirect connection. Now that the contemporary changes in moral sources have been outlined, I shall explore the nature of this connection.

5) Globalisation and the Return of the Sacred

In the first section, I outlined the main facets of globalisation. I argued that the compression of both space and time led to an increase in interconnections and to the dissolution and endless fragmentation of shared identities. As a result of "the dialectical interplay of the local and the global," societies and individuals are asked to reconstruct and re-actualise their identities in line with the various options offered by globalisation.[1012] While this heralds the spread of insecurity and anxiety, it also facilitates various forms of communal resistance. It seems that at the level of subjectivity, a similar movement is taking place. The de-centring of the sovereign individual is being met by a renewed attraction to communalism. At the risk of generalising, Bauman notes that as the age of self-conscious contingency, post-modernity thus becomes "the age of community: of the lust for community, search for community, invention of community, imagining community."[1013] The ontological dislocation that accompanies globalisation thus calls for the reconstruction of individual and collective identities on the basis of communal resistance and in

[1010] Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity."
[1011] Gebser, *The Ever-Present Origin*. Post-modernity is a cultural condition "where the traditional, the modern and the postmodern coexist, where local, regional and global space qualify the principle of nationality and redefine the context of community." Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* , p.255.
[1012] Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, p.5.
[1013] Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1991), p.134.

relation to selected traumas and glories.[1014] It is in this context that the resurgence of ethnicity, nationalism, or religion should be understood.

The connection between globalisation and the contemporary religious revival is thus non-coincidental. And despite the fact that most religious movements differ in their beliefs and aspirations, their common growth and worldwide appeal largely coincide with the third wave of globalisation and the post-modern turn.[1015] Numerous authors have related millenarianism, religious terrorism, and fundamentalism to the fragmentation, socio-economic marginalisation, and insecurity that accompany globalisation.[1016] It is widely agreed that to escape this condition, people "search for those threads which can give a person a set of ties that place him in the continuity of the dead and the living and those still to be born."[1017] In particular, these post-modern fears that are assailing all individuals are breeding religious movements that strive on the idea that "[t]he individual is to be liberated *from* this individualism *to* the solidarity of either old or new collective structures."[1018] If modernisation is the spreading of the condition of homelessness, then religion "*can be understood as the promise of a new home.*"[1019]

At the heart of this 'Return of the Sacred,' fundamentalism is a form of religion adapted to the loss of foundations and the instability of post-modern life.[1020] As a child of the internal contradictions of late modernity, [1021] religious fundamentalism is attempting to build a new foundation for truth and knowledge according to an alternative "substantive vision for the world."[1022] On the one hand,

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[1014] Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (2004).
[1015] Christian Karner and Alan Aldridge, "Theorizing Religion in a Globalizing World," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 18, no. 1/2 (2004).
[1016] Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, vol. 1, The Fundamentalism Project (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1991). Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad Vs. Mcworld* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996). Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*.
[1017] Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?," p.444.
[1018] Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, *The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), p.175.
[1019] Ibid., p.124.
[1020] Bell, "The Return of the Sacred?," p.444. Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalisation Is Reshaping Our Lives* (London: Profile, 2002), p.34. Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997), p.184.
[1021] Giddens, *Runaway World*, p.49. Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization : The Human Consequences* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p.3.
[1022] Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, p.23. Berger, Berger, and Kellner, *The Homeless Mind*. Frank J. Lechner, "Fundamentalism: Origins and Influence," in *The Search for Fundamentals: The Process of Modernisation and the Quest for Meaning*, ed. Lieteke Van Vucht Tijssen, Jan Berting, and Frank J. Lechner (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern* (London: Faber, 2003). Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*, p.182.

some argue that it is modern in its acceptance of modern technologies, sophisticated means of communication, and in its reliance on 'identity counsellors' and specialists.[1023] Islamic fundamentalism is anti-traditionalist, a-cultural, and often de-embedded.[1024] And on the other, Bauman and Lechner hold that fundamentalism escapes "the agony of the individual condemned to self-sufficiency, self-reliance and the life of never fully satisfying and trustworthy choice" by relying on an alternative form of rationality and by adhering to messages of insufficiency of the individual and of complete submission to the Will of God.[1025] As a result, fundamentalists are no longer besieged by the modern existential anxiety: "They have found the Truth. All they seek is a society solidly based on the Truth."[1026]

Within the field of International Relations, fundamentalism, religious terrorism, and the clash of civilisations have attracted most of the scholarly attention associated with religion. However, it is important to note that fundamentalism is only the tip of an iceberg that is far broader than a simple resistance to modernity or a minor anomaly. By focusing solely on radical religious groups, scholars have overlooked the fact that besides the fundamentalist minority, a large majority of religious women and men are aspiring to create a new space within global modernity. The above depiction of the return of religion as a reaction and an act of resistance has the unfortunate consequence of turning religion into a coping mechanism, an opiate, or a reactive placebo. However, this is only part of the story since religion is also resurging as a consequence of "a profound dissatisfaction with a life encased entirely in the immanent order. The sense is that life is empty, flat, devoid of higher purpose."[1027] Anthony Giddens is right to note that fundamentalism is not just an antithesis or a side effect of globalised modernity but that it carries with it the important message that one cannot live in a disenchanted world where no traces of the sacred remain.[1028] For many, the goal is not to reverse or to reject globalised modernity but to make religion more determinative in the shaping of the 21st

[1023] Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*, p.178. Gray, *Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern*.
[1024] Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*. Olivier Roy, *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: C. Hurst, 2004).
[1025] Bauman, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*, p.182, 83, 85.
[1026] Lechner, "Fundamentalism: Origins and Influence," p.95.
[1027] Taylor, "The Future of the Religious Past," p.216.
[1028] Giddens, *Runaway World*, p.50.

century.[1029] Besides fundamentalism, the return of religion is taking place through the spread of progressive religious movements.

Finally, before concluding, I would like to point to one last connection between the emergence of the new moral source and religion. The impact of globalisation on identity and community formation is largely visible and has now been studied for a decade. However, less attention has been paid to the fact that the de-centred subjectivity that is emerging possesses strong 'spiritual traits' which facilitate the experience of interconnectedness and unity, and opens the door to a more mystical experience of reality.[1030] In *I and Thou*, Martin Buber argues that when man transcends his buffered self and enters into a relation with the 'other,' he enters a spiritual form of association.[1031] Henceforth, by moving away from the sovereign and independent individual, the new source of morality opens up a space propitious to the formation of spiritual associations and thus to the strengthening of 'religion.' Influenced by Buber, Emmanuel Levinas expressly developed this point and argued that the 'other' opens up the way to God. Commenting on Levinas' philosophy, Andrius Valevicius notes that "it is by way of alterity the the [*sic*] realm of the divine is revealed. The relation with God begins in the relation with other men. Over and over, Levinas emphasises the social origin of the human encounter with God."[1032] Considering that etymologically, 'religion' is derived from the Latin *religare* - meaning to bind again, to (re-)connect humans in a community and with God, it could well be that the emerging source of morality will play a role in the return of religion.

6) Conclusion

So far in this chapter, I have outlined the globalising forces at the heart of the 20th century and I have explained their impact on moral sources, subjectivity, and identity. In the first part, I looked at the global dynamics that are leading to a

[1029] Peter F. Beyer, *Religion and Globalization* (London: Sage, 1994), pp.3-4.
[1030] David Ray Griffin, *Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy, and Art* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.6. Joanna Macy, "The Ecological Self: Postmodern Ground for Right Action," in *Sacred Interconnections: Postmodern Spirituality, Political Economy, and Art*, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p.38.
[1031] Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, ed. Walter Arnold Kaufmann (Edinburgh: T. Clark, 1970), p.80, 112.
[1032] Andrius Valevicius, *From the Other to the Totally Other: The Religious Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), p.5.

worldwide increase in existential anxiety and ontological insecurity. I argued that these socio-cultural trends are generating a backlash and a return towards communal arrangements. Second, I looked at the impact of globalisation on moral sources. I traced the philosophical shift that led away from the 'buffered' and sovereign 'self' of the Enlightenment to a more de-embedded and de-centred conception of identity. The process led to the recognition that the 'self' can only exist in relation to the 'Other.' The internalisation of the sources of morality went full circle and ended up in their 'externalisation.' As such, from the modern buffered self, it seems that we could be returning to the 'porous' self of the pre-modern and enchanted world.[1033] In fact, Bauman holds that post-modernity "brings 're-enchantment' of the world after the protracted and earnest, though in the end inconclusive, modern struggle to dis-enchant it."[1034] Legitimacy has been returned to the mysterious and the inexplicable. Finally, I argued that globalisation and the associated societal changes are linked to the resurgence of religion and the spread of fundamentalism.

Steve Bruce recently argued that "unless we can imagine a reversal of the increasing cultural autonomy of the individual, secularization must be seen as irreversible."[1035] In light of the above argument, it does not seem that the cultural autonomy of the individual is being fundamentally overturned. Rather, over the last decades, the 'de-secularisation' or religious resurgence has corresponded to a by-product, to a backlash against the corrosive forces of globalisation. Thus, globalisation has not shown so far to be a de-secularising force.

However, the present situation could prove to be the first stage of a more complex process. Indeed, fundamentalist movements have reconstructed meaning by breaking away "from the institutions of society, and promis[ing] to rebuild from the bottom up, while retrenching themselves in a communal heaven."[1036] But in a second stage, they can potentially move away from resistance and emerge as collective agents of social transformation. In face of the crisis of the state, the development of a theologically-informed social project is a powerful source of change. Recent attempts by governments such as Malaysia to achieve the Islamisation of modernity could be the precursor to a more profound cultural movement or at least part of "a story of

[1033] Taylor, "The Future of the Religious Past," p.181.
[1034] Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p.33. Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, pp.x-xi.
[1035] Steve Bruce, "The Social Process of Secularization," in *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology of Religion*, ed. Richard K. Fenn (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p.262.
[1036] Castells, *The Power of Identity*, p.67.

continual development and formation, constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs of modernity and of distinctively modern institutional patterns, of multiple modernities." [1037] The resurgence of religion could be seen as a comprehensive attempt to develop non-secular forms of modernity.[1038]

Now that the most recent transformations in moral sources have been outlined and that connections have been drawn with the return of religion, we can focus on the second level at which the process of de-secularisation can be observed, namely, in the sphere of legitimacy. Therefore, in the second part of the chapter, I deal with the contemporary changes in legitimate orders and I sketch the current shift away from the ideal of civilisation and the onset of new forms of international legitimacy after the Second World War. I explain that the shift is leading to the weakening of secularism and to the accentuation of religious concerns. However, I conclude that the religious revival is only a by-product of globalisation.

[1037] S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of 'Multiple Modernities'," *Millennium* 29, no. 3 (2000): p.592. Willfried Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," *Current Sociology* 51, no. 3/4 (2003).
[1038] S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Resurgence of Religious Movements in Processes of Globalisation - Beyond End of History or Clash of Civilisations," *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 2, no. 1 (2000).

B. Legitimacy After the Two World Wars

> We no longer believe…like the Greeks, in happiness of life on earth;
> we no longer believe, like the Christians, in happiness in an otherworldly life;
> we no longer believe, like the optimistic philosophers of the last century,
> in a happy future for the human race.
>
> *Benedetto Croce*

In *Nationalism and International Society*, James Mayall explains that over the last centuries the Enlightenment notion of the self played a central role in the establishment of the concepts of nationalism and self-determination in the foundation of international politics. The 'discovery' of the sovereign subject seized "the imagination of society at large" and then influenced the organisation of international society.[1039] Mayall concludes his monograph by stating that at the turn of the 21st century "[i]t is difficult to see the lineaments of some more satisfactory principle of state legitimisation emerging in the future."[1040] We should not "look for our salvation to some miraculous or mechanical supersession of the national idea" but should instead accept the fact that the national principle is likely to remain deeply entrenched in the workings of the international society for the foreseeable future. [1041]

In light of my account of the transformations of the 'Enlightenment subject' in the late 20th century, it seems legitimate to question this conclusion. Thus, we could well wonder whether globalising forces and the emergence of the 'post-modern subject' are connected to the emergence of a 'post-national' or 'de-centred' legitimate order. [1042] Since our condition of post-modernity is one in which transformations in self-identity and globalisation are inter-related, we could expect to see a decentring of power at the international level similar to that which characterises the post-modern subject, i.e., interdependence, shift in loyalty towards transnational organisations and associations, global institutions, minority nations etc.[1043] Indeed, it seems that the

[1039] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, p.38. Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security," p.758.
[1040] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, p.150.
[1041] Ibid., p.150, 51.
[1042] Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, ed. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). Castells, *The Power of Identity*.
[1043] For Giddens "[c]hanges in intimate aspects of personal life…are directly tied to the establishment of social connections of very wide scope…the level of time-space distanciation introduced by high modernity is so extensive that, for the first time in human history, 'self' and 'society' are interrelated in

recent "emphasis on the decentred subject has had a corrosive influence…on the imagined sovereign will of the nation…and the effectiveness of the national state."[1044] Knowing that the advent of the state and nationalism was central to the secularisation of Europe, its questioning might be connected to the process of de-secularisation.[1045]

Hence, the second part of this chapter is devoted to the study of the principles of legitimacy that are emerging in connection to the post-modern turn and globalisation. In the following sections, I address this issue of changes in legitimacy by looking at the reconsideration of the civilising international order that had spread globally in the wake of the Enlightenment. In particular, I look at the challenges mounted against its colonial expression through the 'revolt against Western dominance.' This is justified by the fact that the anti-colonial struggle marked "a sea change in international legitimacy."[1046] As Robert Jackson argues "[t]here is no better place to look for changing norms and assumptions about sovereign statehood, therefore, than in the sphere of decolonization." [1047] I argue that the challenge to the civilising mission and the revolt against the West heralded a shift in the international legal and moral climate that saw the challenge to the secular foundation of the state and the resurgence of ethno-religious forms of identities.[1048] For Scott Thomas, the roots of the resurgence of religion, at least in the Third World, are also found in the colonial era and the dissolution of colonial empires during the 20th century.[1049]

1) The Decline of Civilisation

In the 19th century, the Enlightenment project of civilisation faced a growing front of critiques. In opposition to the then new faith in historical progress, many thinkers began to cast a shadow of doubt over the West's ability to transcend itself and to solve its problems through the use of reason, technology, and science. Both

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a global milieu." Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, p.32. John Tomlinson, *Globalization and Culture* (Oxford: Polity, 1999), p.1.
[1044] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* , p.61, 62.
[1045] Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*.
[1046] Jackson, *Quasi-States*, p.83.
[1047] Ibid., p.82.
[1048] Richard A. Falk, *Religion and Humane Global Governance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001).
[1049] Scott Thomas, "Religion and International Society," in *Religion, Globalization and Political Culture in the Third World*, ed. Jeff Haynes (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), p.33.

Romantic and non-Romantic thinkers began to question the foundation of modernity. In their diagnostic of its failures these thinkers came to delineate the coming decline of civilisation in Europe.[1050] Despite the great technological, industrial, and scientific discoveries, the creation of incredible wealth, and the increasing freedom from material necessity, the ideal of civilisation lost much of its aura of sanctity.[1051] The outbreak of "The Great War for Civilization" exposed the inability of the civilising project to tame the predispositions of men and in the 20th century, the ideal of progress was "finally revealed to be a hollow one."[1052]

The change of mood in Europe and the 'crisis of modernity' were mirrored by a sharp fall in the prestige Westerners enjoyed among colonised people. The war had destroyed all ideals of moral, spiritual, and racial superiority. And as Freud argued, it had become obvious that the Europeans had "never really rose as high as [they] had believed."[1053] The horror of the trenches and the massacres of millions

> made a mockery of the European conceit that discovery and invention were necessarily progressive and beneficial to humanity…Years of carnage in the very heartlands of European civilization demonstrated that Europeans were at least as susceptible to instinctual, irrational responses and primeval drives as the peoples they colonized.[1054]

At home and abroad, thinkers concluded that reason and hopes in scientific progress were the direct sources of the war. The mechanised slaughter of Europe's youth was a reminder of how far astray the West had moved away from the spiritual and moral ideals of the Enlightenment. The material facet of 'civilisation' had completely overwhelmed and replaced the spiritual quest it was meant to foster.[1055]

The idea quickly spread among Western and Western-educated intellectuals that a civilisation guilty of such atrocities could not claim to govern and control the fate of the rest of humanity. As a matter of fact, "[t]he crisis of the West and the appalling flaws in Western civilization that it revealed did much to break the psychological bondage of the colonized elite…World War I provided myriad

[1050] Arthur Herman, *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (London: Free Press, 1997).
[1051] As will be argued in subsequent sections, the idea of civilisation never completely disappeared. After all, it underlined the American approach to the Soviet Union and remains part of the rhetoric of the War against Terror.
[1052] Gianni Vattimo, *The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1988), pp.7-8.
[1053] Sigmund Freud, *Reflections on War and Death* (New York: Moffat Yard, 1918), p.30.
[1054] Michael Adas, "Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission Ideology," *Journal of World History* 15, no. 1 (2004): p.41.
[1055] Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*.

openings for the reassertion of colonized cultures."[1056] In the following decades, the anti-colonial discourse unfolded and came to contribute to the revolt against the imperialist order. The Great Depression of 1929 and the Second World War only strengthened the colonies in their struggle for self-determination. The colonisation of numerous countries in the name of racial, moral, and spiritual superiority came to a halt and the process was slowly reversed. The crumbling of the civilising mission and the downfall of 'civilisation' as the operational basis of the international order marked a major revolution in sovereignty comparable to the one that had followed the Protestant Reformation.[1057]

2) Decolonisation and the Revolt Against the West

With the loss of confidence in the ideal of 'civilisation' and with the growing discontent of colonised people, the civilising international legitimate order came under increasing challenge. As Hedley Bull argues, "[a]fter the Second World War a revolt against Western dominance – a revolt which had been growing in strength earlier in the century, and whose roots lay late in the last century – became powerful enough to shake the system."[1058] The revolt was reformist in essence and never challenged international society itself. It was mostly directed to those rules that had been made by, but also *for*, the European states and that had come to apply to all units of the expanded international society.[1059] Amongst the demands of colonised people, five themes were predominant: equal sovereignty, formal political independence, racial equality, economic justice, and cultural liberation.[1060]

Three 'waves of revolt' can be identified at the heart of this revolt against Western dominance.[1061] First, the anti-colonial struggle for independence and equal sovereignty from the 1930s until the 1960s; second, the struggle against neo-colonial and indirect domination in the form of economic injustice from the 1960s to the 1980s; and third, the "protest against the intellectual and cultural ascendency of the West"

[1056] Adas, "Contested Hegemony," p.63. Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, pp.164-67.
[1057] Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty*.
[1058] Hedley Bull, "The Revolt against the West," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.217.
[1059] Ibid.
[1060] Ibid., pp.220-22.
[1061] Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," p.817.

and for liberation "in matters of the spirit of the mind."[1062] By the end of the decolonisation process, Third World countries had accomplished most of their objectives including independence and sovereign equality.[1063]

During their colonial struggle, speaking as "suppliants in a world in which the Western powers were still in a dominant position," Third World countries had taken "Western moral premises as their point of departure."[1064] In turn, they were encouraged to justify their demands "in terms of constitutions, charters of rights and international conventions of which the Western powers were the principal authors; the moral appeal had to be cast in the terms that would have most resonance in Western societies."[1065] Paradoxically enough, by adopting European ideas of nationhood and self-determination, ex-colonies were brought "into the orthodox system of diplomacy and statehood."[1066] However,

> as Asian, African and other non-Western peoples have become stronger relative to the Western powers, as they have come to depend less on demonstrating conformity with the ideas of their former masters, and as the Westernized leaders of the early years of independence have been replaced in many countries by new leaders more representative of local or indigenous forces, Third World spokesmen have become freer to adopt a different rhetoric that sets Western values aside, or at least places different interpretations upon them.[1067]

Strengthened by the failure of secular ideologies such as Marxism or nationalism as well as by the disappointments of economic development, this psychological and spiritual awakening of non-Western countries has led an increasing number of Third World states to replace their project to modernise with attempts to 'indigenise' modernity.[1068]

Leaders have begun to look at their past to find the right guidelines for the recovery of the lost autonomy and success. They have tried to re-affirm, amongst

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[1062] Hedley Bull, "Justice in International Relations: The 1983 Hagey Lectures (1984)," in *Hedley Bull on International Society*, ed. Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p.212, 30.
[1063] Ibid., pp.234-35.
[1064] Ibid., p.213, 12.
[1065] Ibid., p.213.
[1066] Ian Brownlie, "The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law of Nations," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.364-65. Similarly, "like the colonialists, the leaders of the anti-colonial movement have been committed to the idea of modernization or development." Bull, "Justice in International Relations," p.232. Also, see page 243.
[1067] Bull, "Justice in International Relations," p.213.
[1068] Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," p.818.

other things, "traditional religious beliefs as ultimate norm-setting principles of identity and culture."[1069] In the case of the Middle East, "since the glory of the past is forever associated with Islam, it is the road back to the Koran that is being fervently sought not only in the Near East but throughout the commonwealth of *c.* 600million believers."[1070]

Nowadays, the idea of cultural liberation from "the intellectual or spiritual suzerainty of the West" is closely connected to globalisation and to the resurgence of religion.[1071] Unlike the previous revolts of the mid-20th century, this third wave does not so much draw on Enlightenment and Western ideas of self-determination, sovereignty, and international law as on traditional values which are not necessarily compatible with the moral ideals of the West.[1072] As Bassam Tibi argues in the case of Islamic fundamentalism, this new revolt is "directed against Western norms and values." [1073] By "drawing upon homegrown values to ward off the West… [fundamentalism] is nothing short of an effort to de-center the West; it mobilizes anti-Western attitudes and prejudices while developing alternative worldviews."[1074] In opposition to the anti-colonial revolt, Islamic fundamentalism advocates a major change in forms of legitimacy and pushes for the acceptance of a new 'ideology of order' based on a theo-centric universalism as opposed to secular national sovereignty.[1075] Of course, this fundamentalist challenge remains the work of a minority and overall the rules and norms of the Western international system remain widely accepted. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that various international actors have recently attempted to re-direct and reshape the international society and that their demands need to be addressed.[1076] Now that the challenge to the civilising order and the psychological and spiritual awakening of non-Western countries have been outlined, I turn to the ensuing shift in legitimate order post-1945.

[1069] Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society*, p.117.
[1070] Adda B. Bozeman, "The International Order in a Multicultural World," in *The Expansion of International Society*, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.401. Nowadays, the Muslim population is around 1.4 billion.
[1071] Bull, "Justice in International Relations," pp.232-33. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously," p.817. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, p.89. Bull and Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society*, p.428.
[1072] Bull, "Justice in International Relations," p.213. ———, "The Revolt against the West," p.223.
[1073] Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, p.179.
[1074] Ibid., p.89, 179.
[1075] Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?* , p.30. Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, p.121.
[1076] Bull, "Justice in International Relations."

This will allow me to assess the reality of the de-secularisation process in the realm of international legitimacy.

3) Beyond Civilisation, Human Rights and Self-Determination

During the 20th century, and as a result of the decolonisation process, there occurred a profound transformation of the international normative atmosphere marked by the reconsideration of the civilising legitimate order and its adaptation to the post-colonial reality. According to the orthodox positivist view, the ideal of civilisation was replaced by that of self-determination and equal sovereignty. Effectively, changes in legitimacy meant that a "contemporary global system of 'sovereign' states has emerged out of an earlier Eurocentric system of 'civilized' and before that 'Christian' states." [1077] This transformation being fundamental for the architecture of the international order, it deserves to be further scrutinised.

In *The Moral Purpose of the State*, Christian Reus-Smit explains that "[u]nless embedded within a wider complex of higher-order values, the principle of sovereignty cannot alone provide the state with a coherent social identity."[1078] For sovereignty to have any substance, it must necessarily embody deeper meta-values, i.e., the moral purpose of the state. [1079] As such, while positivists are essentially right in their emphasis on the continuity of the states-system and on the transformation of the Christian system into a civilising order, I believe that their focus on sovereignty is incomplete since it fails to embody any such meta-values and to fully grasp the substantive nature of the emerging normative context.

In turn, some scholars have claimed that civilising ideals remain very much alive underneath the superficial adherence to the 'sovereign' order. As Jackson explains, "[e]ven though 'sovereign state' has replaced 'civilized state' the idea of 'civilization' has not been and cannot be abandoned...The old 'standard of

[1077] Jackson, *Quasi-States*, p.79. Jackson is not himself an orthodox positivist but he seems to share a similar understanding of the transition in legitimacy. p.143. However, in *The Global Covenant*, he seems to have dropped the 'civilised state' and only outlines the shift from Christianity to pluralist sovereignty. ———, *The Global Covenant* pp.156-69.
[1078] Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State*, p.29.
[1079] Ibid.

civilization' still exists, but is expressed differently today."[1080] For example, Gerrit Gong, David Fidler, Edward Keene, and Jack Donelly argue that the standard remains present in the notions of human rights, non-discrimination, development, liberalisation of markets, or good governance.[1081] However, this interpretation of the return to the standard of civilisation in the guise of a 'standard of human rights,' a 'standard of non-discrimination,' or a 'standard of democracy,' though essentially correct, over-emphasises the necessary continuity between legitimate orders.

Instead, it seems that out of the rethinking of the 'standard of civilisation' have (re-)emerged two sets of legitimating principles: ideas of national self-determination and cosmopolitan ideas of humanity and human rights. As Roland Robertson noted

> The standard of 'civilization' reached its zenith during the 1920s as an essentially regulative principle concerning inter-state relations. Two things need to be said immediately about its demise. First, the standard appears to have been modified into the principle of national self-determination…Second, the emergence of the relatively autonomous principles of humanity, human rights and so on can be traced to the period when the standard of civilization was in its most explicit phase in the early years of this century.[1082]

Ian Clark concurs that these ideals of (democratic) self-determination and human rights have been "important bedrocks of post-1945 international society as a whole."[1083]

As mentioned in the previous section, the idea of national self-determination was enthusiastically embraced by newly-independent countries and corresponds to a large extent to the shift from civilised to sovereign statehood mapped out by orthodox positivists. However, Bull remarked that

> the norms proclaimed by the political organs of the United Nations represent a profound change that has taken place in our legal and moral thinking about matters of international relations, in great contrast to the orthodoxies that were accepted on these matters only

[1080] Jackson, *Quasi-States*, p.143. While this line of argument seems to be sustained by Jackson in *Quasi-States*, a different view is developed in *The Global Covenant*. The notion of civilisation is barely mentioned and greater emphasis is put on a pluralist conception of sovereignty. ———, *The Global Covenant* pp.156-82.
[1081] Gong, *The Standard Of "Civilization" In International Society*, pp.90-92. Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?," *International Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1998). David P. Fidler, "The Return of the Standard of Civilization," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 2(2001). Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society*, pp.9-10.
[1082] Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), pp.121-22. The language of 'rogue states,' 'axis of evil,' 'failed states,' etc., seems to be a remnant of the civilising discourse and has also spread in the last decade.
[1083] Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society*, p.188.

> a few decades ago, and strengthening the assault on the old order.[1084]

Besides self-determination, a "Kantian image of a cosmopolitan world society…has made considerable headway in recent decades."[1085] In a dramatic break with the civilised order, "the post-World War II order was explicitly built upon the normative foundation of human dignity and human rights."[1086] Cosmopolitan ideals and liberal values gained greater recognition with an "emerging sense of a world common good" and "the growth of a cosmopolitan moral awareness."[1087] As Andrew Hurrell rightly noted, this transformation has seen the increase in concern with issues of human suffering and the consolidation of a stable normative structure based on a shared culture, language, and vocabulary of human rights.[1088]

While the institution of a cosmopolitan order is clearly not on the agenda or even close to being realised, the normative movement must be taken seriously to the extent that it seems to be part of broader socio-cultural transformations.[1089] It is true that the 'community of mankind' is only a moral vision and "that we are still living in a political world in which states continue to be the primary normative units and referents."[1090] But this does not mean that the aims and values that inform the system remain immobile. The lasting presence of states worldwide should not keep us from considering the socio-cultural trends at play nowadays and the 'real change' that has "taken place in the normative structure of international society."[1091]

This transformation at the level of legitimacy is very much connected to what Richard Falk calls the 'Grotian Moment.' According to Falk, we are witnessing "a reversal of the shift completed in the middle of the seventeenth century, by which time Medieval Europe had given way to the modern state system."[1092] The current 'Grotian Moment,' he explains, corresponds to this gradual transition in world order systems away from statist arrangements and back towards non-territorial central

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[1084] Bull, "Justice in International Relations," p.242.
[1085] Jackson, *Quasi-States*, p.144.
[1086] Samuel K. Murumba, "Grappling with a Grotian Moment: Sovereignty and the Quest for a Normative World Order," *Brooklyn Journal of International Law* 19, no. 3 (1993): p.839.
[1087] Bull, "Justice in International Relations," p.222, 21.
[1088] Andrew Hurrell, *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.162-63.
[1089] Ibid., p.9.
[1090] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.112.
[1091] Hurrell, *On Global Order*, p.162.
[1092] Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," p.653.

guidance and supranationalism.[1093] The Princeton professor notes that there is a normative tension between: (1) a long-standing and waning state-centred form of politics premised on sovereign consent (Westphalian conception) and (2) an emerging and still vague form of politics centred on the community and premised on the existence of a unified mankind (UN Charter conception). Or in other words, the current situation is characterised by the emergence of 'community-oriented' forms of authority at the expense of 'sovereignty-oriented' ones.[1094]

The reality of this Grotian Moment has been criticised by many scholars but what is certain is that the contemporary transformations in the sphere of legitimacy do not point to the unfolding of a de-secularisation process and it is now possible to conclude that a reversal of legitimate order in a religious direction is unlikely. To the extent that the onset of a neo-medieval 'system of overlapping sovereignties and multiple loyalties' is taking place, it is modern and secular.[1095] These changes in international legitimacy are not challenging the secular foundation of international politics since principles of human rights and self-determination remain mostly within a liberal political framework. In this context, it is more likely that the renewed vigour of religious movements also corresponds to a by-product of these changes that have taken place in the realm of legitimacy. In the following section, I return to the process of globalisation and to its implications regarding the legitimacy of state sovereignty. Because the state has been a major secularising force in history, the study of its questioning in recent decades may yield important insights concerning the current religio-cultural trends. It is only in the final section of this chapter that I will connect the above changes in legitimate order to the resurgence of religion. There has been a tendency to assume that secular ideologies such as nationalism would flourish as part of the Grotian Moment but most unexpectedly religious transnational movements have also spread.

[1093] ———, "The Grotian Quest," p.40. ———, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," p.653.

[1094] Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order," in *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective*, ed. Richard A. Falk, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, *Studies on a Just World Order ; No. 2* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p.123.

[1095] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1995), p.245.

4) Globalisation, the State, and Secularism

The impact of globalisation on the international order has been widely debated from the 1990s onwards. In particular, the fate of the state has been a matter of concern for students of international relations. Numerous commentators have argued that as space and time are contracting, the territorial dimension of states is being challenged, thereby giving way to supra-territoriality. Sovereignty defined as the exercise of ultimate, absolute, and singular control over a country and its territory is no longer dominant both in practice and ideationally.[1096] On the one hand, economic, financial, and commercial fluxes are transcending the boundaries of all states and thus profoundly questioning their sovereignty – at least commercially and economically. And on the other, the spread of shared identities through transnational networks is loosening the affective loyalty required for the exercise of sovereignty and hence facilitating claims to self-determination by sub-national and supra-national groups.[1097] Likewise, global issues such as ecological crises or genocides are increasingly holding greater value than state sovereignty in the eyes of many.[1098] Overall, the pervasiveness of globalisation means that the 'essential nature of the state itself' is being transformed.[1099]

Numerous scholars have explained the ways in which the revolution in information technology and the changes in consciousness are undermining the sovereign statehood inherited from Westphalia. In *The End of Sovereignty?* Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk have demonstrated that the new post-modern perspectives, along with the rapid structural changes brought about by globalisation, have resulted in a major shift that has had "significant implications for the enduring legitimacy of…the sovereign nation-state."[1100] Indeed, as the result of cultural changes the political space is being redefined and civil society is being reconceptualised. Central to this gradual transition towards a new polity are two tendencies: "the reassertion of cultural identity and acceptance of cultural pluralism as an organizing principle of national and international life…Particularism and globalism are likely to flourish side

[1096] Scholte, *Globalization* p.136.
[1097] Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State* (London: Routledge,2003).
[1098] Scholte, *Globalization* p.137.
[1099] Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.8.
[1100] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* , p.58.

by side in uneasy coexistence."[1101] On the one hand, there is a movement towards the self-determination of nations which strengthens the state-system but also facilitates the formation of local communities based on tradition, religion, and indigenous identities.[1102] And on the other hand, one can see signs of the emergence of a 'thicker' international society based on a universal and democratic community of mankind and on a global consciousness that looks at "the world as a whole."[1103]

The issue is hotly contested but most authors agree that states are gradually being consigned to an intermediate role in the midst of increasingly powerful local, regional, transnational, and global actors. While claims of the retreat, expropriation, or extinction of the state are clearly over-stated, it is true that governance is becoming less territorial, more multi-layered, and that sovereignty is acquiring different dynamics and underpinnings.[1104] States remain central, but their role is evolving and sovereignty is transforming.[1105] Andrew Linklater has demonstrated that as a result of globalisation and cultural liberation, amongst other factors, political communities are undergoing transformations in a post-Westphalian direction.[1106] Likewise, Georg Sørensen outlines the emergence of a postmodern state 'sandwiched' in a system of multi-level governance in which collective identities and loyalties are increasingly projected beyond the state - onto local, transnational, international, trans-governmental, or supranational actors.[1107]

Whether a post-Westphalian order is emerging is a matter of debate but what seems definite is that under conditions of globalisation, loyalty and legitimacy are shifting away from nation-states in two directions, "toward the center of the globe and toward the local realities of community and sentiment."[1108] In such a context,

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[1101] Ibid., p.255.
[1102] Roland Robertson and JoAnn Chirico, "Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration," *Sociological Analysis* 46, no. 3 (1985). Roland Robertson, "A New Perspective on Religion and Secularization in the Global Context," in *Secularization and Fundamentalism Reconsidered*, ed. Jeffrey Hadden and Anson Shupe (New York: Paragon House, 1989).
[1103] Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* , p.65. Kumar, *From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society*, p.193. Hurrell, *On Global Order*. Mazlish, *The New Global History*.
[1104] Scholte, *Globalization* p.22. Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Bauman, *Globalization : The Human Consequences*, p.65. L. Ali Khan, *The Extinction of Nation-States : A World without Borders* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996).
[1105] Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory*.
[1106] Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community : Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Oxford: Polity, 1998).
[1107] Ibid. Georg Sørensen, *The Transformation of the State : Beyond the Myth of Retreat* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.162.
[1108] Falk, "A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals," p.690.

knowing that the state has been the repository and cornerstone of international secularism since the Treaty of Westphalia, it is important to look at the impact the current dynamics may have had on the secular foundation of international politics. Indeed, the religious resurgence seems to be directly connected to the "exhaustion of the creative capacity of the secular sensibility, especially as it is embodied in the political domain."[1109]

In *Religion and Humane Global Governance* Falk explains that the rise to prominence of secular forms of polities was directly connected to the birth of the state and to the shattering of the central guidance of the papal Church and that ever since, the 'secular' has remained closely tied to the state. Therefore, in an age in which "the secular imagination is dependent upon the problem-solving capacities of the state," he concludes that the questioning of the state is facilitating the return of religion.[1110] For example, the secular tradition at the heart of the French state is coming under increasing challenge from a variety of international organisations. As state sovereignty is devolved or delegated, French *laïcité* is being questioned by the European Union, transnational groups, minorities, various states, etc.[1111] While France clearly remains sovereign in this respect, it is undeniable that pressure is mounting as can be witnessed in the recent issue of the headscarf, the establishment of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, the call of its president for a moratorium on the 1905 law on the separation of church and state, Nicolas Sarkozy's numerous speeches on religion in Rome, Ryad, and Paris, or the recognition of the degrees delivered by the Vatican.

Secularism can also be weakened by the erosion of state loyalty in favour of various transnational allegiances. To accommodate migrant populations, secular countries are growing increasingly sensitive to religion and are sometimes adapting their secularism as is attested by the establishment of Sharia tribunals in Great Britain. State-based secularism is also challenged by the growing legitimacy of supra-national institutions. For example, the policies pursued by Turkey's secularist elites and the

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[1109] _____, *Religion and Humane Global Governance*, p.26.

[1110] Ibid., p.28.

[1111] Zucca, "The Crisis of the Secular State - a Reply to Professor Sajo." Zucca argues that "Supranational pressures increasingly reveal that the state is no longer the best form of organization for our societies. The struggle for the soul of Europe has moved from the level of the state to the European level. Hence the heated debate provoked by the reference to Christian values in the European constitution." In this context he holds that "[r]eligion's revival is not a disease but simply a symptom of the crisis confronting the secular state. Religion understands that the next challenge is not at the level of the state but at another level." p.500.

restrictions they have imposed on Islamist movements are considered by many to be even greater impediments to the country's membership to the European Union than Islamism.[1112]

Finally, besides these indirect connections between globalisation, the loss of influence of state-based secularism, and the resurgence of religion, the changes in legitimate orders underway are paving the way for the return of faith on two additional counts. In the last section of this chapter, I look at the connection between globalisation, decolonisation, and the return to traditional collective identities. I argue that by displacing legitimacy to various supra-national and local groups, globalisation is participating in the religious revival by creating spaces for alternative forms of modernities.

5) Globalisation and the Return of the Sacred

In the political sphere, it is widely accepted that the religious revival came as a reaction to the failures of the civilising order imposed by colonial powers and of the secular states in Third World countries – i.e., one phase of the revolt against the West.[1113] The erosive and corrosive nature of modernity "generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer."[1114] As "a global myth capable of providing a foundation for the construction of an identity," religion can assume "the cultural form of resistance to the instrumental rationality of the apparatus of domination."[1115] It has become usual to argue that religion offers powerful solutions to the challenges of modernity and to the concomitant destructions of communities and traditional meaning systems. In our globalising world, one can see pervasive efforts to retrieve indigenous identities and "to reach back in cultural history past the

[1112] Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe, *Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues* (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.11-12.
[1113] Jürgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p.115.
[1114] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp.75-76.
[1115] Alberto Melucci quoted in Camilleri and Falk, *The End of Sovereignty?* , p.216.

experiences of modernity and forward beyond the constraints of nationalism, statism, and a Western conception of progress and fulfilment."[1116]

But besides this view of the revival as a reaction to modernity and to the compression of the inter-societal system, it seems that the resurgence is also fostered by the rise of supra-territoriality.[1117] In *The Declining World Order*, Falk argues that under the impulse of globalisation the international sphere is the theatre of a twofold movement

> a nostalgic return to small local communities premised on high degrees of integration, perhaps epitomized by premodern images of self-determination and social cohesion affirmed by many representatives of indigenous or traditional peoples; and an evolution toward encompassing functional communities that were premised on low degrees of integration, but looked toward the emergence of a planetary polity in some form that sustained peace and stability.[1118]

And I believe that the sources of the religious revival are also to be found in the second part of this movement. Besides resistance to modernity, the religious revivalism seems to be encouraged by "expectation of identity declaration" built into globalised and cosmopolitan forms of organisation.[1119]

As Robertson and Chirico argue, universalistic tendencies and the realisation of the global-human condition through new forms of supra-nationalism seem to "accentuate or at least open-up religious or quasi-religious concerns." [1120] The implications of globalisation for both "the legitimacy of *the world order of societies* and *the meaning of what mankind* '*really is,*'" raise questions and issues of a religious nature at the global level.[1121] As a result, "religious movements arise in reference to the issue of defining societies in relationship to the rest of the world."[1122] The net effects of the global integration and of the return to cultural memory, Tibi argues, "underlie the rise of religious fundamentalisms worldwide."[1123]

[1116] Falk, *Religion and Humane Global Governance*, p.9.
[1117] Scholte, *Globalization* p.202. Shad seems to connect the religious revival to the world becoming 'a single place. Quoted in Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p.67.
[1118] Richard A. Falk, *The Declining World Order* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.14.
[1119] Robertson, *Globalization* pp.174-75.
[1120] Robertson and Chirico, "Humanity, Globalization, and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration," p.238, 39.
[1121] Ibid.
[1122] Robertson, *Globalization* p.69.
[1123] Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, p.3.

Ultimately, the combination of resistance to secular modernity and this opening of telic concerns paves the way for the development of multiple modernities. For Eisenstadt, the increased global interconnectedness and the restructuration of the nation-state model are "*allowing for new interpretations of the cultural programme of modernity as it has developed in Western Europe*" and are thus facilitating the emergence of fundamentalist and communal-religious movements.[1124] As Willfried Spohn argues, "the contemporary global rise of nationalism and religion…[is] a reaction to the previous authoritarian imposition of the Western European model of state secularism."[1125] And through this global attempt to refashion the secular and redraw its boundaries, religion is resurging.[1126]

Overall, the globalisation is facilitating the return of religion in various ways. But besides the reaction to modernity, the response to colonial imperialism, and the challenge to state-based secularism, it does not seem that the emerging order possesses an inherently religious dimension. The religious revival corresponds to a by-product of global and local circumstances rather than the result of a comprehensive shift towards faith-based structures of consciousness. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a fundamental and profound process of de-secularisation, globalisation and the revolt against the West are questioning the very nature of the international order. The current wave of cultural liberation is highlighting the limits of the secular international architecture, thereby calling forth the transformation of international relations in a post-secular direction.

[1124] Eisenstadt, "The Resurgence of Religious Movements in Processes of Globalisation - Beyond End of History or Clash of Civilisations," p.4. This is not to justify the validity of all fundamentalist worldviews or ideas. The variety of expressions of modernity should not stop us from questioning the evangelical denial of Darwin's theory of evolution and the comforting images of the place of man in the universe associated with it.
[1125] Spohn, "Multiple Modernity, Nationalism and Religion: A Global Perspective," p.281.
[1126] Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*.

Conclusion:

Man's extremity is God's opportunity

During the 20th century, scholars of structures of consciousness predicted the onset of a major period of socio-cultural upheaval and the return of religion. The aim of this chapter was thus to assess the possibility of a process of 'de-secularisation' in the 21st century and to consider its potential implications for the secular foundation of international politics. I proceeded in accordance with the theoretical framework developed in chapter three and focused my attention on the most recent transformations in moral sources and structures of legitimacy.

In the first part of the chapter, I argued that processes of globalisation are challenging the modern moral sources and facilitating the emergence of a new sense of identity propitious to the return of religion. In the late 20th century, Sartre, Buber, and others moved beyond the Book of Reason by demonstrating that man can only exist in relation to his environment. In opposition to the conception of the self as a sovereign and buffered individual endowed of reason, social theorists from diverse traditions de-centred the subject and demonstrated the fluidity and instability of subjectivity. In the international sphere, I explained that the existential anxiety and ontological insecurity associated with this post-modern turn are related to a renewed interest in communal resistance and more specifically to the religious revival.[1127] I concluded that the changes outlined by Nelson and Sorokin are not taking place and that the return of religion has only been, up until now, a by-product and a reaction to globalising forces. However, the situation could change in the near future with religion playing a greater role in the development of alternative forms of modernity.

In the second part of the chapter, I focused on the second level at which the process of de-secularisation should be observed if it were to take place, namely, the level of legitimacy. I dealt with the contemporary changes in legitimate orders and I sketched out the shift away from civilisation and towards notions of self-determination and human rights after the Second World War. I explained that the emerging legitimate order is not inherently religious and that under the impulse of globalising forces, the religious resurgence springs from the shift in loyalty and

[1127] One could say that in face of the homeless condition of modern man, people are 'homing' and are looking for a reliable foundation to their existence.

legitimacy away from nation-states up towards supra-national institutions and down toward local communities and traditional bonds. I argued that the shift is leading to the weakening of state secularism, to the accentuation of religious concerns, and to the emergence of multiple modernities.

Already at the beginning of the century, Max Weber was wondering whether "entirely new prophets or a mighty rebirth of ancient ideas" would come out of the iron cage of modern civilisation; or whether it would ultimately decline and disappear when "the last ton of fossil fuel has burnt to ashes."[1128] In this new century, the prophetic words with which Weber concluded the *Protestant Ethic* could not be more relevant. In light of the argument developed in this chapter, the issue remains essentially undecided. Identities and groups based on religion are resisting global forces all around the planet. But if the resurgence of religion is to become a defining trait in the 21st century, the key issue becomes the development of comprehensive ethics of conviction to achieve the transformation of social structures. And so far this has only taken place to a very limited extent through localised attempts to re-Christianise or re-Islamise selected sectors of societies. Nevertheless, even though a process of de-secularisation is only happening in a restricted sense, it is important to note that the revolt against Western dominance is calling for the reform of international arrangements in a post-secular direction.

Now that the processes of secularisation and de-secularisation have been explored up until the 21st century, it is possible to conclude the thesis by answering the two research questions set in the introduction. In the following chapter, I begin by summarising the argument developed throughout the thesis regarding the impact of secularisation on the secular foundation of international politics (first research question). Then, in light of the theological roots and nature of contemporary politics and because of the renewed influence of religion in world politics, I argue that the secular foundation of international relations cannot be sustained post 9/11 (second research question). Since secularism is neither objective nor neutral, the international order it legitimises is no longer warranted. Instead, if International Politics is to account for the continued existence of religion within modernity, it must reconsider its secularism. For the sake of pluralism, International Relations must open itself to a post-secular dialogue with religion.

[1128] Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, pp.123-24.

8. Conclusion: Towards Post-Secular Pluralism

‘Occidental Rationalism’ now appears to be the actual deviation.

Jürgen Habermas

During the 20th century, the global resurgence of religion came as a great surprise because of the widespread acceptance, amongst Western elites, of the secularisation and modernisation theses. In particular, this return flew in the face of a Westphalian system which upheld secular politics as the most peaceful, stable, and universal foundation for international relations. The aim of this thesis has thus been to interrogate the secular dimension of the contemporary foundation of international politics as well as the avowed secularism of the field. It has been about reconsidering, in light of the return of religion, the beliefs and assumptions that shape IR’s historical foresight so that the discipline may transcend its ‘own theoretical captivities’ and develop more adequate ‘horizons of expectations.’[1129]

The thesis was framed by the following two research questions: (1) What has been the impact of the secularisation process on the foundation of international politics? (2) Is the contemporary foundation sustainable in the 21st century? In the previous chapters, I answered the first question by exposing the theological origins and character of the ideas, beliefs, and assumptions that have lain at the foundation of the so-called ‘secular’ project. In turn, the argument has highlighted the fact that secularism’s overconfidence in its own neutrality and objectivity may be a threat to the preservation of peace and security.

Therefore, the aim of this last chapter is to answer the second research question and to assess the adequacy and sustainability of the secular order in the 21st century. In the first section, I summarise the findings of the previous chapters and I argue that, broadly speaking, the project to bring about peace and security by

[1129] Toulmin, *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity*, p.3. Petito and Hatzopoulos, *Religion in International Relations*, p. 3.

excluding religion from international relations is oblivious to its own theological character and indifferent to the current cultural trends.

In the second section, I consider the implications of this conclusion for the secularist heritage at the core of the current pluralist international order. Debates over the nature and historical development of the world order have been central to the field of International Relations and in particular to the English School. And nowadays, it is broadly accepted that we live in a mostly pluralist society of states in which the minimalist arrangements in place allow states to pursue freely and independently their chosen goals without fear for their territorial integrity or sovereignty.[1130] As the most representative and explicit outline of the secularist assumptions at the heart of pluralism and of much theorising in IR, Robert Jackson's *Global Covenant* is the starting point for our discussion. While the Boston professor remains convinced of their contemporary relevance, I explain that the secularist postulates embedded within the global covenant are compromising the pluralist attempt to serve as "a bridge between the diverse cultures and civilizations of the contemporary world." [1131] Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the way IR, and more specifically pluralism, relates to religion with a view to strengthening political independence and international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts.

Finally, in the last section of this conclusion, I explain that in the interest of peace and security pluralism should exchange its secularism for a 'post-secular' dialogue with religion.[1132] After all, secularism is not essential to the international pluralist architecture and it is unlikely that the 'rehabilitation' of religion would jeopardise the international order as proponents of the Westphalian mythology have it. On the contrary, I argue that a post-secular dialogue with religion can be integrated within the current ethics of statecraft to facilitate peaceful coexistence. Ultimately, the consequences of this transformation depend on the outcome of the post-secular dialogue.

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[1130] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* ; James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). Of course, solidarist dynamics are at play on a global scale. However, solidarism does not seem to question the secularist heritage embedded within pluralism. While the status quo is challenged and minority rights or inequalities are taken into consideration, solidarism fails to address the issue of religion. Hurrell, *On Global Order*, p.291.
[1131] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* pp.24-25.
[1132] Jürgen Habermas, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2008).

Throughout this thesis, I demonstrated that the process of secularisation and the rationalising forces of modernity resulted in (1) the decline of faith as a structuring mode of thought in favour of reason-based structures of consciousness, to (2) the shift in moral sources from God to Man, to (3) the shift in the legitimating principle of authority from supernatural to immanent and rational belief systems, to (4) the differentiation and separation of Church and State and the transfer of property and functions from the former to the latter. And more precisely, I argued that secularisation and the corresponding shifts in structures of consciousness, moral sources, and legitimate orders took place in three steps during the seminal periods of the 12th century Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment.

First of all, the medieval attempt to secure access to God and His design led to the rationalisation of theology and to the separation of grace and nature from the 12th century onwards. As a result, the differentiation of the sphere of politics from Christianity was established and the secular realm came to enjoy mounting prestige and influence in earthly affairs, at least intellectually. The socio-cultural context remained predominantly religious but gradually came to legitimise a more secular foundation for authority.

In turn, the 'moral field' or 'immanent frame' that emerged provided secular rulers with the means and tools for the usurpation of the Church's monopoly over the supernatural realm.[1133] The pope's Petrine powers and role as God's vicegerent on earth were transferred to secular rulers and both state and nation became the new rocks on which God's kingdom was to be built. With the 12th century Renaissance, but especially with the Protestant Reformation, the principles legitimating the authority of the Church came under challenge and were slowly replaced by new principles favourable to the empowerment of secular rulers. In this, Lutheranism played a significant role by lending legitimacy to kings and princes from within the 'sacred' core of Christianity. As such, "it is a mistake to imagine that modernity is in its origins and at its core atheistic, antireligious, or even agnostic…from the very beginning modernity sought not to eliminate religion but to support and develop a new view of religion and its place in human life."[1134] Indeed, the emergence of the contemporary secular foundation of politics was initially a religious project that was

[1133] Taylor, *A Secular Age*.
[1134] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.xii.

inspired, legitimised, and sacralised by religion, and was overall enabled by religious actors.

Secondly, secular forces began a process of modelling and translation of the Christian liturgy, eschatology, soteriology, and theology into political and immanent discourses and doctrines. As Leo Strauss puts it, the 'secularization' of theological concepts corresponded to "an adaptation of traditional theology to the intellectual climate produced by modern philosophy or science both natural and political."[1135] Whether one looks at the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, or Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one sees obvious similarities between their secular liturgies and the various Biblical myths and stories. This second step in the secularisation of Europe was marked by the development of a political liturgy and soteriology to replace that of the Church. The religious character of the new worship resulted from the transfer of all divine attributes from God to the secular world and was framed using very traditional forms of Christian devotion. The main difference was in their respective foundation, the ascending theme of government and immanence for the former, and the descending theme and transcendence for the latter. Also, it is as a consequence of this process of modelling and translation that the boundaries of the religious sphere were redrawn. Following the sacralisation of the political realm, religion was redefined, privatised, and rationalised.

Thirdly, unable to free themselves from their mythopoeic urge humans engaged in a 'god-building' enterprise and re-enchanted the world on a secular basis (i.e., Weber's notion of disenchantment).[1136] In the 17th and 18th centuries, the immanentisation of the Christian eschatology was radicalised. The material world became the arena in which redemption could be achieved and reason became the faculty through which justification could be realised. By striving tirelessly towards progress and civilisation, rational men could transcend all boundaries set by traditions, religion, and nature – including death – and achieve a state of eternal peace and harmony here on earth. The newly translated secular dogmas were ultimately emptied

[1135] "'Secularization is the 'temporalization' of the spiritual or of the eternal. It is the attempt to integrate the eternal into a temporal context. It therefore presupposes that the eternal is no longer understood as eternal. 'Secularization,' in other words, presupposes a radical change of thought, a transition of thought from one plane to an entirely different plane." Strauss, *Natural Right and History*, p.317.

[1136] As Gillespie argues, "the so-called process of disenchantment is thus also a process of re-enchantment in and through which both man and nature are infused with a number of attributes or powers previously ascribed to God." Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.274.

of their original sacred content, resulting in the establishment of a hollowed secular project. Being "composed out of rearranged fragments of religious discourse," modern politics thus corresponds to "a chapter in the history of religion."[1137] Contrary to the common wisdom, secularisation did not put an end to superstitions but enacted a "theological discourse in its own right."[1138] Overall, this means that the "supposedly 'secular' political theory is really theology in disguise," though of a secular type.[1139]

Generations of thinkers have argued that the function of religion has traditionally been to reconcile men with their fate and the unpredictable forces of nature. And thus, it is generally understood that religion is an illusion or an opiate which claims to fulfil human wishes and hopes according to revelation "while disregarding its relations to reality."[1140] However, these scholars were well aware that were religion to be rejected or displaced, a new system of meaning and teachings would soon emerge to fulfil the same psychological function. Hence, in light of the argument developed in this thesis, it could well be that following the collapse of the Christian order, secularism developed as a substitute to religion. And like its predecessor, secularism seems to be motivated by some form of wish-fulfilment at odds with the empirical evidence. In particular, the secularist attempt to bring about peace and security by excluding religion from international relations is essentially blind to its own religious nature and ignores the residual character of religion.

Now that the theological origins and character of the ideas, beliefs, and assumptions that have lain at the foundation of the so-called 'secular' project have been ascertained, it is necessary to consider the implications of the argument for the pluralist foundation of the international order. In the remainder of the conclusion, I answer the second research question and assess the adequacy and sustainability of the secularism of the current pluralist order. First of all, I outline the main secularist postulates as embedded in Jackson's account of pluralism and then I argue that they contradict the essence of the pluralist project. I argue that what is required is to reconsider the way IR relates to religion with a view to strengthening political independence and international freedom. Again, my focus on Jackson is solely motivated by the fact that his pluralist project embodies most explicitly and

[1137] Milbank, "Problematizing the Secular: The Post-Postmodern Agenda," p.37. John Gray, *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia* (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p.1.
[1138] Hurd, "The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations," p.236. Cavanaugh, "The Liturgies of Church and State," p.28.
[1139] Cavanaugh, *Theopolitical Imagination*, p.2.
[1140] Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, pp.54-55.

emblematically that set of secularist assumptions that has been taken for granted by most IR scholars. The specifics of his political project are not under discussion here. In the final section of this conclusion, I explain that in the interest of peace and security pluralism should exchange its secularism for the establishment of a 'post-secular' dialogue with religion. In particular, what is needed is the development of a post-secular 'common language' that could put an end to "the disastrously speechless collision of worlds" that characterised events such as 9/11.[1141] While this could be integrated to the current pluralist order, we should leave the door open to more fundamental transformations. The terms of the dialogue should not foreclose the outcome of the debate. Ultimately, the implications of this transformation for pluralism depend on the outcome of the post-secular dialogue.

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In *The Global Covenant*, Jackson explains that following the Thirty Years War, a secular pluralist order was established "to forestall hostilities and collisions between different political groups over issues of values."[1142] Because international relations could not "be constructed on muddle or confusion or misunderstanding or deep mistrust," statespeople were asked "to rise above their own particular civilizations or cultures."[1143] Accordingly, values that 'properly belonged' to the domestic jurisdiction of states were nationalised, privatised, and tamed and international arrangements were set up to allow states to pursue freely and independently their chosen goals without threatening the sovereignty or integrity of their neighbours. Because they had "no place in international society," political religions, political ideologies, and religious creeds were excluded from these international arrangements. In this regard, and despite the fact that sovereigns retained their religious commitments, Westphalia marked the secularisation of the international society of states.[1144]

In the 21st century, Jackson explains that 'however inadequate it may be' the secular pluralist political framework currently in place "is the one political-legal framework that can transcend all the manifold differences between the countries of the world, can accommodate their various belief systems and domestic ways of life,

[1141] Jürgen Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge," in *Speech delivered on 14 October 2001 upon reception of the Peace Price of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association at St. Paulskirche* (Frankfurt 2001).
[1142] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.182.
[1143] Ibid., p.15, 24.
[1144] Ibid., p.182.

and can serve as a normative basis for their coexistence and co-operation."[1145] By teaching virtues of tolerance and self-restraint in opposition to religion's history of persecution and struggles for moral superiority, state-based secular politics provides the only sustainable and viable source of order.[1146]

However, with the return of religion, a growing number of voices are rejecting this claim. In opposition to IR's assumptions, they denounce its secular character as a specifically Christian achievement and its imposition on the non-Western world as "an explicitly religious action as narrowly sectarian as anything attempted by its nonsecular opponents."[1147] Unaware of their own theoretical captivities, proponents of secularism defend an order whose historical foresight and nature are questionable. Far from having risen above civilisational parochialism, the contemporary foundation of international relations has a theological character and is creating frictions and tensions across boundaries (the European Union and Turkey, the USA and Iran, political Islam, the US attempt to impose a secular constitution to Iraq…).[1148] For a legal-political framework that prides itself with being able to "transcend all the manifold differences between the countries of the world" and that "can serve as a normative basis for their coexistence and co-operation" this is rather inopportune and most ironical.[1149]

The pluralist project is thus compromised by its own secularist heritage. But this does not have to be so. Despite their historical connections, pluralism and secularism are essentially separate and different. Effectively, the global covenant is not about secularism: "It is about freedom; it is about political independence. Freedom is not the same as [secularism]."[1150] While secularism may have been a source of freedom and independence against an all powerful Church in the 16th century, it has become a source of misunderstandings, inequalities, and disputes in the present context.[1151] Conversely, while religion has been a source of oppression in the past, it

[1145] Ibid., p.366.
[1146] Ibid., p.182, 366, 67.
[1147] Johnston, "Religion and Culture: Human Dimensions of Globalization," p.669. Lewis, *What Went Wrong?* , p.116. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*.
[1148] In particular, the theological roots and character of the contemporary order turn the conflict between the secular West's and different religions into Wars of Religion. Andrew Sullivan, "This Is a Religious War," *The New York Times*, October 7 2001.
[1149] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.366.
[1150] Ibid., p.410.
[1151] Alessandro Ferrara, "The Separation of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35, no. 1-2 (2009).

is not necessarily opposed to freedom.[1152] And in the 21st century, "[i]t would be dangerously myopic to focus one's attention on the danger that religion poses to the polity while ignoring the equal or greater danger posed by secular causes."[1153] As a consequence, if pluralism is to genuinely recognise the variety of moral universes and to foster unity in diversity, it must distance itself from its secularist history. In the name of pluralism, secularism is to be subordinated to international freedom. Moreover, like all fundamentalism, secular fundamentalism "is to be avoided and shunned in the conduct of foreign policy." [1154]

Therefore, what is required is to reconsider the way IR relates to religion as well as to secularism with a view to strengthening political independence and international freedom and to forestalling value conflicts. If pluralism wants to 'acknowledge' and 'accommodate' civilisational and cultural diversity around the world, it must renounce excluding religion from international dealings.[1155] After all, secularism is not essential to the international pluralist architecture. Rather, in light of secularism's theological character and for the sake of international freedom, a potential solution would be for pluralism to re-open itself to religion. Indeed, the failure of the modern attempt to exorcise religion from politics induces us to embrace consciously that feature of modernity that had been until then repressed and dismissed.

I believe that the 'rehabilitation' of religion is all the more justified by the fact that the current movement beyond secularism is opening the door to "an appreciation for the polymorphic quality of human experience from which religion can no longer be excluded."[1156] Because of the "rules and regulations imposed by the 'plausibility

[1152] Throughout history, religion has served as a potent source of resistance (anti-slavery, civil rights movement, etc.). But at a deeper level, religion has thoroughly influenced secular morality. Habermas rightly notes that "For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Universal egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love." Jürgen Habermas, "A Conversation About God and the World," in *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp.148-49.

[1153] Wolterstorff in Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p.80.

[1154] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.367.

[1155] Ibid., p.409. This does not mean that anything goes. Rather, it calls forth the development of new rules and norms for normative dialogue in the international sphere.

[1156] John D. Caputo and B. Keith Putt, "What Do I Love When I Love My God? An Interview with John D. Caputo," in *Religion with/out Religion: The Prayers and Tears of John D. Caputo*, ed. James H. Olthuis (London: Routledge, 2002), p.152. There exists three complementary sources of knowledge available to humans: the senses, reason, and intuition, with "each source of knowledge [disclosing] some aspect of the manifold reality." Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*, p.105. John Milbank concludes

structures' of secular modernity," the religious modality of experience was discarded – but not refuted.[1157] But in light of secularism's limits, we are led to go beyond the "illusion that there can be only one valid system of truth" and to establish a more integral approach to knowledge - thereby opening the door to the re-enchantment of the world and to a deeper level of experience.[1158]

As such, a possible solution would be to substitute the secular Westphalian language at the heart of pluralism with a post-secular normative dialogue between representatives of the competing worldviews. The institutional state-based framework within which norms are negotiated is not being questioned here. Rather, it is the secular common language in which claims and values are expressed and debated that is at stake. And I believe that it could be replaced by a post-secular dialogic search for truth that should be self-reflexive as well as cognitively and morally 'multi-lingual,' i.e., it should uphold the cohabitation of both secular and religious languages.[1159] This multi-lingual dialogue is beneficial to all since it truly shares the 'cognitive burden' associated with the communication and exchange of beliefs and values between diverse religious and non-religious groups. Based on a deep sensitivity to the complexity of religion and on a profound self-critical assessment of the limits of secular reason, post-secularism opens an epistemic universe in which all sources of knowledge can cohabit without jeopardising the commitments of any one believer, whether secularist or religious. Such a dialogue could be established at the diplomatic level and institutionalised within international organisations. After all, the European Union and the United Nations are already engaged in cooperation with religious groups and faith communities.

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that theology "no longer has to measure up to accepted secular standards of scientific truth or normative rationality…to a fixed notion of the knowing subject, which was usually the modern, as opposed to premodern, way of securing universal reason." John Milbank, "Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short *Summa* in Forty-Two Responses to Unasked Questions," in *The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader*, ed. Graham Ward (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p.265. James K. A. Smith, "Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology," (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 2004), p.74.

[1157] Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, p.683.

[1158] _____, *The Crisis of Our Age*, p.103. Philip Blond, "Theology before Philosophy," in *Post-Secular Philosophy, between Philosophy and Theology*, ed. Philip Blond (London: Routledge, 1997), p.23. Berman, *The Reenchantment of the World*. Alister E. McGrath, *The Re-Enchantment of Nature: Science, Religion and the Human Sense of Wonder* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003), p.188. James K. A. Smith, "Secularity, Globalization, and the Re-Enchantment of the World," in *After Modernity? Secularity, Globalization, and the Re-Enchantment of the World*, ed. James K. A. Smith (Waco: Baylor University Press 2008), p.11.

[1159] Daniel O. Conkle, "Secular Fundamentalism, Religious Fundamentalism, and the Search for Truth in Contemporary America," *Journal of Law and Religion* 12, no. 2 (1995).

Post-secularism should not be seen as a return to the religious intolerance of the Middle Ages. On the contrary, it frames interaction between believers and non-believers as a 'complementary learning process.' It requires all participants "to learn and understand the moral languages being used by others, and they themselves would need to communicate in moral languages other than their own."[1160] On the one hand, it requires non-believers to engage in "a self-critical assessment of the limits of secular reason" and "a self-reflexive overcoming of a rigid and exclusive secularist self-understanding of modernity."[1161] On the other, it requires believers to reflexively relate their beliefs to those of other groups and to accept the authority of the constitutional state.[1162] Ultimately, this does not necessarily threaten the prudential and procedural norms of the global covenant (non-intervention, state sovereignty, etc).[1163] Malaysia's attempt to integrate Islam to the modern nation-state shows that pluralism and religion can cohabit.

This call for the 'rehabilitation' of religion is bound to raise many academic eyebrows and to revive deep-seated fears. After all religion and faith have long been denigrated and criticised as pre-modern superstitions and dangerous fancies. Some will argue that this post-secular project marks the death of pluralism since it fails to divorce the "normative dialogue of world politics…from the values of particular civilizations."[1164] By bringing religion into the political arena, it legitimises all forms of parochialism and thus endangers the peace. However, my point is that secularism is itself a threat to pluralism and that one must agree to move towards post-secularism to restore political independence. Being commensurable with freedom and inextricably connected to modernity, religion must be rehabilitated in the society of states as part

[1160] Ibid.: p.364.
[1161] Jürgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," *European Journal of Philosophy* 14, no. 1 (2006): p.15. Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion*, p.138.
[1162] Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere," p.14. ———, "Notes on Post-Secular Society," p.27. For all its virtues, I believe that Habermas's proposal fails to provide a solution to the issues it claims to address. His notion of complementary learning process remains biased in favour of secularism and I believe that it can only fulfil its professed goal by becoming 'multi-lingual.' Cristina Lafont, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Remarks on Habermas's Conception of Public Deliberation in Postsecular Societies," *Constellations* 14, no. 2 (2007); Maeve Cooke, "Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas's Postmetaphysical Proposal," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 60, no. 1-3 (2006); Austin Harrington, "Habermas and the 'Post-Secular Society'," *European Journal of Social Theory* 10, no. 4 (2007).
[1163] Scott Thomas argues that "the resurgence of religion poses no inherent threat to order in international society. What threatens international order are regimes that deny political participation and global inequality." Thomas, "Religion and International Society," p.41.
[1164] Jackson, *The Global Covenant* p.1.

of a 'deeper pluralism.'[1165] Moreover, the reinstatement of faith at the heart of the international society of states is likely to strengthen a pluralist ethics through the humility and prudence it requires on the part of secularism. Indeed, the acceptance of the theological nature of the secular foundation of international politics requires secularists to realise that "they never really rose as high" above civilisational parochialism as they quite believed.[1166]

It is true that in most religious traditions there exist believers who reject the state as a satanic idol and earthly sovereignty as a sin against God and who consider it their duty "to wage a continual crusade by one means or another against the infidel states…The institutions of the infidels, being godless and illegitimate, have no right to respect. Their states are not entitled to independent existence."[1167] However, this over-publicised and mediatised fundamentalist vision of the world should not prevent the onset of dialogue with the large majority of believers. Indeed, believers the world over accept the pluralist architecture of the world. For example, writing before the revival of religion, Majid Khadduri noted that "[t]wentieth-century Islam found itself completely reconciled to the Western secular system."[1168] While fundamentalist views need to be expressed, they should only be heard to the extent that their proponents adopt a non-authoritarian approach and accept the rules of the game.[1169] At the end of the day, because they are only held by a small – though vocal – minority, these extremist views would influence the debates only marginally.[1170]

In the world of the 21st century, the recovery of the 'spiritual energy' that dwells at the heart of secularism is necessary since "[u]nless and until we understand the metaphysical, theological core of modernity, we will remain unable to understand religiously motivated antimodernism [sic] and our response to it."[1171] To avoid being "perceived as crusaders of a competing religion or as salespeople of instrumental

[1165] Audi and Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square*, pp.78-80. Thomas, "Taking Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously."
[1166] Freud, *Reflections on War and Death*, p.30.
[1167] Michael Donelan, *Elements of International Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), p.51, 52. For a Muslim version of this argument, see Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus: Dar al-Ilm, 2000).
[1168] Majid Khadduri, "The Islamic Theory of International Relations and Its Contemporary Relevance," in *Islam and International Relations*, ed. J. Harris Proctor (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p.35.
[1169] Maeve Cooke, "A Secular State for a Postsecular Society? Postmetaphysical Political Theory and the Place of Religion," *Constellations* 14, no. 2 (2007).
[1170] For an Islamic theory of International Relations, see AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, *Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations : New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought* (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993).
[1171] Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, p.xii.

reason and destructive secularization," the legitimacy of faith must be accepted.[1172] The much disputed boundaries between faith and reason, secular politics and religion, "should therefore be seen as a cooperative task which requires *both* sides to take on the perspective of the other one."[1173] On the road towards peace and concord amongst nations and between civilisations, the rehabilitation of religion within a post-secular pluralist framework is one of the most important steps to be taken.

[1172] Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature*, p.103.
[1173] Ibid., p.109.

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